DAISETZ T. SUZUKI AND PAUL J. TILLICH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THEIR THOUGHTS ON ETHICS IN RELATION TO BEING

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TO MY WIFE AND MOTHER

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

The purpose of this thesis is to explore and compare Daisetz Suzuki's and Paul Tillich's ontological ethics. It is important to undertake such a study especially in the light of the East-West dialogue and of the basic problems of ethics in Christian Churches.

The first chapter, as the introduction to this thesis, is devoted to the significance of the East-West dialogue and of ontological ethics. The second chapter explores Suzuki's Busshō ethics. It is rooted in being, in the isness of things. In order to bring out the difference between Suzuki and the Christian view, Tillich's theonomous ethics is examined in the third chapter. Like Suzuki, theonomous ethics has also its foundation in the basic structure of being.

Tillich's ontological principle "participation," however, is different from Suzuki's "identity." This is the basic difference from which Tillich's and Suzuki's ethical consequences are derived. In the fourth chapter, the comparison is made under nine major headings:

1) Both Tillich's theonomous ethics and Suzuki's Busshō ethics are based on an ontological foundation.

2) Tillich's system of theonomous ethics develops out of his ontological principle "participation," while Suzuki's system of Busshō ethics comes from his different

ontological principle of "identity."

3) In accordance with the two different ontological principles "participation" and "identity," Tillich's substantial individuality and Suzuki's anātman, "non-ego," are diametrically opposed to each other.

4) Also, Tillich's and Suzuki's ontological approaches to reality are different. For Tillich, reality has its dualistic aspect, that is, the essential created goodness and the actual distortion of existence, while for Suzuki reality has the logic of self-identity. Tillich divides reality as essence and existence, and Suzuki identifies existence with essence. Consequently, existence including nature, for Tillich, is an estrangement and a "fall" from essence. Suzuki, however, asserts that existence works perfectly and is not estranged from essence. Men who are not enlightened, however, are ignorant of this fact.

5) The Ultimate in Tillich is symbolized in personal categories, i. e., "Personal God" who is the ground of everything personal and reigns over men with love and justice. This is why God forgives, demands, and leads men to convert. The Ultimate in Suzuki, however, is stated in an impersonal category: the "all-inclusive Buddha-nature" which is the blessed oneness of everything in the ultimate ground of being. The Buddha-nature neither forgives nor demands nor makes men convert.

6) In accordance with their different ontological

attitudes toward existence, Tillich's agāpe implies transformation, the movement from the highest to lowest, and "in-spite-of" acceptance of the unacceptable, while Suzuki's mahākarunā is non-transformative, totalistic, and implies acceptance "just-because-of."

7) Tillich wrestles seriously with the ethical problems within the total context of estranged existence, while Suzuki has comparatively little to state about the concrete problems of ethical decisions at the level of the existential situation.

8) For Tillich, "Jesus as the Christ" is power in the fulfillment of time, "kairos," in which the power of the Kingdom of God in history may be seen. In order to overcome the existential distortion and ambiguities the Kingdom of God is fighting in history everywhere. In Suzuki, Zen is radically non-historical.

9) Finally, "Jesus as the Christ" is the final revelation, and the focus of all philosophies and religions. Here Tillich's claim of "Jesus as the Christ" turns upon its uniqueness. However, for Suzuki, all beings are the Buddha-nature. This means that Zen is the ultimate fact of all philosophies and religions. Here Suzuki's claim of the Buddha-nature is universality.

These nine headings show that Tillich and Suzuki, though both are based on a same ontological foundation, represent two diverse ways of viewing ethics. The contrast is located fundamentally in their respective interpretations of being. The alternative must be with full recognition of all its implications.

PREFACE

The purpose of this thesis is to explore and compare Daisetz Suzuki's and Paul Tillich's ontological ethics, that is to say, the grounding of their ethics in their respective concepts of being. It is important to undertake such a study in the light of (1) the East-West dialogue, (2) the Christian mission to the Oriental soil, and (3) the basic problems of ethics in Christian Churches.

First, especially within the past few years, there has been taking place a remarkable resurgence of interest in the interfaith dialogue of Eastern Buddhism and Western Christianity, and such dialogue has been widely recognized, particularly in contemporary theology and philosophy since Tillich's visit to Japan in 1960. We are informed that the Buddhist should seek as correct an understanding of Christianity as possible, and also Christian misunderstanding of Buddhism should be corrected. Most of the objections raised by each tradition against the other seem to be based upon incomplete comprehension of the nature of their respective philosophies. Overcoming the resultant misconceptions is imperative if we are to progress toward mutual understanding.

Second, any one in Asia who is engaged in missionary work of a serious character must take cognizance of this fact. Here we should seek to relate the gospel to the contemporary Buddhist situation in the Oriental societies. When nowadays we are really concerned with evangelism, we should engage in dialogue with Buddhists. Before we dialogue, we should know what are the roots of the dialogue in the situation today. The thesis will be undertaken in the hope that an academic statement of the Buddhist and Christian conceptions of ethics in relation to being are not entirely unrelated to the needs of the contemporary scene. In this respect, from the viewpoint of Christian mission to the Oriental soil, it is necessary to study what is the relationship between Buddhism and Christianity.

Third, there are serious ethical problems especially in the Eastern Christian Churches. That is to say, these problems are their fundamental attitudes toward ethics, primarily toward the relationship between ethics and being. The Eastern Christian life is mostly Puritanic and Confucianic, that is, ascetic, legalistic, graceless. For this reason, the aim of this thesis is to make clear what is the basic structure of ethics, including its function. As stated before, ethics should be related to being, because ethics itself is involved in our essential nature. It is that critical problem of how being evokes and gives shape to ethics, individually or socially, and, more than that, how being in turn is shaped by our moral comportment towards it. Tillich's ontological idea of Christian ethics and Suzuki's theory of identity formation in his Busshō ethics are proposed here as models for understanding those dynamics of interaction between being and ethics more clearly.

There is hardly any need to justify the choice of Daisetz Suzuki, who is an outstanding authority on Buddhist philosophy, and Paul Tillich, one of the greatest Christian theologians, especially since the comparison focuses on a particular idea which has a crucial place in both.

In this respect, the present writer asserts, first of all, the significance of the dialogue of East-and-West and of ontological ethics as an introduction to the comparative study of Suzuki's Eastern Buddhist ethics and Tillich's Western Christian ethics in the first chapter. In the second chapter, the Busshō ethics of Suzuki is examined. First, in examining Suzuki's ethics, the present writer intends to make clear his basic thoughts underlying Zen Buddhist ethics. This is very important for understanding Suzuki's ethics. Second, his Busshō ethics is examined ontologically. Like Tillich's theonomous ethics, it is definitely based on an ontological foundation. That is, Busshō ethics is what a thing is genuinely in its isness, but is neither moral nor immoral. The third chapter treats the theonomous ethics of Paul Tillich. First of all, I intend to clear up the ontological foundations of theonomous ethics in Tillich after a prefatory inquiry into his idea of ontology. Second, Tillich's idea of the basic relation between morality and religion is discussed. Here the religious principles of moral actions are searched for, and an attempt is made to show that the religious principles dwell within the principles of moral action. If morality is intrinsically religious, as religion is intrinsically ethical, neither is dependent on the other, and neither can be substituted for the other. Third, Tillich's ontological approach to existence is treated. His understanding of existence is the foundation on which his theonomous ethics is built up. Fourth, the ethical concepts are examined. Here the ontological meanings and their significance for the ethical concepts are explicated in order to lay the ground work for his ethical thought.

Finally, in the fourth chapter the comparative study of Suzuki's *Busshō* ethics and Tillich's theonomous ethics is undertaken. This study has two parts. First of all, their ontological approaches to ethics in their similarity are compared. In their basic differences, two different ontological presuppositions "identity" and "participation," and two different approaches to existence, are discussed. These are the most important and basic distinctions between Suzuki and Tillich from the ethical point of view. In addition, difference between substantial individuality and *anātman*; between *agāpe* and *mahākarunā*; between Zennist life of *anabhogākarya* and Christian life of social justice; between "personal" and "impersonal"; between "historical" and "non-historical"; finally, between the uniqueness of "Jesus as the Christ" and the universality of the Buddha-nature are discussed.

These chapters, as stated before, are then given to important meeting points of Suzuki's Busshō ethics and Tillich's theonomous ethics, and to the major contemporary problems of Christian ethics especially in the Eastern countries. By such both ethics as analysed from the ontological point of view, the ethical problem besetting the modern Protestant Churches in Asia might be resolved.

In this study the present writer has received assistance and encouragement from many sources. Librarians of Pacific School of Religion(Berkeley, California), of the Graduate Theological Union(Berkeley, California), and of the University of California(Berkeley, California), have made their documents and books available. The present writer is grateful to his committee chairman Dr. A. Durwood Foster of Pacific School of Religion for his consenting to be my permanent chairman and his constant guidance, suggestions, and direction of the thesis. Also, I offer my gratitude to other committee members, namely, Dr. Conrad Bonifazi of Pacific School of Religion for his valuable suggestions; Dr. Kenan Osborne of Franciscan School of Theology(Berkeley, California) for his reading my thesis, especially its part of **Tillich's theonomous** ethics and for his materials on Tillich; Dr. John C. Bennett of Pacific School of Religion for his valuable guidance; Dr. David McBriar of Franciscan School of Theology for his reading the part of the Zen Buddhist ethics of Suzuki. Finally, the present writer cannot forget the important scholarship assistance of the following: the Graduate Theological Union, the Pacific School of Religion, and the Sycamore Congregational Church, El Cerrito, California.

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CHAPTER I

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EAST-WEST DIALOGUE AND OF ONTOLOGICAL ETHICS

The Significance of the East-West Dialogue

> "East is east, and west is west, and never the twain shall meet," so writes the English poet, Rudyard Kipling. Is that true? Are the thought worlds of East and West so different and incomparable that they can never meet and therefore at bottom never understand each other?[1]

This is Rudolf Otto's introductory interrogative statement which was put at the very beginning of his highly esteemed work Mysticism: East and West. As Otto questioned, are there really no dialogues between East and West, especially philosophically? Are there no possibilities of interpenetration between them? Needless to say, there are, and also there should be, dialogues between East and West. The human being itself has something which rises from the very depths of its spirit. Also, we seriously experience it at any time and at any place. It is an intrinsic nature of our human being which was given by God. This sort of a spiritual experience is the same in all ages and in all places. Timeless and independent of history, it has always been identical.[2] At this point, East and West and other differences vanish. All forms could always be exchanged one for the other. For one and the same experience speaks here, only by chance in varying dialects. Therefore, as

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[1] Translated by Bertha L. Bracey and Richenda C. Payne (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 13.

[2] Ibid.

Otto states, "East is West and West is East."[1] Indeed, there are strong impulses working in the human soul which as such are completely unaffected by differences of climate, of geographical position or of race. These show in their similarity an inner relationship of types of human experience and spiritual life which is truly astonishing.

In this respect, man's basic needs are fundamentally the same although they find radically different ways of coming to expression, both because of the suppleness of human nature and because of the diversities of geographical and cultural conditioning factors. The term "needs" here, however, is not to be confused with the term "wants." Because the term "needs," as Floyd Ross states, means the need for self-transcendence. Ross says:

> By basic needs I refer to the need for orientation or a frame or reference, for self-worth, self-transcendence...The religions of mankind arise out of man's deeply felt need for self-transcendence, wholeness, reconciliation, expressed variously as the need for the beatific vision, for communion with God, moksa, nirvana, blessedness, though all religions seek to point beyond themselves to some transcendent dimension of meaning, power, or grace.[2]

For this reason, Daniel D. Williams says that one of the major issues which "may well dominate much of theological thought as we move into the second half of the twentieth century" is the relation of Christianity to culture and other religions.[1] Indeed, all mankind faces a global age. Needless to say, this does not simply mean that whole world is now totally covered and integrated by the rapidly advancing universality of technology. As a real basis of the global age a new spiritual horizon, as Masao Abe points out, is needed which can open up the innermost depth of human religiosity and on which all nations can display their spiritual and cultural creativity without being dehumanized by the world's sociological complexity or by technological conformity.[2] In this respect, the great issue of the hour is not Christian ecumenism but human ecumenism.[3] Indeed, the Christian mission today involves bearing witness to a profound search for living truth which can never be confined within any language, theological or nontheological, Christian or non-Christian.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Floyd H. Ross, "The Christian Mission in Larger Dimension," The Theology of the Christian Mission, ed. by Gerald H. Anderson(Nashville and New York: Abingdon Press, 1961), p. 215.

There is, however, surprisingly little creative theological endeavor available for guidance. No part of Christendom, as Wilhelm Pauck points out, has evinced major theological responsibility and creativeness in connection with evangelistic endeavors. Christian theological endeavor has been more concerned with introspection, with intra-Christian relations, than with the interrelation of Christianity and other faiths.[1] In this respect, Wilfred C. Smith says that the Christian community is at the moment theologically unequipped for living in the twentieth century, with its pluralistic mankind. In other words, especially in its later history, Christendom had become a isolated enclave of humanity. The form of Church life, and the presuppositions of Christian thought, were all shaped by the experiences of this self-enclosed existence.[2] We live, however, in one world in which the competing faiths, no longer separated and insulated by distance, jostle one another in every city and even in the minds of ordinary Christians. Today, the question of the theology of the Christian mission is a question that knocks at the door of every congregation.

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[1] Daniel D. Williams, What Present-Day Theologians are Thinking(New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1952), p. 11.

[2] Masao Abe, "Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions," The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, Vol. I, No. 1(Kyoto: The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1965), p. 109.

[3] Ross, "The Christian Mission in Larger Dimension," op. cit., p. 214.

In this respect, the fundamental task of the Christian mission today is to clarify the nature and meaning of its being. This must be done in the realm of theological thought, not only to increase effectiveness in presenting the gospel to the world, but also to give Christians a deeper understanding of what their task is in the world. That is why the report Rethinking Missions came into existence. Gerald H. Anderson summarizes it as follows:

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[1] Gerald H. Anderson, "The Theology of Mission among Protestants in the Twentieth Century," The Theology of the Christian Mission, p. 3.

[2] Lesslie Newbigin, "Foreword," The Theology of the Christian Mission, p. xi.

> This valuable Report suggested that the aim of missions is "to seek with people of other lands a true knowledge and love of God, expressing in life and word what we have learned through Jesus Christ"; that "the Christian will regard himself as a co-worker with the forces which are making for righteousness within every religious system"; that "the relation between religions must take increasingly hereafter the form of a common search for truth"; and that the missionary "will look forward, not to the destruction of these(non-Christian) religions, but to their continued co-existence with Christianity, each stimulating the other in growth toward the ultimate goal, unity in the completest religious truth."[1]

When we ask what is the proper Christian view of other religions, relative to interpenetration, we have a number of approaches to other faiths. L. Harold De Wolf classifies them as four: A Total Rejection, A Relativistic Syncretism, Discontinuity, and Fulfillment.[2] First of all, the Christian attitude of "total rejection" has been done for the purpose of radical displacement. This proposal is exemplified by most of the earlier Protestant missionaries. They regard non-Christian religions as simply false and wholly evil. Also, they thought that Hindus, Buddhists, and Moslems alike were in bondage to Satan and could escape the wrath of God only by repenting of their heathen practices in toto and accepting Christ.[3] However, few missionaries today, except some from the extreme Fundamentalist sects, would subscribe to so simple and extreme a view.

Secondly, according to the attitude of a "relativistic

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[1] Anderson, "The Theology of Mission among Protestants in the Twentieth Century," op. cit., p. 9.

[2] Harold DeWolf, "The Interpenetration of Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions," The Theology of the Christian Mission, pp. 206-209.

[3] Ibid., p. 206.

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syncretism," all religions were paths to the same reality. No one path would be entitled to universal preference, since different paths may be better for different personal temperaments and social traditions.[1] Such a view is represented by a certain type of mysticism, by the Ramakrishna Society, and to some extent by William E. Hocking. In fact, the controversy of the problem of interfaith relations was greatly exacerbated by Professor Hocking of Harvard. Christian missions, according to him, should give up any attempt to exterminate native religions; rather, they should cooperate with them for the weal of the native people. This attitude is technically called the "inter-religious cooperation theory."[2] Hocking, however, remained unsatisfied with this and later he contended that now that the oneness of the world had become reality there was no reason that religions should conflict with each other; rather, they should be synthesized into one great world religion in which all men might believe.[3] However, this idea of creating a great synthetic world religion is now discredited by the Protestant theologians like Karl Barth, Paul Tillich, and Hendrik Kraemer. Barthian theology asserts that syncretism jeopardized the very basis of the Christian mission. It protests that religions are human efforts "from below" while the gospel is divine revelation "from above." On this presupposition

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 207.

[2] Masatoshi Doi, "On Interfaith Cooperation," *op. cit*., p. 29.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 28.

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Barth insists that Christ is the crisis of all religions and that all religions are fundamentally "unbelief" because they do not accept the revelation. Also, for him "religion is a concern, indeed, we must say that it is the one great concern, of godless man."[1] Further, religion is the gravest temptation of all, in the judgment of the gospel, because it tempts man to self-justification and self-righteousness by believing and doing "religious things." The irreconciliability of non-Christian religions and the gospel is, in this view, far more radical than the disagreements exposed through comparison would indicate.[2] For this reason, for Barth the revelation of God in Christ spells the annulment of all religions.

Tillich also criticizes syncretism. He states that Christian mission is not an attempt to unite the different religions. If this were the function of missions, a uniting point, or center, would have to exist. Then, however, this uniting center would be the center of history, and the Christ would become "decentralized." He would no longer be the center; but the center would be that which is above him and also above Buddha, Mohammed, and Confucius.[3]

Further, syncretism as a theological problem concerns not only missions but all serious theological thinking in this time of increasing contact among the great religions. In fact, it is one of the most universal theological problems in which is implied the understanding of truth, its authenticity and the source of its authority. Syncretism also comes from the absence of the sense of ultimacy. This is characteristic of Japanese religions. In Japan syncretism also means man's split adherence to two or more religions. It is interesting to know that in 1957, against a total population of 90 million, the total number of adherents reported by all religious organizations amounted to 123 million. Since the total number of those who had no religions at all was estimated at 24 million, this means roughly that each Japanese believed in two religions at a time.[1]

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[1] Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, Vol. I/2, ed. by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1957), pp. 299-300.

[2] J. Robert Nelson, "Christian Theology and the Living Faiths of Men," Christian Mission in Theological Perspective, ed. by Gerald H. Anderson(Nashville and New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 120.

[3] Paul Tillich, "Missions and World History," The Theology of the Christian Mission, p. 284.

At any rate, to approach the dialogue between the religions with open minds is not to succumb either to syncretism or to indifference. No Christian is asked to be untrue to his confession of faith and each participant must respect the right of the other to be true to his own integrity. If the conversations are approached with mutual respect and seriousness by all parties concerned, the circle of one's own faith may be deepened as well as broadened.[2]

Thirdly, there is an attitude of discontinuity. In line with Barth, Kraemer championed the movement to re-establish a theological basis for the Christian mission. Like Barth, early Kraemer insists upon "discontinuity" between the gospel and religions and contends that religions are "the misdirected expressions of human aspiration." He "far too one-sidedly characterized the religions as human performances and achievements, good or bad, and dealt with them too unilaterally as purely human products."[1] The world of religions belongs to the realm of the old man, the unredeemed man, not yet re-created into the Image of God in whose likeness man was originally created. Later Kraemer, however, issues a warning to Christians that "it is in direct antagonism to the rudiments of essential Christianity" to have a superiority-feeling over other religions. Kraemer further urges that Christians should enter into conversation with the people of other religions "in due fairness and openness."[2] That is, for him Christian religion must be viewed in its finiteness and weakness, and stands under judgment as do the non-Christian religions. It is quite otherwise with the Christian revelation. Like non-Christian religion, even "empirical Christianity" has stood and stands under the continuous and direct influence and judgment of the revelation of Christ and is in virtue thereof in a different position from the other religions.[3]

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[1] Masatoshi Doi, "The Nature of Encounter between Christianity and Other Religions as Witnessed on the Japanese Scene," The Theology of the Christian Mission, p. 170.

[2] Ross, "The Christian Mission in Larger Dimension," op. cit., p. 216.

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[1] Hendrik Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957), p. 316.

[2] Doi, "On Interfaith Cooperation," op. cit., p. 29.

[3] Kraemer, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World, op. cit., p. 145.

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He maintains, therefore, that for the Church to cooperate with the non-Christian religions, or to engage in exchanges of views in search for further truth, would be simply a betrayal of the Word of Christ. Yet he strongly holds to the conviction that Jesus Christ is the criterion of all religions.[1] All non-Christian religions are based solely on human effort and wisdom--often admirable--but never on revelation of Christ. The Christian revelation is absolute, incomparable and *sui generis*.[2] Yet Kraemer assumes that he knows his revelation. But does not his interpretation of the revelation and its requirement of us constitute a part of religion, if not the religion of the Church, then at least the religion of Hendrik Kraemer? On what ground does Kraemer's understanding of the Word escape the relativism of all religion? If his understanding of the Word is, even in some respects, human and relative, then why should we accept this part of it, namely the doctrine of discontinuity, without the proofs required of any other human idea which claims identity with divine truth?[3] This is why the present writer questions whether Kraemer's idea of absolute discontinuity between the gospel and other religions is an inevitable consequence of the biblical revelation.

In this respect, the present writer asserts that "the fulfillment theory" is a milder expression of the Christian superiority-feeling over other faiths. This theory maintains that Christianity fulfills the truth which is fragmentarily expressed in other religions. Consequently, mission is by no means one-sided. There is also mission to the Christians by those non-Christians to whom Christian missions are addressed. What Christian missions have to offer is not Christianity but the message of Jesus as the Christ, of the New Being.[1] Like every historical religion, Christianity is a synthesis of many elements from Judaism, the mystery religions, Hellenistic ideas, and so forth. It is the message about Jesus as the center of history which day by day, is confirmed by missions. History is running toward the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God is the symbol of fulfillment, unification, and purification of history. Fulfillment transcends history, but it is reached through history.[2] The Christian interpretation of history is that the moment in which the meaning of history becomes fully manifest is to be called the center of history, that this center is the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. In this center the contradictions of historical existence are overcome, in "beginning and power."[3] From this fundamental statement issues directly the meaning of missions. Also, the goal of missions is the mediation of a reality which is the criterion for all human history. This criterion not only stands critically against paganism, Judaism, and humanism wherever it may be, but it also stands critically against Christianity. All mankind stands under the judgment of the New Being in Christ.[1]

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[1] Doi, "On Interfaith Cooperation," *op. cit.*, p. 29.

[2] DeWolf, "The Interpenetration of Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions," *op. cit.*, p. 207.

[3] *Ibid.*

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[1] Tillich, "Missions and World History," op. cit., p. 288

[2] Ibid., p. 282.

[3] Ibid., p. 283.

In this respect, as the center of history the Christ is the uniting point in which all religions can be united after they have been subjected to the criticism of the power of the New Being. For this reason, we must say that mission is neither the attempt to save individual souls, nor an attempt at cultural cross-fertilization, nor an attempt to unite the world religions. Rather, it, according to Tillich, is the attempt to transform the latent Church--which is present in the world religions--into something new: the New Reality in Jesus as the Christ. Transformation is the meaning of missions.[2] The process of transformation is always going on; it is going on both within and outside the Christian nations and cultures. The claim of the Church is that Jesus as the Christ is the bringer of the New Reality for mankind all over the world. And that is what mission does. He who brings the New Being is not a relative figure but an absolute figure of an all-embracing character. The New Being is one, as being-itself is one.[3] Thus, all religions, faiths, philosophies, are reformed and fulfilled by the New Being, the New Reality, in the Christ.

Every historical religion is a synthesis of different elements from different cultures and religions as far as its historical expression is concerned. Christianity is no exception. In this respect, we have to take into consideration that there is some element of continuity between Christianity and other religions and cultures, although it is also true that there can be no conversion from one religion to the other unless there is some element of discontinuity between them. For this reason, the central core of the religious experience, which is involved in the encounter between Christianity and other religions, is the existential commitment of a person, who has been brought up in a definite religious tradition, to God who revealed Himself in a historical event as the ultimately meaningful reality. This encounter is to be understood in terms of correlation between the ultimately meaningful event and the experiencing subject who accepts this event as ultimately meaningful.[1] Where either pole of this correlation is lacking there can be no real encounter. No historical event can be ultimately meaningful unless there is an experiencing subject who accepts it as ultimately meaningful. And no experiencing subject can produce the ultimately meaningful event. Only what is ultimately meaningful can produce the consciousness of what is ultimately meaningful.[2]

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[1] Ibid., p. 288.
[2] Ibid., p. 284.
[3] Ibid., p. 285.

The perennial debate on the continuity or discontinuity

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[1] Doi, "The Nature of Encounter between Christianity and Other Religions as Witnessed on the Japanese Scene," *op. cit*., p. 172.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 175.

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of the gospel and the religions of the world has been marked by an antiphony of "yes" and "no" choruses. Perhaps this has been so for no more reason than that theologians usually disagree; for the "yes" and the "no" are inherent in the nature of the gospel itself.[1] H. H. Farmer, as J. Robert Nelson states, finds the theologically and philosophically satisfying middle way between syncretism and absolutism by holding that the Christian revelation and faith are at once different in degree and different in kind from other religions. Farmer says: "Difference of degree, when it reaches a certain point, may become a difference in kind without ceasing to be a difference in degree."[2] In other words, while Christianity remains in the category of religion, it is also the given normative concept of religion itself. Professor Pierce Beaver of Chicago expressed the moderate view that in view of the increasing freedom of choice among religions, religions should converse with each other more openly without excluding the possibility of conversions.[3] This is the most reasonable conclusion from the fact that faith as an existential commitment to what is ultimately meaningful involves in itself the sense of mission to communicate the ultimate truth to the other.

In this respect, religion combines uniqueness and universal validity as its polar elements. Therefore, if one pole is emphasized at the sacrifice of the other, it becomes unhealthy. Faith, in Tillich's terms, is the state of being ultimately concerned with what is ultimately meaningful. And since there can be only one thing which is ultimately meaningful for a certain individual, faith is something which is extremely existential and unique. But faith cannot appeal to other persons unless it has some element of universality, however meaningful it may be to a certain individual. In Shintoism, however, this element of universal validity is so small that it cannot develop into a universal religion unless it undergoes a radical change.[1] The Christian faith is extremely existential and unique in the sense that it believes that in Jesus Christ the redemptive love of God was revealed "once for all." But at the same time it asserts that that which appeared in Jesus Christ is the ultimate meaning of all existence, namely, the eternal Logos. Zen Buddhism is essentially a philosophical religion. However, in it what is supremely important is the eternal law or Dharma, not the historical person called Shakyamuni. It seems to be lacking in existential tension.[2]

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[1] Nelson, "Christian Theology and the Living Faiths of Men," p. 123.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] Doi, "On Interfaith Cooperation," p. 30.

Also, existential commitment to the ultimately meaningful reality is the nucleus of a religious existence out of which religious energy flows. In this respect, it must be respected in all religions. But at the same time we must not forget that our understanding of the ultimately

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., pp. 30-31.

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meaningful reality is subjectively conditioned and accordingly relative. It cannot exclude the possibility that other persons may understand the ultimately meaningful reality in different ways. True religion has in itself no room for self-absolutization. Lonely aloofness in dogmatic absolutism by no means proves the strength of faith; it rather betrays its weakness. Protestantism has its most intimate relation with other religions. Christianity is not based on a simple negation of the religions or quasi-religions it encounters.[1] The relationship between Christianity and other religions is profoundly dialectical, and that is not a weakness, but the greatness of Christianity, in its self-critical, Protestant form.[2]

For this reason, the dialogue of East and West is something to be created through adventures and risks, all participants groping for possibilities and limits through mutual conversations and joint works on the basis of their own faiths. No substantial cooperation can take place in some neutral zone where the participants are obliged to set aside their own convictions.[3]

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[1] Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions(New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1963), p. 51.

[2] Ibid. [3] Doi, "On Interfaith Cooperation," p. 32.

The Significance of Ontological Ethics

In this thesis, the East-West dialogue is explored by understanding and comparing both Suzuki's and Tillich's ethics. Indeed, their ontological ethics are significant especially in the legalistic situation of the Christian life in Asia. Strictly speaking, there are some serious problems in the Christian churches, both Catholic and Protestant, and most conspicuously in Protestantism. Bacially they can be reduced to the fundamental attitude toward ethics, primarily the relationship between ethics and being. In other words, the ground of ethics in the Christian churches demands clarification before we Christians criticize the corruption of morality and the loss of ethics in this particular age.

Such a serious problem of the Christian churches appears particularly in the state of their preaching and teaching. "Gospel, the message of reconciliation and reunion with God as the Ground and Aim of our being," as Tillich points out, "has been transformed into a multiplicity of laws, partly doctrinal and partly ethical."[1] Needless to say, we also must criticize the partly magical, partly relativistic, partly moralistic distortion of the idea of ethics in the churches. Such an ethical situation has been occurring frequently in the modern Christian churches especially in the East. The Christian life in the East is mostly Puritanic and Confucianic, in other words, ascetic, legalistic. It is not related to man's being. Generally, when we Oriental Christians say "the Christian life" we mean that it is concerned with the Churchly disciplines and training. In Korea we see in many Christian Churches the toiling of people who are trying to keep a number of Churchly disciplines, and they are called "serious," "good Christians." Many Asian Christians, however, are discontented with such a Christian Church situation. They are searching for a "change" or "renewal" or "reformation" of their present Church conditions.[1]

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[1] Tillich, Morality and Beyond (New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1963), p. 13.

Such an understanding of ethics was due to the theology of Calvin. He was very much influential upon the Oriental Christian through the first Western Protestant missionaries. The first Japanese to be converted, for example, were sons and daughters of the samurai class who had been brought up in the Confucian tradition. Accordingly, what appealed to them most strongly was the Puritan ethics introduced by the missionaries, for there are similarities between Calvin and Confucius from the point of ethics. The first Japanese Christians felt that Christianity would give the nation power to fulfil the Confucian moral code. For the Confucian morality, because of its feudalistic and legalistic character, could not do justice to the subjective and creative aspect of moral life.[1] Unlike Luther, Calvin established his own ethical idea independent of being, that is, of the essence of human being. For him the Christian ethics is something external, that is, to obey to the law, to keep the rules of Church, State, not the inner relationship of man to his essence. He is nearer to a moral interpretation of Christianity than to a strictly religious interpretation of Christianity. With respect to the Christian life he cannot share Luther's joyfulness which the mind experiences since Christian commitment should rather signify an ardent desire and endeavor to live a holy and pious life.[2] For Luther the new life is a joyful reunion with God, for Calvin it is the attempt to fulfil the law of God in the life of Christians.[3] Also, for Calvin the summary of the Christian life is self-denial and not love. By self-denial he understands dedication to the glory of God or doing all things to please God.[4] It, however, is departing from ourselves. Luther's fragmentary up and down, ecstasy and despair, is not what describes the Christian life in Calvin. The Christian life, according to Calvin, is a line upwards, exercised in methodical stages.

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[1] For further discussion of this situation, see The Northeast Asia Journal of Theology, Vol. I(Tokyo: N. C. C., 1968), pp. 89-102.

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[1] Doi, "The Nature of Encounter between Christianity and Other Religions as Witnessed on the Japanese Scene," p. 171.

[2] Tillich, A History of Christian Thought, ed. by Carl Bratten(New York and Evanston: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 270.

[3] Ibid.

[4] John Calvin, The Institute of the Christian Religion, III, ed. by John T. McNeill, and tr. by Ford Lewis Battles (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1960), p. 7.

Through the idea of self-denial, Calvin's asceticism begins to be realized. His asceticism, however, was not the Roman asceticism, to deny life itself, to deny the body in special activities of an ascetic character. Because for Calvin the world is a place of exile, the body is a valueless prison of the soul. Calvin's asceticism is a so-called "inner-worldly one,"[1] an asceticism which has two characteristics: cleanliness, in terms of sobriety, chastity, temperance--subordinated to the concept "clean." This has tremendous consequences in the whole life of the nations which were Calvinistic: an extreme external cleanliness, an identification of the erotic element with the unclean. In this respect, for Calvin the radical restriction of sex and the restraint from many other potentialities of created goodness brought this kind of disciplinary asceticism.[2] The very word "saintly," implying no drinking or dancing, became first moralistically empty and then ridiculous. Therefore, it is the merit of the psychotherapeutic movement since Freud that it helped the

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[1] According to Tillich, Marx Weber and Ernst Troeltsch have called Calvin's ethics an inner-worldly asceticism(A History of Christian Thought, pp. 270-271.).

[2] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 211.

Churches get rid of this distorted image of saintliness. Thus, for Calvin saintliness has often been identified with, and has always been made partly dependent on, asceticism. Beyond asceticism, it, however, is the transparency of the divine ground of being in a person which makes him a saint. Saintliness in the sense of being, as Tillich points out, open to the Spiritual Presence.[1] The term "saint" has the same kind of paradoxical implications, when applied to the individual Christian, as the term "holiness" has when applied to the Church. Both are holy because of the holiness of their function, the New Being in the Christ. This paradoxical meaning of saintliness was lost when the early Church attributed a special saintliness to the ascetics and the martyrs. But the idea was not that the saint represented moral superiority over the others; his saintliness was his transparency to the divine. This transparency expressed itself not only in his words and his personal excellence but also in his power over nature and man, not in a moral, but in a spiritual sense. Saintliness is transmoral in essence.[2] Also, fear of the demonic permeates Calvin's doctrine of the divine holiness. An almost neurotic concern about the clean develops in later Calvinism. The word "Puritan" is most of what holiness comes to mean. This means the end of the numinous character of the holy. The _tremendum_ becomes fear of the law and of judgment;

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[1] _Ibid_., pp. 210-211. [2] _Ibid_., p. 237.

the fascinosum becomes pride of self-control and repression. Many theological problems and many psychotherapeutic phenomena are rooted in the ambiguity of the contrast between the holy and the unclean.[1] The Protestant, however, is holy not because he symbolizes a form of grace but rather because he has received the forgiveness of sins. He is holy in his unholiness. Here the application of the concept of holiness necessarily involves a paradox, and hence it can never result in a form or Gestalt.[2]

Thus, in Calvin it has strong moral connotations rather than ontological ones. It presupposes the fallen state of reality and the will to resist the temptation coming from many things which in themselves are not bad. In this respect, for Calvin no humanity is possible without elements of this kind of asceticism. This, however, is the moral yoke imposed upon us. The moral "yoke" that Jesus wishes to make easy has only been made heavier, and the message of grace has largely been lost. The yoke of Jesus, however, is above law, asceticism. It is not a demand but a reality. Tillich says:

> "Take my yoke upon you and learn of me...for my yoke is easy and my burden is light." This does not indicate a quantitative difference--a little easier, a little lighter. It indicates a contradiction! The yoke of Jesus is easy

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[1] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 217.

[2] Tillich, Political Expectation, ed. by James Luther Adams(New York, Evanston, San Francisco, and London: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 31.

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> in itself, because it is above law, and replaces the toiling and laboring with rest in our souls...It is not a new demand, a new doctrine or new morals, but rather a new reality, a new being and a new power of transforming life..;if He calls it easy, He means that it is not a matter of our acting and striving, but rather that it is given before anything we can do.[1]

For this reason, to those who come to Christianity we must proclaim the principle that none of their good deeds has ultimate value before God and that none of their bad deeds is ultimately damning. At this point, the intuitive ethics of Zen Buddhism is very similar. The Zen ethics is not between good and evil, but it has to do with something which is neither good nor evil becoming conscious of itself.[2] In other words, being is not harassed by dualistic thoughts of good and evil, just and unjust, merit and demerit. For Zen Buddhists, spirituality goes beyond them.[3] In this respect, Like Tillich, we must say: "Forget your Christian morals, your achievements and your failures, when you come to Him. Nothing is demanded of you--no idea of God, and no goodness in yourselves, not your being religious, not your being Christian, not your being wise and not your being moral." [4] Although for the Christian there is not a so-called "good deed," for him there is the great paradox, that there is a reunion with the eternal "ground of our being" without "right action" on our part, without our being "good people," or the "people of good will."[1] Needless to say, we do not mean that ethics completely ignores commands and prohibitions, but no commands and prohibitions necessarily follow upon the perception of the New Being. Christian revelation does not give a new law and a new set of commands; it gives a new spirit, in which any law may be accepted as a norm of behavior because it is already transcended in spirit.[2] It demands nothing but "your being open and willing to accept what is given to you, the New Being, the being of love and justice and truth, as it is manifest in him whose yoke is easy and whose burden is light."[3] Indeed, morals as here treated relate what is to what ought to be, and attempt to bridge the chasm between the two, to reunite moral principles and moral actions in that creative harmony which will conquer the crisis that the atrophy of the moral conscience engenders.[4]

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[1] Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 99.

[2] Daisetz Suzuki, "Ethics and Zen Buddhism," Moral Principles of Action, ed. by Ruth Nanda Anshen(New York and London: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 607.

[3] Suzuki, The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind(London: Rider & Co., 1949), pp. 116-117.

[4] Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 102.

But such an ethics of the New Being has disappeared behind the preaching of the religious and moral law. Grace as the power of accepting the person who is unacceptable, and of healing the person who is mortally sick, has disappeared in the mere moral law. How can such a moralistic situation in the Church itself, in which grace is lost, be resolved? It is a very important question for us especially in this mechanized and dehumanized world.[1] It is imperative that the Churches transcend the graceless moralism in which they are so largely caught. But, how? The answer is the message of the Christ, a power of being in which we can participate, and out of which true thought and right action can follow. That is to say, being precedes action. Expressing it in another way, faith makes the works. This is Luther's theological ethical core. For him faith is central, because by faith the very inner being of a man is set right, so that the fruit of his life is good. Faith insures that the heart will be right, as well as the acts.[2] In this respect, faith makes the person; person makes the works, not works the person. As a matter of fact, there are people who do many good works but in whom the ultimate center is lacking. This ultimate center is faith, faith as accepting the power itself out of which we come and to which we go. Faith can exist as an absolute affirmation of life as life, of being as being.[3]

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[1] Tillich, Morality and Beyond, p. 14.

[2] George H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message(London: Burns & Oates, 1962), p. 146.

[3] Tillich, The Shaking of the Foundations, p. 102.

[4] Anshen, (ed.), Moral Principles of Action, p. x.

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[1] Compared with the Western world, the social change in the Eastern world has been extremely rapid and abrupt. In the process of rapid social change, there is an inner vacuum in the minds of men and women. There is a searching for the ultimate meaning and end of life and the hope to live in the struggle of life without losing the outlook of humanity. In a word, the Oriental social structure now presents itself in multifarious aspects: progressive and retrogressive, action and reaction. In such a situation, the moral standards of these countries are always fluctuating.

[2] Edward L. Long, Jr., *A Survey of Christian Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 133.

[3] Tillich, *A History of Christian Thought*, p. 247.

"Being precedes action" or "faith makes the works" stands in opposition to both moral legalism and amoral lawlessness. It affirms morality and points beyond it to its religious foundation. This is why Christian ethics should be ontologically analyzed.

Tillich's theonomous ethics is directly dependent on a doctrine of being. The roots of the moral imperative, the criterion of its validity, the sources of its contents, the forces of its realization, all this is based on an ontological analysis of man's being. For Tillich, there is no answer in ethics without an explicit or implicit assertion about the nature of being.[1] Indeed, ethics has its ground in the basic structure of being. Further, ethics and being are interrelated. Because, one cannot discuss the ontological foundations of love, power, and justice without presupposing their ethical functions, and one cannot discuss their ethical functions without referring constantly to their ontological foundations.[2] Also, for Suzuki the good is the isness of things, it is not something added to them from an external source. In this respect, for him anything of ethics is something inherent in being.[3] The ethical problems, therefore, are not resolved without the ontological analysis of human being.

Moreover, the ontological approach to ethics appears promising also in theology, because it offers a way of breaking out of the impasse of literalism as found in older orthodoxy and in newer linguistic analysis and beyond the subject/object dichotomy which has dominated Western thought.[1] In a pluralistic world, the ontological standpoint in ethics opens a way by which the integrity of alternate ontological configurations can be respected without denying the uniqueness, the vitality, the power, and the significance which any of them hold for those who have been formed by them. Finally, this approach suggests a way in which significance and identity is established not only within formal religions but also outside of them in what they call the "secular" world.

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[1] Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice(New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 72.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Suzuki, "Human Values in Zen," New Knowledge in Human Values, ed. by A. H. Maslow(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 95.

Indeed, ontological ethics makes a remarkable contribution to understanding the ethical problems, theologically and philosophically, and to the deplorably graceless, soul-emptying moralism of the modern Churches. And Paul Tillich, as Reinhold Niebuhr has agreed, is one of the most thoughtful analysts of the basic problems of Christian ethics whom we have in our day.[2]

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[1] Here William Barrett states that what we call the Western tradition is formed by two major influences, Hebraic and Greek, and both these influences are profoundly dualistic in Spirit. They divide reality into two parts and set one part off against the other. The Hebrew makes his division on religious and moral grounds: the Greek, on the other hand, divides reality along intellectual lines(Suzuki, Zen Buddhism: Selected Writings of D. T. Suzuki(New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956), p. ix).

[2] In his book-review of Tillich's ontological analyses and ethical applications Love, Power, and Justice, Reinhold Niebuhr evaluates Tillich highly. See the back of the book.

CHAPTER II

DAISETZ TEITARO SUZUKI

Basic Thoughts Underlying Suzuki's Zen Buddhist Ethics

A Positive Understanding of Sūnyatā

Almost all who study Japanese Buddhism, especially Zen Buddhism, have been influenced directly or indirectly by the late Professor Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki of Ōtani University, Kyoto. Most books on Japanese Buddhism in Western languages, with a few exceptions, depend heavily on him, though they sometimes misinterpret and distort his ideas. It is not an exaggeration to say that Suzuki is universally recognized as an outstanding authority on Buddhist philosophy and without question the greatest authority on Zen Buddhism. Indeed, Suzuki dedicated his whole life to the subject of Buddhist philosophy and to interpreting its contents and concepts for Western people. Especially to Western readers his contribution is his introduction of Zen. This is why Carl G. Jung evaluated Suzuki highly. [1]

The purpose of this section is to present the basis and background of the ethical thoughts in Suzuki's Zen Buddhist philosophy. In order to understand what lies underneath Suzuki's ethical thoughts it is necessary to know his philosophy of emptiness, "*sūnyatā*" in Sanskrit. Emptiness is one of the most important expressions of spiritual truth in Buddhism, especially in Mahayana Buddhism. For Suzuki, emptiness is the basis on which his whole Buddhist philosophy, especially its function and structure, is built. Also, it is the ultimate ground of all things and the foundation of all philosophies and ethics in Mahayana Buddhism. He says:

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[1] In his Foreword to Suzuki's An Introduction to Zen Buddhism (New York: Grove Press, 1964), Jung states that we cannot be sufficiently grateful to the author, first for the fact of his having brought Zen closer to Western understanding, and secondly for the manner in which he has achieved this task (p. 9).

> *Sūnyatā* is the gospel of the *Prājnāparamitā-Sūtra* and also the fountainhead of all the Mahayana philosophies and practical disciplines. It is indeed owing to this emptiness as the ground of existence that this universe is at all possible with its logic, ethics, philosophy, and religion.[1]

In a word, *sūnyatā* means "Ultimate Reality." It is variously designated in Buddhism as the absolute, the Self pure and simple, the Buddha-nature, the Godhead, the One Mind, Suchness, Being, the Pure Reason(*prajnā*). For Suzuki, it is the most primary thing and at the same time the last real thing which the human mind can grasp "immediately," "directly,""from within," and "totalistically." Further, when the experience takes place a man feels at last at home with himself as well as with the whole world, and asks no more questions because he is the Life.[2]

Especially Zen Buddhism bases its *Welt*- and *Lebens*-

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[1] Daisetz Suzuki, *On Indian Mahayana Buddhism*, ed. by Edward Conze(New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1968), p. 109.

[2] Suzuki, "What is the 'I'?" *The Eastern Buddhist*, New Series, Vol. IV(Tokyo: The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1971), p. 16fn.

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Anschauungen on sūnyatā.[1] For Suzuki, sūnyatā is the source of creativity, artistic impulse, aesthetic appreciation, and moral behavior. It is full of infinite merits and values beyond description. Also, it is an intuitive truth. Here the intuition is enlightenment as the culmination of Mahayana Buddhist discipline.[2] Zen has developed from this enlightenment-experience and such an experience is best expressed by sūnyatā. Sūnyatā is the living experience of self-realization which constitutes the concrete base of Suzuki's thoughts on ethics, philosophy, and religion, For Suzuki, sūnyatā, therefore, is not something intellectual but purely experiential. To experience means to become aware of, but not in the way in which we become aware of the world of sense and intellect. [3]

Emptiness, however, does ~~not~~ mean relativity as has sometimes been suggested by Buddhist scholars. It goes beyond that; it is what makes relativity possible.[4] Also, it does not mean something negative. Though sūnyatā is the basis of the Buddhist philosophy, many interpreters, even some Buddhist scholars, Western and Eastern, have misunderstood the term sūnyatā. The idea of emptiness has been treated as something negative by them, especially by Westerners. A reason for this is that the term *sūnyatā* has been translated by "nothingness." Such a term as "nothingness," however, is liable to be understood as non-reality, chaos, and something negative. But as Frederick J. Streng points out:

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[1] Suzuki, "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," Philosophy and Culture East and West, ed. by. C. Moore(Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1962), p. 429.

[2] On Indian Mahayana Buddhism, p. 109.

[3] Selected Writings, p. 261.

[4] On Indian Mahayana Buddhism, p. 109.

> The term emptiness which in the past also has been translated by nothingness or relativity suggests for many Westerners the notion of chaos, nonreality, or the opposite of anything positive. This is, of course, understandable in the context of Western philosophical, poetical, and religious expression. In trying to understand the meaning of this term in the thought and life of any Eastern people where Buddhism is a cultural force, however, we must ask how this notion relates to other notions and attitudes about life that form a cultural matrix different from ours.[1]

Suzuki states:

> The former(*sūnyatā*) is quite likely to be misinterpreted even among Buddhists themselves. When we speak of emptiness or void we generally think of a state of negation where nothing is allowed to exist,a kind of mere expanse devoid of content, if such a state of things is at all conceivable. This is, however, from one point of view altogether natural, for our logic has never taught us to rise above dualism, and we have always interpreted all our experiences on the basis of a bifurcation or dichotomy. First of all, the subject stands against the object, the seer against the seen, the knower against the known. Once this antithesis is established, many other oppositions and contradictions become possible, and we are hopelessly involved in dilemmas and most vexatious uncertainties. But *sunyatā* is a concept even prior to the rise of this world of pluralities, at the same time conditioning the latter so that all individual existences have their being in it.[2]

At the present time, many Westerners especially do not seem to have a clear conception as to what is really meant by

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[1] Frederick J. Streng, *Emptiness: A Study in Religious Meaning*(New York: Abingdon Press, 1967), p. 11.

[2] Suzuki, *Buddhist Philosophy and Its Effects On The Life and Thought of The Japanese People*(Tokyo: Kokusai Bunka Shinkōkai, 1936), p. 4.

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sūnyatā. For this reason, Suzuki first tries to expose the term sūnyatā positively. He says that it will be apparent that the emptiness of things does not mean nothingness as interpreted by some critics. And emptiness does not mean absence in the sense that something was before and nothing is now.[1] Therefore, the term "nothingness" does not really correspond to sūnyatā in Suzuki. This is the main reason why Suzuki does not use the term "nothingness," but rather "the Absolute Nothingness." By the term "the Absolute Nothingness" Suzuki means the non-relative nothingness. He says:

> That something or nothing which we reach after eliminating all individual notions is not to be conceived in the sense of relativity. We generally say that nothing stands in contrast to something; but this nothingness is not absolute nothingness. It is relative nothingness.[2]

In this respect, for Suzuki the term which corresponds to sūnyatā is ku in Japanese and kung in Chinese, which means "emptiness."[3] However, even emptiness is not quite the proper term for sūnyatā though sūnyatā is originally spatial, indicating "absence of things," "unoccupied space," and for Suzuki the Chinese equivalent kung exactly corresponds to it. Sūnyatā is a most difficult term for which to find an equivalent in English. Suzuki thinks, therefore, it is best to leave the original untranslated, trying in the meantime to make its significance as clear as possible. It is a positive concept with a definite connotation and not a mere negation.[1] But it ought not to be considered as the outcome of abstraction or generalization, for it is not a postulate idea. It is what makes the existence of anything possible, but it is not to be conceived immanently as if it lay hidden in or under every existence as in independent entity. *Kung* connotes all the necessary phases of meaning: first, "emptiness" in the sense of antithesis of being; second, the state of being devoid of specific character; third, "emptiness" in the highest sense, or transcendental emptiness, i. e., all oppositions synthesized; fourth, the absolute emptiness; and several others. These will be discussed later on.

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[1] Suzuki, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism(London: Luzac & Co., 1907), p. 173.

[2] Suzuki, The Field of Zen, ed. by C. Humphreys(New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 59.

[3] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 432.

Suzuki tries to make the positive idea of *sūnyatā* clearer in discussing the fourteenth chapter of Nagārjunā's *Madhyamika-Cestra*. Here Suzuki discusses the basic character of *sūnyatā*. Following Nagārjunā Suzuki states against sceptics who misunderstand the meaning of *sūnyatā* that the negative interpretation of *sūnyatā* is not the true significance and interpretation of emptiness. Suzuki says:

> Some one may object to the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness, declaring: If all is void and there is neither creation nor destruction, then it must be concluded that even *the Fourfold Noble Truth* does not exist. If the *Fourfold Noble Truth* does not

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[1] Suzuki, *Studies in Zen*, ed. by C. Humphreys(New York: Delta Books, 1955), p. 117

> exist, the recognition of Suffering, the stoppage of Accumulation, the attainment of Cessation, and advancement of Discipline,--all must be said to be unrealisable. If they are altogether unrealisable, there cannot be any of the four states of saintliness; and without these states there cannot be anybody will aspire for them. If there are no wise men, the *Sangha* is then impossible; and as there is neither Good Law nor *Sangha*, the existence of Buddha himself must be an impossibility...Emptiness not only destroys the law of causation and the general principle of retribution, but utterly annihilates the possibility of a phenomenal world. To this it is to be remarked that only he is annoyed over such scepticism who understands not the true significance and interpretation of emptiness.[1]

Sūnyatā in the Prajnāpāramitā-sūtra

In order to understand Suzuki's basic understanding of *sūnyatā*, we have to discuss its meaning in the *Prajnā-pāramitā-sūtra* which literally means "the wisdom which has gone beyond the limitation of thought," because Suzuki's idea of *sūnyatā* comes from this sūtra. The *Prajnāpāramitā-sūtra*, as previously stated, is the oldest and most essential Buddhist cannonical writing especially in Mahayana Buddhist and Zen Buddhist philosophy. In fact, Zen Buddhism developed from the intuition of the *Prajnāpāramitā*. In the beginning of its history Zen had much to do with the *Lankavatara-sūtra*, but it gradually detached itself from this sūtra and took up the *Prajnā* teaching for its fundamental tenets. *Sūnyatā* is the essential element. This is why the *Prajnāpāramitā* is generally regarded as exclusively teaching the philosophy

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[1] *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*, pp. 173-174.

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of emptiness.[1] *Prajnāpāramitā*, according to Edward Conze, the present authority on the subject, is concerned with a number of themes which centre about the Void(Emptiness) and all that this ultimate concept implies.[2] Conze continues to say that behind all things is No-thing, which is not nothing; it is thatwhich precedes all things and all thing-ness.[3]

Suzuki adapts Hsüan-Chuang's version of the *Mahāprajnā-pāramitā* eighteen forms of emptiness. These are concerned with so many ways of definitely arriving at the ideas of emptiness. Basically, what emptiness really means Suzuki believes has been made by these detailed expositions. In his *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, third series, Suzuki gives the following list:

1) *Adhyātmā-sūnyatā*, emptiness of the inner things,
2) *Bahirdhā-sūnyatā*, emptiness of the outer things,
3) *Adhyatma-bahirdha-sūnyatā*, emptiness of the inner-and-outer things,
4) *Sūnyatā-sūnyata*, emptiness of emptiness,
5) *Mahā-sunyata*, great emptiness,
6) *Paramārtha-sunyatā*, emptiness of the ultimate truth,
7) *Samskrita-sūnyatā*, emptiness of things created,
8) *Āsamskrita-sunyata*, emptiness of things uncreated,
9) *Atyanta-sūnyatā*, ultimate emptiness,
10) *Anabaragura-sūnyatā*, emptiness of limitlessness,
11) *Anavakara-sunyatā*, emptiness of dispersion,
12) *Prakriti-sūnyatā*, emptiness of primary nature,
13) *Svalaksana-sūnyatā*, emptiness of selfhood,
14) *Sarvadharma-sunyata*, emptiness of things,
15) *Anupalambha-sunyatā*, emptiness of unattainability,
16) *Ābhava-sūnyatā*, emptiness of non-being,
17) *Svabhava-sūnyatā*, emptiness of self-nature, and
18) *Ābhava-svabhava-sūnyatā*, emptiness of the non-being of self-nature.[4]

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[1] Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, Third Series(London: Luzac & Co., 1934), p. 222.

[2] Christmas Humphreys, *Zen: A Way of Life*(New York: Emerson Books, Inc., 1965), p. 65.

[3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, Third Series, pp. 222-223.

By *Adhyātmā-sun̄yatā* Suzuki means that all our psychological activities have no ego-soul behind them. For Suzuki, this is another way of upholding the doctrine of *Anātman*. By *Bahirdhā-sūnyatā* Suzuki tries to mention that there are no self-governing substances behind things. This is technically known as the "egolessness of things."[1] As there is no *Ātman* at the back of psychological phenomena, so there is no *Ātman* at the back of the external world. For Suzuki, *Adhyātmā-sūnyatā* means that we generally distinguish between the inner and the outer, but since there is no reality in this distinction, it is here negated. For Suzuki, what is inner is outer, and what is outer is inner. This relativity is called emptiness.[2] By *Sūnyatā-sūnyatā* Suzuki means that to maintain the idea of emptiness is to leave a speck of dust when all has been swept clean. For him, therefore, the emptiness of emptiness is designated to destroy this attachment. Particularly this form of emptiness corresponds to Jōshū's idea of nothingness.[3] And *Mahā-sūnyatā* means the unreality of space. Things in space are subject to the laws of birth and death, that is, are governed by causation, but space itself is thought to be eternally there. And by *Paramartha-sūnyatā* Suzuki means the true being of all things, the state in which they truly are, apart from all forms of subjectivity. This is something not subject to destruction, not to be held up as this or that, to which nothing can be affixed. Therefore, this ultimate truth is empty.[1] *Samskrita-sūnyatā* and *Asamskrita-sūnyatā* are treated together for Suzuki. To say that the *Samskrita* are empty is another way of saying that the external as well as the internal world is empty. Existence is sometimes divided into *Samskrita* and *Asamskrita*, sometimes into inner and outer, according to points of view necessitated by the course of reasoning. All these descriptions are, however, only relative and have no corresponding objectivity, and are, therefore, all empty. According to Suzuki the *Asamskrita* exist because of their being contrasted to the *Samskrita*. When the latter have no reality, the former are also no more. They both are mere names, and empty.[2] By *Atyantā-sūnyatā* Suzuki emphasizes the idea of all things being absolutely empty. "Ultimate" means "absolute." The denial of objective reality to all things is here unconditionally upheld. Emptiness beyond every possible qualification, beyond an infinite chain of dependence--this is *Nirvāna*.[3] For Suzuki, *Anvaragra-sūnyatā* means the emptiness of limitlessness. When existence is said to be beginningless, people think that there is such a thing as beginninglessness, and cling to the idea. In order to do away with this attachment, its emptiness is pronounced.[4] By *Anavakara-sūnyatā* Suzuki means that there is nothing perfectly simple in this world. Everything is doomed to final decomposition. Something may seem to exist as a unit, to retain its form, to be itself, but there is nothing here that cannot be reduced to its component parts. It is sure to be dispersed. The four *Skandhas*--*Vedanā*, *Samjnā*, *Samkarā*, and *Vijnāna*--are meant for ultimate dispersion and annihilation. In other words, they are empty.[1] *Prakriti-sūnyatā* means that there is no *Ātman* in it, which constitutes its primary nature, and that the very idea of primary nature is an empty one. For Suzuki, *Prakriti* is what makes fire hot and water cold, it is the primary nature of each individual object. All things are products of various causes and conditions. All is ultimately empty, and if there is such a thing as primary nature, it cannot be otherwise than empty.[2] By *Svalaksana-sūnyatā*, the emptiness of self-aspect or self-character, is meant that each particular object has no permanent and irreducible characteristics to be known as its own.[3]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 223.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] For Jōshū's thought on nothingness see Suzuki's *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, Second Series(London: Luzac & Co., 1933), p. 175.

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[1] Suzuki, *Essays in Zen Buddhism*, Third Series, p. 224.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 225

For Suzuki, *Sarvadharma-sūnyatā* is the most comprehensive one. For the term *dharma* denotes not only an object of sense but also an object of thought. All things are empty. Here all *dharmas*, according to Nāgārjuna, include existentiality, intelligibility perceptibility, objectivity, efficiency, dependence, mutuality, duality, multiplicity, generality, and individuality.[4] All these characterizations have no permanence, no stability; they are all relative and phenomenal. *Anulpalabha-*

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 225-226.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 226.

sūnyatā means the emptiness of unattainability. Emptiness suggests nothingness, but when it is qualified as unattainable, it ceases to be merely negative. It is unattainable just because it cannot be an object of relative thought cherished by the *Vijnāna*. When the latter is elevated to the higher plane of the *Prajnā*, the "emptiness unattainable" is understood.[1] For Suzuki, the next three of *Abhava-sūnyatā*, *Svabhava-sūnyatā*, and *Abhava-svhava-sūnyatā* are treated together. Existence is viewed here from the standpoint of being and non-being, and these two views, where taken individually or relatively, are said to be empty. *Abhava* is the negation of being, which is one sense of emptiness; *svabhava* means "to be by itself," but as there is no such being it is also empty. Is then the opposition of being and non-being real? According to Suzuki no, it is also empty, because each term of the opposition is empty.[2]

By each of these explanations of the eighteen forms of *sūnyatā*, Suzuki's basic idea of *sūnyatā* has been made clear. *Sūnyatā* is not to be confounded with nothingness; nor is it an object of thought to be designated. It is beyond human understanding, beyond the categories of time and space, and transcends all modes of relativity; it is non-duality, non-discrimination, non-distinction, and yet it is full of meaning, and is the creativity itself in life. For Suzuki, the idea of

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 226-227.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 227.

sūnyatā is the result of an intuition and grows out of a deep experience, which is the living experience of self-realization. That is to say, the *prajnā* sees into all the implications of *sūnyatā*.[1] In this respect, *sūnyatā* is called the unattainable or the unthinkable,[2] it is a deep insight into the abyss of human consciousness. All these thoughts of Suzuki on *sūnyatā* are most important for understanding the foundation of his ethical thought.

Sūnyatā as Non-duality

In his *Selected Sayings From The Perfect Of Wisdom*, Conze summarizes what *sūnyatā* means especially in the *Prajnā-pāramitā* philosophy. "*Sūnyatā* is," says Conze, "often defined as the absence of all discrimination and separation, as non-duality, as the sameness, or identity of everything."[3] In short, *sūnyatā* is non-duality and non-discrimination. For Suzuki, one of the most fundamental differences between East and West is the approach to reality. The Western mind emphasizes the dualistic aspect of reality while the Eastern mind basically intends to be advaitist. Suzuki says:

> The West lives in a world separated into two terms: subject and object, self and not-self, yes and no, good and evil, right and wrong, true and false. It is therefore more logical or scientific, where yes cannot be no and no cannot be yes, where a square is not a triangle, where one is not two, where "I" and "thou"

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[1] *On Indian Mahayana Buddhism*, p. 49.
[2] *Ibid*., p. 50.
[3] (London: The Buddhist Society, 1955), p. 100.

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are eternally separated and can never be merged,..[1]

In other words, for Suzuki, the Western mind is: analytical, discriminative, differential, inductive, individualistic, intellectual, objective, scientific, generalizing, conceptual, schematic, impersonal, legalistic, organizing, power-wielding, self-assertive, and inclined to impose its will upon others. Against these Western traits those of the East can be characterized as synthetic, totalizing, integrative, non-discriminative, deductive, nonsystematic, intuitive, nondiscursive, subjective, spiritually individualistic and socially group minded. [2]

However, we have to pay attention to what Suzuki intends by advaitism. Suzuki's idea of advaitism is different from monism; it simply asserts that reality is non-dualistic. It is not-two, which is not the same as one. It is both yes and no, yet it is neither the one nor the other. It is neither monism nor oneness. It points to "pure experience,"[3] No words, no letters can explain it. Suzuki says:

> Manjusri says: "As I understand it, when there is not a word to utter, not a sign to see, nothing to take cognizance of, and when there is complete detachment from every form of questioning, then one enters the gate of advaitam(non-duality)."[4]

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[1] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 429.

[2] Erich Fromm, Daisetz Suzuki, and Richard DeMartino, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis(New York, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 5.

[3] Suzuki, The Essentials of Zen Buddhism, ed. by Bernard Phillips(New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1962), p. 64.

[4] Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 416.

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When Suzuki says that reality is not dualistic, that a world of subject and object is not final, and that there is a something which is neither subjective nor objective, and further that this something is not to be subsumed under any category born of the dualistic concept of subject and object, he may be stamped as a mystic with all his scientifically unacceptable qualifications.[1] For him, we have a subject that is aware of something and an object of which the subject is aware, for the world of sense-and-intellect is a dichotomous world of subject and object. Therefore we must transcend the subject/object aspect of existence. For Suzuki, this transcendence is attained when the personality and the teaching, or the questioner and the question, are identified.[2] That is, the question is answered only when it is identified with the questioner. In this respect, to be aware of sūnyatā, we have to transcend this dichotomous world in such a way as not to be outside it. For Suzuki, sūnyatā is to be experienced in a unique way. This unique way consists in sūnyatā's remaining in itself and yet making itself an object of experience to itself.[3] Sūnyatā, therefore, is experienced only when it is both subject and object.

By the statement "reality is a non-duality" Suzuki means something mystical. This something mystical is a very concrete, positive experience of ultimate reality which cannot be conceptualized.[1] Also, it should be grasped in its suchness or isness, or in its totality.[2] In other words, we have to take life as life, reality as reality. At this point, Suzuki criticizes logicians and scientists for their approach to reality. "The reality," says Suzuki, "can never be satisfied with so-called logical accuracies and mathematical measurements."[3] In this respect, man has the feeling of a something which persistently claims his attention. Suzuki describes this something as "the steely barb of the infinite" following Baudelaire.[4] And this mysterious something is always bafflingly before us or behind the duality of "I and thou," or of the self and no-self, or subject and object, or good and evil, value and disvalue. Suzuki provisionally calls this mysterious something the First Person, "I."[5] Also, the First Person, "I," is variously designated in Zen Buddhist philosophy as Eastern Subjectivism, and as Rinzai's "True Man of No Rank." The term the First Person, "I," is of course not conceptual, but it is "O taste and see."[6] This means that the term is personal and perceptual. But its presence in our mind is undeniable and its persistent call for our conscious attention is authentically attested in the history of thought.

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[1] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 429.

[2] The Field of Zen, pp. 14-15.

[3] Selected Writings, pp. 261-262.

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[1] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 429.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 430.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 430-431.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 430.

[5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Ibid.*

First of all, the First Person, "I," is not the subject standing in contrast to the object; here Suzuki calls the First Person, "I," Eastern Subjectivism.which is not opposed to objectivism, which generally characterizes Western thought. That is, Eastern Subjectivism is mentioned from the point of view of the thing-in-itself-ness of a thing, or simply its isness.[1] To see a thing subjectively, therefore, means to see it as it is, in its suchness, in its just-so-ness. For Suzuki, what we ordinally call "subjective" is, strictly speaking, not subjective, for it is still objective inasmuch as it is conceived in opposition to an object. No subject is possible without its object, and to this extent there is in the subject something of objectivity.[2] Eastern Subjectivism is an absolute one. It is a position transcending the dualism of subject and object, and all forms of opposition and separation. It is "emptiness." For Suzuki, the First Person, "I," therefore, can never be caught in any form of intellectual duality. The only way to catch it is by means of a paradox or contrary diction--"the light of the void, or rays of darkness, or eternal present, or pure darkness is pure light," etc.[3] For Suzuki, the primary feeling-experience seems to be an adequate term for these experiences of paradoxes.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 436.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 430.

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As "feeling" is liable to be misunderstood, Suzuki likes to pose the difference between sense-perception and "primary" feeling-experience. In the former there is a sense-subject and its object, but, in the latter, subject and object are not differentiated--subject is object, and object is subject.[1] Suzuki says:

> The subject is quieted when the object ceases, the object ceases when the subject is quieted. The object is an object for the subject, the subject is a subject for the object: know that the relativity of the two rests ultimately on one Emptiness.[2]

Richard De Martino carries the discussion further. He calls both subject and object pure and unconditioned, he says:

> As pure, unconditioned subject and object, subject is, indeed, object, as object is, indeed, subject. Their duality, no longer contradictory or dualistic, is hereafter a reconciled non-contradictory, non-dualistic duality. Moving unobstructed and unimpeded in the absolute freedom of unconditioned subjectivity, subject mirrors subject and is mirrored by subject.[3]
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> That which mirrors is that which is mirrored, that from which it is mirrored, and that in which it is mirrored. Ego, ego-consciousness, and its subject-object duality, becoming trans-rooted, trans-centered and transformed, are now the non-contradictory, non-dualistic duality of ego-Self, or Self-ego.[4]

In fact, Suzuki's idea of the First Person, "I," is derived from Gigen Rinzai's thought on "Man."[5] Throughout his whole philosophy, Rinzai mostly concentrates on "Man." In other words, his philosophy is that of "Man." Rinzai deals with his idea of "Man" in the Lin-Chi-Lu, "sayings of Rinzai," which traditionally has been called the "King of Zen Sayings." In it Rinzai presents an original and penetrating view of "Man," an approach which elucidates "Man" as being the crucial point of this work and the nucleus of genuine Zen spirit. For Rinzai the subject matter of the work is the "True Man of No Rank." This "True Man of No Rank," is Rinzai's term for "Self," "Person," and the "Way-Man." One day Rinzai gave this sermon: "There is the true man of no rank in the mass of naked flesh, who goes in and out from your facial gates(i. e., sense organs). Those who have not yet testified(to the fact), Look, look!" A monk came forward and asked, "Who is this true man of no rank?" Rinzai came down from his chair and, taking hold of the monk by the throat, said, "Speak, speak!" The monk hesitated, Rinzai let go his hold and said, "What a worthless dirt-stick this(true man of no rank) is!"[1] This is one of the famous sermons from the Lin-Chi Lu. Here Rinzai emphatically asserts the presence of Man in every phase of our human life-activity. For Rinzai, "Man" is the most concrete and living Self, that is, "Man" is the One who is at this moment, right in front of us, solitarily, illuminatingly, in full awareness, listening to this talk on the Dharma.[2] "Man" is neither a philosophical assumption nor a logical postulate. He is the one who is working fully alive, here and now. This is why Rinzai says, "Look, look!" and "Speak, speak!" Rinzai's "Man," as Suzuki states, is also the real Self which is a kind of metaphysical self in opposition to the psychological or ethical self which belongs in the finite world of relativity. That is, Rinzai's "Man" is defined as "of no rank," or "independent of," or "with no cloths on," all of which makes us think of the "metaphysical Self."[1] Therefore, we must transcend the discriminative consciousness in order to understand Rinzai's "Man." Human consciousness is always imprisoned in objectivity and relativity. Zen urges human consciousness or human intellect at the far edge of its own field to leap and thereby effect a "turning-over." This turning-over as a leap from the very field of consciousness is nothing but the realization of "Absolute Subjectivity" which itself cannot be objectified--it being the root-source of one's objectification in terms of the consciousness or intellect. In other words, the realization of "Absolute Subjectivity" takes place at the moment one realizes that the intellect's endless proceeding is nothing but its complete turning back. Rinzai's "True Man of No Rank" is no more than this "Absolute Subjectivity," to use Suzuki's terms, the "Cosmic Unconsciousness," "Prajnā-Intuition."[2] This "Absolute

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[1] Ibid., p. 431.

[2] Suzuki, Manual of Zen Buddhism(New York: Grove Press, 1960), p. 78.

[3] Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 169.

[4] Ibid., pp. 169-170.

[5] Rinzai(d. 867), the founder of Rinzai Zen Buddhism, is one of the great Zen masters throughout the history of Buddhism. Needless to say, his thought much influenced on the Buddhist philosophy. Especially, Zen Buddhist philosophy, its idea of religion, philosophy, culture, and ethics, are based on Rinzai's philosophy.

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[1] Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 32.

[2] Ibid., p. 33.

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[1] Ibid., p. 32.

[2] Suzuki chiefly treats Rinzai's "True Man of No Rank" as "the Cosmic Unconsciousness" in his Zen and Japanese Culture pp. 165n, 192-3, 199, 226, 242-3, or as "Prajna-intuition" in his Studies in Zen, pp. 80ff, 147, 159f.

Subjectivity" goes beyond the dualism of all forms of subject and object, self and the world, being and non-being, good and evil. For Suzuki, there is, however, a hidden duality between God and His creation in Christianity. Even when God before creation is talked about, who is it who talks about "God before creation"? This hidden and final dualism is a great and serious problem which Zen believes must be thoroughly overcome for man to attain a complete liberation. Zen is properly concerned with the very origin before duality takes place. Since the hidden duality is the final one which is concerned with God Himself, the veiled "seer" of God's creation can be neither God nor Man as a creation. This "seer" is "the True Man of No Rank." They veiled "seer" is also called "Emptiness" or "Void" because, being the ultimate seer, it cannot be objectified. Although it cannot be objectified it is not sheer emptiness but the absolute subjectivity as the root-source of human objectification.[1]

As the ultimate seer "the True Man of No Rank," according to Abe, stands neither before God's creation nor after God's creation. That is, He is standing and working right here and now "prior to" any form of duality such as before and after, time and eternity, God and man, good and evil, seer and the seen. The ultimate seer is nothing but "Seeing" itself.[2] "Seeing" is the absolute activity prior to both personification and

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[1] Masao Abe, "Zen and Compassion," Eastern Buddhist, New Series, Vol II, No. 1(August, 1967), ed. by Keiji Nishitani and Hiroshi Sakamoto(Kyoto: The Eastern Buddhist Society), p. 61.

[2] Ibid.

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deification. Being the absolute activity "Seeing" does not see itself just as an eye does not see itself. "Seeing" is non-seeing in regard to itself. It is because of non-seeing in regard to itself that Seeing is "Seeing" which is absolutely active.[1] In the "Seeing," according to Abe, God sees the light and the light sees God; God sees God and the light sees the light since "Seeing" is always working regardless of before and after and thereby is working right here and now. Rinzai, taking it in the most existential way, calls it "Man."[2] Also, Rinzai's "Man" has two aspects, that is, He exists as a final individual, at the same time, he is a bottomless abyss. In other words, "the True Man of No Rank" is supra-individual as well as individual. Both go hand in hand, and we must go through this "abyss aspect of him if we are to be individuals in the true sense."[3] The bottomless abyss is "Emptiness," "Cosmic Unconsciousness" which is supra-individual. The relationship between both aspects of "Man" is that of interpenetration, interdependence. This supra-individual cannot manifest itself directly unless it materializes in an individual existence. And an individual existence is really individual only in so far as the supra-individual emptiness manifests itself in and through it. In other words, the living oneness of the individual and the supra-individual is "Man."[1] Also, "Man" is the one who has neither shape nor form, neither root nor trunk, and who, having no abiding place, is full of activities. He responds to all kinds of situations and manifests his activities, and yet comes out of nowhere.[2] Everywhere He goes, He remains pure, undefined, His light penetrates the ten quarters, and the thousand things are of one Suchness.[3] Here is the liberated and creative activity of "Man." Acting through the five senses "Man" goes beyond them without being trapped in them. Acting in accord with consciousness, "Man" transcends consciousness without being confined by it. Indeed, He is the master of Himself wherever He goes. Here in Rinzai's "the True Man of No Rank" we can see what is the true way of human existence. That is, the Ultimate Reality, *sūnyatā*, is originally non-duality which lies underneath Suzuki's Zen Buddhist ethics.

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[1] Ibid.   [2] Ibid.

[3] Suzuki, Rinzai no Kihon Sisō (Tokyo: Chūo-Kōron-sha, 1949), p. 117.

Finally, the idea of Non-duality in *sūnyatā* is excellently expressed by Dōgen's thought on Buddha-nature. In order to make clear the non-duality of *sūnyatā* or Buddha-nature, Dōgen emphasizes two things: 1) the idea of "no-Buddha-nature"--to clarify the non-substantiality of the Buddha-nature, and 2) the bottomlessness of all being--to deny its being objectified.[4]

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[1] According to Abe, "Supra-individual" indicates being free from all limitations including form and color, time and space, "I" and "thou," one and many, and so on, while "individual" is limited by these conditions.

[2] *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, p. 35.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 34.

[5] Abe, "Dōgen on Buddha Nature," *The Eastern Buddhist*, New Series, Vol. IV, No. 1(May, 1971), p. 46.

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In his epoch-making volume *Shōbōgenzō*, Dōgen often emphasizes the idea of no-Buddha-nature, "*mubusshō*." *Mubusshō* is not a counterpart to the idea of Buddha-nature, it is no-Buddha-nature in its absolute sense. Dōgen is not concerned with *having* or *not having* the Buddha-nature but with the Buddha-nature in itself which is non-substantial.[1] It means that men in themselves are freed from dichotomous thoughts as to whether or not they have the Buddha-nature. This freedom, no-Buddha-nature, is the genuine realization of Buddha-nature. *Mubusshō* clearly indicates the nonsubstantiality of the Buddha-nature by rejecting both the "eternalist" view which substantializes and is attached to the idea of the Buddha-nature, and the"nihilistic" view which also substantializes and is attached to the idea of no-Buddha-nature.[2]

Also, just as the Buddha-nature is nonsubstantial, "all beings" are unobjectifiable, limitless and groundless. The concept of "all beings" in Dōgen's idea that "all beings are the Buddha-nature," according to him, is not a counterconcept to non-being. That is, it is "all beings" in its absolute sense which is beyond and freed from the opposition between being and non-being.[3] In other words, for Dōgen the dimension of "all beings" is limitless and bottomless, and so it cannot properly be called a measurable

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 47-48.

[2] For Suzuki what Zen teaches is not nihilism, but *satori*-experience. It is seeing immediately into the reality or suchness of things. This suchness is no other than emptiness.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 50.

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dimension. Dōgen grounds his own existence in this dimensionless dimension of all beings. There is a mutual penetration between the Buddha-nature and all beings, affirmation and negation, morally speaking, wrong and right. However, the Buddha-nature is neither immanent nor transcendental in relation to all beings.[1] Through the realization of the Buddha-nature which is non-substantial all things are dynamically nondualistic. For the realization of "all beings are the Buddha-nature" is based on a non-homocentric, cosmological perspective. The non-substantiality of the Buddha-nature will be treated further below.

Śūnyatā as Non-Discrimination

Śūnyatā is also treated as the absence of all kinds of discriminations and distinctions. The life of śūnyatā, above all things, is non-discriminating. Suzuki says:

> The life of emptiness is that of nondiscrimination, where the sun is allowed to rise on the evil and on the good, and rain is sent on the just and on the unjust. Discrimination is meant for a world of particulars where our relative individual lives are passed, but when we wish to abide beyond it, where real peace obtains, we have to shake off all the dust of relativity and discrimination, which has been clinging to us and tormented us so long.[2]

For Suzuki, what human being truly and really has is the one spiritual world, that is, the One, undiscriminated, indeterminated, undistinguished, undifferentiated. At the very first there was no separation or discrimination; these are our later creations. Suzuki says:

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[1] Here is a main difference between Spinoza's idea of God and Dōgen's Buddha-nature. In short, Spinoza's God is immanent and substantial, while Buddha-nature is non-substantial.

[2] On Indian Mahayana Buddhism, p. 112.

> Identification presupposes original opposition of the two terms, subject and object, but the truth is that from the very first there are no two opposing terms whose identification is to be achieved by Zen. It is better to say that there has never been any separation between subject and object, and that all the discrimination and separation we have, or rather make, is a later creation, though the concept of time is not to be interposed here.[1]

In this respect, for Suzuki the aim of Zen is thus to restore the experience of original inseparability, which means, in other words, to return to the original state of purity and transparency. This is why conceptual discrimination is discredited in Zen.[2]

The spiritual world of non-discrimination will never open its door until the discriminating mind is destroyed to its foundations. Then only takes place the birth of _prajnā_, the illumination, the all-transcending Wisdom. _Vijnanā_, that is, the discriminating, self-centered mind is now enlightened and becomes _prajnā_ which will move in its own straight path of non-distinction and non-discrimination. However, we must not think _prajnā_ exists in separation from _vijnanā_, or vice versa.[3] Here we have Suzuki's idea of the relationship between _vijnanā_ and _prajnā_. For Suzuki, the relationship is the basis of his thoughts on the relationship between religion and philosophy, eternity and time, differentiation and non-differentiation, the spiritual world and the sensual world, and, psychologically speaking, consciousness and unconsciousness. In a word, the relationship is the foundation on which Suzuki's idea of "the Non-Discrimination Discriminated" nature of *sūnyatā* is built.

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[1] _Zen and Japanese Culture_, p. 359.

[2] _Ibid_.

[3] Buddhists use "_prajnā_" for intuition and _vijnanā_ for reason or discursive understanding or consciousness. _Prajnā_ and _vijnanā_ are always contrasted by them. But both of them are interpenetrated by and interdependent on each other. _Prajnā_ is the principle of non-discrimination, and it is at the bottom of _vijnanā_.

For Suzuki, *prajnā*-intuition and *vijnanā*-reasoning are diametrically opposed to each other. For this reason, what *prajnā*-intuition states always seems absurd and nonsensical to the *vijnanā*-reasoning and is likely to be rejected without being taken up for examination. *Vijnanā* tends to forget that the world is the creation of "something" that lies far deeper than reasoning. Accordingly, it is not from *vijnanā* that we get spiritual satisfaction. In *vijnanā* we feel something missing in the inmost part of our being, which science and philosophy can never appease.[1] Human being, therefore, never feels satisfaction before *prajnā* is awakened. Science and philosophy, according to Suzuki, do not exhaust reality; reality contains more than that which is taken up by our relative knowledge for investigation. What is still left in reality turns toward *prajnā* for its recognition.

Thus, for Suzuki *prajnā*-intuition underlies *vijnanā*-reasoning, in the sense that it enables *vijnanā* to function as the principle of differentiation. Without *prajnā* intellect can never work.[1] For Suzuki, therefore, when we are dissatisfied we become conscious of the limitations of the intellect, and this is due to the inner working of *prajnā*-intuition from the bottom of our being, as the basis of intellect. In *vijnanā*-reasoning, accordingly, there is always the potentiality of *prajnā*-intuition. For Suzuki, from *vijnanā*-reasoning to *prajnā*-intuition, however, is not a continuous process or progress, but "an existential leap." Suzuki says:

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[1] *The Essentials of Zen Buddhism*, p. 215.

> From *vijnanā* to *prajnā* is not a continuous process or progress. If it were, *prajnā* would cease to be *prajnā*; it would become another form of *vijnanā*. There is a gap between the two; no transition is possible hence there is a leap, "an existential leap."[2]

That is to say, from *vijnanā*-thinking to *prajnā*-seeing there is no mediating concept, no room for intellection, no time for deliberation. This is the reason why immediacy constitutes *prajnā*-intuition. At any rate, for Suzuki separation means distinction, and where there is distinction only, there is *prajnā*, and without *prajnā* *vijnanā* becomes muddled and goes astray. That is, *prajnā* is the principle of non-discrimination lying underneath every form of distinction and discrimination.[3] In this respect, the spiritual world of non-distinction and discrimination is not a separate existence of its own part from the world of intellection, for it were separate it would

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[1] *The Field of Zen*, p. 53.

[2] Charles A. Moore, (ed.), *Essays in East-West Philosophy* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1951), p. 43.

[3] Suzuki, *The Essence of Buddhism*(Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1948), p. 12.

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not be a world of non-distinction, and it would have no vital connections with our daily life.[1] That is to say, the spiritual world of non-distinction and non-discrimination has no separate existence of its own. It is right here with and in this world of infinite distinctions; indeed, it is no other than this world itself. In other words, the spiritual world is no other than the sense-world. There is one complete whole world, that is, one complete undivided whole world and nothing else. It is the One as it is in itself.[2] Accordingly, when Suzuki says that the spirit belongs to the world of non-distinction and sense to that of distinction, we have to remember the logic of self-identity, in which the two words are at once one and not-one. It is an absolute, pure experience. It is not to be confused with other experiences of our daily life, which may be classified as intellectual, emotional, or sensuous. However, we must not think it as something separate from the latter. Both are mutually penetrated and dependent.

Therefore, the dichotomy of subject and object cannot obtain unless there is something that lies behind them, something that is neither subject nor object; this is a kind of field where they can operate, where subject can be separated from object, object from subject.[3] Therefore, if the two are not related in any way, we cannot even speak of their separation or antithesis. Suzuki says that there must be something of subject in object, and something of object in subject, which makes their separation as well as their relationship possible.[1] That is to say, there is a living synthesizing activity whereby the subject "A" is linked to the object "A" when we say that "A" is "A." It is, according to Suzuki, _vijnanā_ that analyses the one "A" into the subject "A" and the object "A"; and without _prajnā_ this bifurcation cannot be replaced by the original unity or identity. Without _prajnā_ the divided "A" remains isolated; however much the subject may desire to be united with the object, the desire can never be fulfilled without _prajnā_.[2] For Suzuki, it is, therefore, _prajnā_-intuition that makes the law of identity work as an established self-evident truth requiring no objective evidence. The foundation of our thinking thus owes its functioning to _prajnā_.

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 12.

[2] _Ibid_., pp. 4-5.

[3] Moore, (ed.), _Essays in East-West Philosophy_, pp. 23-4.

Further, _prajnā_ and _vijnanā_ are mutually related. Both are equally indispensable. Suzuki says:

> Whenever _prajnā_ expressed itself it has to share the limitations of _vijnanā_ either in agreement with it or otherwise. Even when _prajnā_ flatly denies what _vijnanā_ asserts it cannot go outside the _vijnanā_ area. To think it does is also the doing of _vijnanā_, and in this sense _prajnā_ cannot escape _vijnana_. Even when the role of _prajnā_ is emphatically upheld in the drama of human activities, it must not be understood as ignoring the claims of _vijnana_. _Prajnā_-intuition and _vijnanā_-

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 24.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 33.

> discrimination are equally important and indispensable in the establishment of a synthetic philosophy.[1]

Expressing it in another way, for Suzuki irrationality is also a form of reasoning. We cannot escape it. What is wrong with intellection or reasoning arises when experience is denied in order to put reason foremost, while the fact of life tells us that the latter grows from the former not vice versa.

Thus, for Suzuki, everything connected with vijnanā also belongs to prajnā; prajnā is there in its wholeness; it is never divided even when it reveals itself in each assertion or negation made by vijnanā. Prajnā-intuition may be taken as suggesting oneness abstracted from the many, not but unity in multiplicity, nor multiplicity in unity; but unity is multiplicity and multiplicity is unity. That is, prajnā is vijnanā and vijnanā is prajnā. Here what Suzuki strongly insists upon in his idea of the relationship between prajnā and vijnanā is the merging of the two contradictory terms: distinction and non-distinction, thinking and non-thinking, rationality and irrationality. To experience this truth of merging spiritually, means to realise the irrational rationality of non-discrimination, to perceive that two contradictory terms are self-identical, that is, A is Not-A and Not-A is A.[2] Suzuki says:

> It might be interpreted as the identity of the opposites: A is not-A, therefore it is A. Through this definition of the opposites, something original is made, but there

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[1] Ibid., p. 34.
[2] The Essence of Buddhism, p. 13.

> is not the making of something out of something else. This logic of the dialectic of the identical opposites might also be called the logic of becoming.[1]

Expressing it in another way, De Martino states, "I am" and "I am not," "I am I" and "I am not I," "I am I because I am not I," "I am not I, therefore I am I." In other words, the ultimate reality means "Non-Discrimination Discriminated" which is the unconditional Self-affirmation-negation, or, Self-negation-affirmation.[2] That is, it asserts unconditional affirmation.

One's consciousness becomes prajnā itself where there is no distinction between the subject and object of intuition, and yet there is a clear perception of the distinction--that is the distinction of non-distinction and the discrimination of non-discrimination. These are the profoundest of philosophical paradoxes, but they constitute the Buddhist logic of self-identity. For Suzuki, it is imperative to have a penetrating insight into this fundamental truth of absolute self-identity of opposites.[3] This insight, or realization, or perception, or intuition, means the awakening of prajnā, the attaining of enlightenment, becoming the Buddha, entering into Nirvana.[4] Suzuki's Buddhist idea of non-distinction distinguished or non-discrimination discriminated no doubt transcends our intellectual comprehension. However, if one truly understood what is meant by non-discrimination discriminated one would not think of going against intellection _per se_, for intellection is after all the handmaid of religion, whereby we can say the intellect is oriented towards its own original home.

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[1] The Field of Zen, p. 68.

[2] Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 170.

[3] The Essence of Buddhism, p. 13.

[4] Ibid.

Here we have the paradoxical expression, the distinction of non-distinction, or, reversing it, the non-distinction of distinction and discrimination of non-discrimination, and vice versa. Expressing these paradoxical statements in another way, Suzuki takes up paradoxes as paradoxes from the point of view of human life. He says:

> Human life is simply a bundle of paradoxes and contradictions;...Buddhist scholars, therefore, take up paradoxes as paradoxes and describe or explain as the distinction of non-distinction or as the discrimination of non-discrimination...Life as we live it is the self-identification of contradictions and not the unification or synthesizing of opposites.[1]

Another principle of Suzuki's thought on _sūnyatā_ or non-discrimination is to be found in the doctrine of _jijimuge_, the "unimpeded interdiffusion of all particulars," as taught in the Kegon School of Japanese Buddhism.[2] For our knowledge of the Kegon philosophy we are largely indebted to Suzuki. In order to understand _jijimuge_ it is necessary to know the basic meaning of _ji_ and _ri_. For Suzuki, _ji_ means ordinarily "an event," "a happening," but in Buddhist philosophy, "the individual," "the particular," "the concrete," "the monad," while *ri* is "the principle, "the abstract," "the totality." *Ji* is discrimination; *ri* is non-discrimination, non-distinction. *Ji* always stands contrasted to *ri*, and *ri* to *ji*.[1] However, the relationship of *ri* and *ji*, according to Suzuki, is one of "perfect mutual solution"(*en-yu-mu-ge*).[2] In other words, *ri* is *ji*, *ji* is *ri*, *ri* and *ji* are identical. That is, in Kegon philosophy discrimination is non-discrimination and non-discrimination is discrimination. They are modes or aspects of an undivided unity. They are mutually in a perpetual state of suchness. For further exposition of *jijimuge* we have to make a difference *rijimuge* and *jijimuge*. The former is propounded by the Tendai School of Japanese Buddhism and the latter by the Kegon School. For *rijimuge* all *ji* being *ri*, if A=X and B=X, then A=B. However, here the relation between A and B is still indirect, i. e., via the common denominator, *ri*.[3] The Kegon philosophy went further. The Kegon School, according to C. Humphreys, insisted on direct relation between all things, which, in the Buddhist sense, are seen as flowing events or minor whirpools on the surface of becoming.[4] *Rijimuge* seeks the Buddha, the universal, in the individual mind, the body being a devil whose limitations prison the wings of spirit. Jijimuge, on the other hand, the final stage of the Kegon School, with its doctrine of the interdiffusion of all ji, means finding the universal Buddha in every particular thing.[1] Kegon philosophy will be further discussed in the next section.

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[1] _The Essentials of Zen Buddhism_, pp. 386-387.

[2] Kegon literally means "flower-decoration." Kegon philosophy is the climax of Buddhist thought. It is most desirable for all Buddhist students to be acquainted more or less with it.

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[1] *The Essence of Buddhism*, pp. 48-49.

[2] Humphreys, *Zen Buddhism*(London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1957), pp. 150-151.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 151.

[4] *Ibid*.

Sūnyatā as Fullness

The philosophy of sūnyatā is full of meaning. As stated before, it is not the philosophy of sheer nothingness, but the philosophy of infinite possibilities, of a nothing filled with fullness of things, in which "nothing is lost and nothing is added." That is, sūnyatā, as Conze points out, is revealed as the concrete fullness; no longer a dead nothingness beyond, but the life-giving womb of the Buddha within us.[2] Sūnyatā or Buddha-nature is the fountainhead of life. That infinite qualities are contents of sūnyatā is the mystery. Contentless and yet full of contents--this is emptiness. Morally speaking, sūnyatā is full of infinite merits or values beyond description.[3]

To be in sūnyatā is to be in fullness with infinite possibilities. It is zero, yet filled with possibilities. The main thing is to understand the infinite yet finite, finite yet infinite. For Suzuki, there is not simply nothingness but zero which is filled with infinite possibilities in *sūnyatā*. Here zero is to be identified with infinity. Further, an infinity is produced out of *sūnyatā*. One limit of space is zero and the other is infinity. Both are beyond the limit and therefore are one. That is, zero is infinity and infinity is zero. And also finitude is infinity and infinity is finitude. Therefore ~~in~~finity comes with finitude. Suzuki says:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Conze, Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom, p. 21.

[3] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 58.

> When we start to count 1, 2, 3, etc., that 1 already implies infinity; 1 is infinity and infinity is 1. But we have never experienced infinity with our senses or intellect; it is behind those things. Therefore each individual, single, particular experience must be an experience of infinity itself.[1]

This kind of knowledge may be called "*prajnā*-intuition" in Buddhist terminology. As we Christians know, after His creation God saw the world and said, "Good!" in the Genesis story of creation. Here Suzuki says that it is only when we can pronounce, "Good!" that we can approach the "psychology" of the Creator, which is what Suzuki terms "ethico-aesthetic."[2] According to Suzuki the "Good!" here has no moral implication pure and simple. For Suzuki it corresponds to *myō* in Japanese, *miao* in Chinese. The terms *myō*, *miao*, may be said to be our human response to a situation in which the finites are harmoniously blended with the infinite, or we can state that here the absolute present touches on eternity. It is interesting to note that *miao* in the *I Ching* is identified with the Spirit that moves behind the ten thousand things.[1] The infinite is "the unmoved mover" behind the ten thousand things, behind the constant flowing stream of all things. When we understand by *myō*, the whole universe, including everything in it, good and evil, right and wrong, subject and object, you and me, goes through a transformation, which is marvelously phenomenal.[2] For Suzuki, the logically true or the morally good, therefore, is never finally satisfactory. In this respect, the Buddhist evaluation of moral qualities is subjective and not objective. The question of good and evil does not concern Suzuki so much as the inner motives that prompt one to act in certain ways. Therefore we have to come to the realization of the *myō*, the ultimately good, while surveying the creation in its infinite wholeness.

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[1] *The Field of Zen*, p. 61.

[2] In other words, for Suzuki the "ethico-aesthetic" means that there is a higher field or discipline where we can find our original face and home.

Myō is quite a difficult word for English-speaking people to grasp. Consequently, *myō* is also difficult to translate into English. It often means "exquisiteness," "indefinable subtlety."[3] In this case *myō* is the mysterious way in which things are presented to this ultimate knowledge. The best English equivalent one can find for this term *myō* is "mystery" or "mysterious."[1] *Myō* is a Taoist term. It was adapted by Buddhism later. In the beginning chapter of the *Tao Te Ching* Lao Tzu refers to the *myō* as something characteristic of *Tao*. *Tao* is beyond any form of designation or definition. It is manifested as being and non-being, as something contradicting itself. This is *Tao* determining itself. The world of being is subject to quantitative measurements, whereas the world of non-being is unlimited. Man lives in these two worlds, limited and yet unlimited, finite and infinite. According to Lao Tzu this living in two worlds is called *gen*, *hsüan*.[2] Here the *myō* is definable as the feeling reflecting the mystic experience of identity, in which nothingness, "*jomu*," and somethingness, "*jou*," are indistinguishably merged as one, though differentiated in name.[3] That is, the *myō* is the mystic experience of identity of finitude and infinity, zero and infinity,form and *sūnyatā*. For Suzuki, the *myō* experience is essentially the outcome of understanding the obscurest depths of the eternal *Tao*, which expresses itself in the finite world of particulars. And for Suzuki the finite, namable world of particulars ultimately returns to the infinite Nameless, "*mumei*." By "returning" Suzuki means that there is an interrelationship between the infinite and the finite.[4] It does not mean the ordinary returning. Suzuki says:

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[1] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 433n.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 433.

[3] *The Essentials of Zen Buddhism*, p. 184n.

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[1] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 433.

[2] *Ibid*. [3] *Ibid*., pp. 434-435. [4] *Ibid*., p. 435.

> This idea of returning does not mean our ordinary way of coming back to the place where we started... In this kind of returning there is an old, worn-out, mechanical repetition, but no creativity, no ever-renewing, no opening up of a mystery, no continuous revelation.[1]

Suzuki states that we have a feeling for the infinite, and this feeling is at the basis of all finite and particular feelings. However, an infinity as a concrete totality is not only beyond the pale of intellection but incapable of becoming an object of feeling in the ordinary sense. When Suzuki says a feeling of the infinite, he uses the term "feeling" in its deepest and most fundamental sense. It is _sui generis_.[2] It is no wonder that so-called religiously minded people ascribe this experience to a power higher than themselves.

Consequently, as long as we are in a dualistic world of birth and death, right and wrong, good and evil, subject and object, we cannot realize what the _myō_ is; we feel it only when we come in contact with the infinite, where we are free from all forms of restriction and inhibition.[3]

Sūnyatā is not only infinitely rich in content but also inexhaustibly creative. It is the source of creativity. Zen Buddhism plunges itself into the source of creativity and drinks from it all the life there is in it.[4] As stated before,

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[1] James Legge, _The Text of Taoism_(New York: The Julian Press, 1959), pp. 18-19.

[2] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 436.

[3] _Ibid_., p. 437.

[4] _Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis_, p. 12.

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sūnyatā is the fountainhead of all possibilities. The core of Zen Buddhism is the creativity itself of life. That is, Zen seeks reality, and reality is gained in creativity. B. Phillips discusses what Zen tries to seek as follows:

> For there is no formal content which Zen holds up as embodying the ultimate truth about life and to which it asks the disciple to conform. Zen sees reality, and reality is gained not in con-form-ity--which can only yield a correct form--but in creativity which goes beyond form-ality to reality. Zen has only one thing to say finally, and that is 'To thine own self be true; thou canst not then be false to any man.' Or 'Be true to any man, thou canst not then be false to thine own self.' Or 'Be true to any man, thou canst not then be false to anything else. In short, 'Be true,' that is, 'Be the living truth itself.' 'Be real, be reality itself.' Or in the shortest possible terms, Zen would only say, 'Be.'[1]

Ontologically speaking, creativity is objectively seen as necessity, but from the inner point of view of sūnyatā it is "just-so-ness," jinen in Japanese. Even though jinen means just-so-ness, literally "by-itself-so," and may be regarded as equivalent to spontaneity or naturalness, Suzuki sees in jinen the innerness of things more emphatically brought out.[2] When the human mind is perfectly attuned to this innerness, the feeling of myō is awakened.

That is to say, for Suzuki, sūnyatā as the source of creativity is not to be conceived as empty nothingness, inert, inane, and eternally quiescent, and absorbed in aesthetic contemplation. The *myō*, therefore, is not such a station of contemplation. In other words, it is in every form of motion, in every phase of action, not only individually but totalistically in it.[1] When this is experienced, necessity is freedom, and freedom is necessity. Expressing it in another way, *sūnyatā* has both *prajnā* and *karunā*, "wisdom and compassion." It means that in *sūnyatā* we have both being and becoming. Further, for *sūnyatā* being is becoming, becoming is being.[2] In the world of *sūnyatā*, what is static is dynamic and vice versa. That is, that being is becoming and becoming is being is a dialectic. For Suzuki, A equals not-A and A is A because it is not-A. Not-A is *karunā* and A is *prajnā*. A is being, not-A is becoming, which means that one thing turns into what that thing is not. Here becoming means constantly moving from being so to not being so.[3] The constant change that we see in this world is becoming and at the same time *Nirvana*. That is, for Suzuki this world is the world of becoming. Going through it, there is something that never changes. Yet the unchanged does not stay unchanged; it goes through change. Changing is not-changing, not-changing is changing; being is becoming, becoming is being. To see being in becoming and becoming in being, that is enlightenment.[4] This is the core

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[1] The Essentials of Zen Buddhism, p. xxiv.

[2] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 439.

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *The Field of Zen*, p. 39.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 39-40. [4] *Ibid*., p. 19.

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of prajnā philosophy. A Zen master declares that he can turn one blade of grass into the Buddha-body sixteen feet high and at the same time transform the Buddha-body into a blade of grass. This is the mystery of being-becoming and becoming-being. In other words, it is the mystery of self-identification and universal interpenetration or interfusion.[1] The being-becoming corresponds to myō. That is, myō is the human way of expressing this existence of the mystery.

The principle of creativity is the Cosmic Unconscious for Suzuki. All creative works of art, the lives and aspirations of religious people, the spirit of inquiry moving the philosophies-- all these come from the fountainhead of the Cosmic Unconscious, which is really the store-house or possibilities.[2] When human unconsciousness sincerely and genuinely identifies itself with the Cosmic Unconscious, its creations are genuine. Human being has then really created something. However, we have to pay attention to the interpenetration of the conscious and the unconscious. It seems that it becomes the consciously unconscious, or the unconsciously conscious.[3] It is the secret of Nirvana, out of which issues the myō of creativity. Myō is a Japanese word signifying "something defying the challenge of man's thinking powers." In other words, it is a mode of activity which comes directly out of one's inmost self without being intercepted by the dichotomous intellect.[4]

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[1] Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 265.

[2] Ibid., pp. 242-243. [3] Ibid., p. 140.

[4] Ibid.

Myō is something original and creative growing out of one's unconsciousness. It is something we feel within ourselves. The feeling is all in all.

Myō is sometimes called *yugen* or *gemmyo*.[1] Where *satori* flashes, there is the tapping of creative energy; where creative energy is felt, art breathes *myō* and *yugen.* When *satori* artistically expresses itself, it produces work vibrating with "spiritual rhythm," exhibiting *myō*, or giving a glimpse into the Unfathomable, which is *yugen*.[2] In art, for example, there must be something that goes beyond the technique, that is, something that enlivens every display of skill. When this enlivening agency of creativity is present, we have the *myō*. In this respect, beauty is not primarily objective. Nature, symbol of necessity, becomes beautiful and the source of joy when man's mind rises above things finite.[3] Therefore, for Suzuki it is a mistake to think that what is beautiful is limited to a human work of imagination. The universe is also a work of art; it is beautiful when it is seen from the point of view where the iron chain of necessity and obedience, of law and irresistibility, is shattered, that is, when one enters into the spirit of creativity.[4]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 221. *Yugen* is a compound word, each part. *yu* and *gen*, meaning "cloudy impenetrability," and the combination meaning "obscurity," "unknowability," "mystery."

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," pp. 439-440.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 440.

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When this takes place, we have the myō, the feeling of beauty, not objectively perceived but inwardly growing out of one's being. That is, the myō is felt inwardly when all the finites are seen in something infinitely transcending them while not losing their particularization.[1]

For this reason, Buddhism, according to Suzuki, does not try to find meaning outside of life, for living itself is meaning.[2] Meaning is not added to life from the outside. Therefore when one knows what life is, one knows that there is nothing of value beyond the living of it. How to live, however, is an art.[3] In this respect, for Suzuki every one of us is a creative artist. Here the Zen way preserves life as life. In other words, Suzuki takes things as they are. He tries to open the way to a direct approach to the true nature of things, "dharmatā," by removing all adherence to words which abstract from reality instead of disclosing it.[4] Therefore everything we wish to have is already in us, with us, and waiting to be utilized. We are each and all born artists. This means that we are creators of the myō. If we are not already such, we must try our best to attain the myō in our daily living, that is, in "everyday-mindedness."[5] The following couple of mondōs, "questions and answers," may help us to understand what "everyday-mindedness" means. When a monk asked a master what was meant by "one's everyday mind," he answered, "When hungry, I eat; when tired, I sleep."[1] In another mondō, a monk asked Keishin of Ghosha, who was a disciple of Nansen Fugwan. Monk: "What is meant by 'everyday thought'?" Keishin: "If you want to sleep, sleep; if you want to sit, sit." Monk: "I do not understand." Keishin: "When hot, we try to get cool; when cold, we turn toward a fire."[2] These two mondōs suggest that everyday-mindedness means to be doing nothing special; it means to be free from right and wrong, to be free for taking and giving up, to be free from nihilism as well as eternalism, to be neither a saintly nor an ordinary man, neither a wise man nor a bodhisattva.[3] Man's going-about, standing, sitting, or lying-down; his meeting situations as they arise; his dealing with things as they come and go--all this is the Tao.[4] Here we have a deep idea of the identity in Buddhist philosophy.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 441. [3] Ibid.

[4] Conze, Selected Sayings from the Perfection of Wisdom, p. 22.

[5] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 441.

Śūnyatā as the Dehomocentric

Against the traditional Buddhist understanding of śūnyatā, "Buddha-nature," Dōgen emphasizes that all beings are the Buddha-nature.[5] Before Dōgen it used to be understood that all living beings have the Buddha-nature within themselves as the potentiality of becoming a Buddha.[1] That is, although all living beings are at this moment immersed in illusion, they can all be enlightened sometime in the future because of their potential Buddhahood.[2] However, the Buddha-nature is then understood as an object possessed and aimed at to be realized by the subject.[3] For this reason, dichotomies of subject and object, potentiality and actuality, within and without, present and future, and so on are implied.[4] This results in a serious misunderstanding of the basic standpoint of Buddhism. This is the main reason why Dōgen insists that all beings are the Buddha-nature. Indeed, this involves a complete, radical reversal concerning the Buddha-nature's relation to living beings. In this respect, the Buddha-nature is not a potentiality, like a seed, which exists within all living beings. Instead, all beings, living and non-living, are originally Buddha-nature.[5] In order to clarify this unique ontological position, the following four points must be discussed here. They may be indicated by the dehomocentric, non-substantiality, non-duality, and dynamic. The third one was already discussed previously.

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[1] Studies in Zen, p. 140.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

[5] Abe, "Dōgen on Buddha Nature," p. 36. The idea of "All beings are the Buddha-nature" is Dōgen's basic principle on which his whole philosophy was built.

In regard to the dehomocentric character of the Buddha-nature, Zen philosophy seeks a basic dimension common to all living things including human beings. This common dimension may be said to be the generation-extinction nature. Man's birth-and-death is, therefore,a human form of generation-and-extinction which is common to all living beings. The Buddha-nature transmigrates through six realms of existence: the realms of hell, the realm of hungry ghosts, the realm of animal, the realm of fighting spirit, the realm of human existence, the realm of heavenly existence.[1] What is essential in this connection is that these six kinds of living beings including human existence are all interpreted as transmigrating in one and the same dimension, the dimension of generation-and-extinction. Here we can see the dehomocentrism in Zen's understanding of man's most fundamental problem for his existence and his salvation from it. This is why Zen does not approach this as a "birth-death" problem in the human dimension alone but as a generation-extinction problem for all living beings. The Zen Buddhist idea of transmigration in terms of dehomocentrism must be distinguished from that of animism. Abe says:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 37.

> The Buddhist idea of transmigration had nothing to do with animism, which believed in anima which exists apart from human bodies and things, and animates them. The Buddhist idea of transmigration is not based on

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 32.

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> a belief in the independent existence of spirit, or soul, nor on the idea of the stream of life, but on the realization of generation-and-extinction at each and every moment. In reality the endless transmigration is inseparably connected with the realization of momentary generation-and-extinction.[1]

Here we can see the endlessness of transmigration as regards temporality. For this reason, it is not that there are six worlds existing somewhere side by side, but that the boundless horizon of generation-and-extinction opens up, in which six kinds of transmigration are taking place.[2] This shows the boundlessness of transmigration in its spatiality. Thus, transmigration is endless and boundless in space and time. Also, this endless and boundless dimension is nothing but the dimension of generation-extinction, in which man and other living beings are not discriminated from each other. It goes without saying that Zen does not give a special or superior position to man against other living things with regard to his nature and salvation.[3]

At this point, we must take into account the full relationship between nature and man. In contrast to the typical Western attitude to nature, the Eastern understanding of nature, according to Suzuki, is, in a word, the identity of nature-and-man. For Suzuki, the problem of nature is an eternal one. When it is solved, therefore, we know not only nature itself but also ourselves; that is, the problem of nature is the problem of human life, for humanity is rooted in nature.[1] "Man," says Suzuki, "is, after all, a part of nature itself. First of all, man himself is not man-made but nature-made,..."[2] For Suzuki, this means that there is nothing in man that does not belong in nature. Therefore, all things man-made must be considered nature-made and not man-made.[3] In expressing his own idea of creation, Suzuki says:

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 33. [2] _Ibid_.

[3] _Ibid_.,

> If God created the world, he created man as part of it. God did not create man as something separate from nature so that man can stand outside nature as a controlling power and have things "man-made" put against things "nature-made."[4]

Accordingly, for Suzuki even "when separating himself from nature, man is still a part of nature, for the fact of separation itself shows that man is dependent on nature." Here Suzuki says: "nature produces man out of itself; man cannot be outside of nature, he still has his being rooted in nature."[5] For this reason, unlike the Western understanding of nature, there is no hostility between nature and man. Rather, there must be a friendly relationship between them. The idea of conquest is abhorrent. Suzuki says, "if we succeeded in climbing a high mountain, why not say, "we have made a good friend of it?"[6] For this reason, to look around for objects to conquer is not the

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[1] Selected Writings, p. 231.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 236.

[6] Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 334.

Oriental attitude. Generally speaking, we say, "yes, we climb Mt. Fuji, too, but the purpose is not to 'conquer' it, but to be impressed with its beauty, grandeur and aloofness."[1]

In other words, "it is not man facing nature as an unfriendly stranger but man thoroughly merged in nature, coming out of nature and going into nature."[2] Further, for Suzuki, "man came from nature in order to see nature in himself; that is, nature came to itself in order to see itself in nature."[3] This is, however, an instance of objective thinking, so far as Suzuki is concerned. There is another way of seeing into the situation, by shifting our position from objectivity to subjectivity. This probing into subjectivity, according to Suzuki, is probing into the very basis of nature as it is in itself. For Suzuki, to turn to subjectivity means to turn from nature to man himself. That is, it is to make man retreat, as it were, into himself and see what he finds in the depths of his being.[4] Thus, the probing of nature becomes the problem of man: Who or What is Man? Expressing it in another way, nature ultimately resolves itself into the problem of seeing into one's own nature, that is, into the problem of who or what is man.

However, here the question immediately arises: Does not man have any special significance among creatures? What is the difference between man and other living things? For Zen philosophy, the very realization of dehomocentrism is possible only to human existence which has self-consciousness. It is by transcending the human limitation that one comes to realize man's birth-death as an essential part of a wider problem, i. e., the generation-extinction problem common to all living beings. Unlike human existence, however, other living beings cannot know transmigration as transmigration.[1] Unlike other creatures, man is a "thinking animal," being endowed with the capacity of carrying out the Dharma. Here we can see the Buddhist notion of man's special position among all living things. In this respect, Zen Buddhism may be said to be homocentric as well. However, by emphasizing "all beings are the Buddha-nature" Dōgen carries the dehomocentrism of Buddhism beyond the "living" dimension. The dimension of all beings, living and non-living, is no longer that of generation-extinction, but that of appearance-disappearance or being-nonbeing.[2] The "living" dimension, though trans-homocentric, has a life-centered nature that excludes non-living beings. The "being" dimension, however, embraces everything in the universe, by transcending even the wider-than-human "life-centered" horizon. Accordingly, the "being" dimension is truly boundless, free from any sort of centrism, and deepest precisely in its dehomocentric nature.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Selected Writings, pp. 244-245.

[3] Ibid., p. 236. [4] Ibid.

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[1] Abe, "Dōgen On Buddha-Nature," p. 34.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 38. [3] *Ibid.*

In this respect, man's birth-and-death is definitely liberated not from the "living" dimension, but from the "being" dimension.[1] Abe says:

> When Dōgen emphasizes "all beings are the Buddha nature," he definitely implies that man's samsara, i. e., recurring cycle of birth-and-death, can be properly and completely emancipated not in the "living" dimension, but in the "being" dimension. In other words, it is not by overcoming generation-extinction common to all living beings, but only doing away with appearance-disappearance, or being-nonbeing common to all beings, that man's birth-death problem can be completely solved. Dōgen finds the basis for man's liberation in a thoroughly cosmological dimension. Here Dōgen reveals a most radical Buddhist dehomocentrism. "Throughout the universe nothing is ever closed."[2]

This clearly refers to the complete disclosure of "all beings," including man, within the limitless universe, which is radically dehomocentric and ontological. As stated before, Buddha-nature also is non-substantial in a deeper sense. In Zen philosophy, the Ultimate Reality is realized in this infinite and ontological dimension in which all beings can exist respectively as they are. Both "everything is a living being" and "all beings are the Buddha-nature" are verbal preaching of "What is it that thus comes?" which is not a mere question, but is a realization of the Buddha-nature. Also, it is that which one can never obtain, no matter what he does. In other words, "what" or "whence" is unknowable, unnamable, unobjectifiable, unobtainable, and therefore limitless and infinite.[3] It goes without saying that this does not mean, however, that the Buddha-nature is something unnamable and unobtainable, something limitless and boundless. If it were, it would not be truly unnamable because it is something named "unnamable." That is, the Buddha-nature is not something unnamable, but the unnamable. Yet, at the same time the unnamable is the Buddha-nature.[1] The Buddha-nature is the limitless, yet at the same time the limitless is the Buddha-nature. In other words, it means that the Buddha-nature is not something whatsoever, that is, it is not substantial at all. Since the Buddha-nature is not substance, "what" is immediately the Buddha-nature and the Buddha-nature is immediately "what."[2] This is why "what is it that thus comes?" is not mere question, but is a realization of the Buddha-nature.

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[1] Indeed, this is Dōgen's great contribution to the Buddhist philosophy.

[2] Ibid., p. 39. [3] Ibid., p. 40.

Here Professor Abe proposes that we have the critical difference between Spinoza's immanent idea of God and Zen's non-substantial idea of the Ultimate Reality, "the Buddha-nature." Spinoza's idea of God as Substance, as Abe states, is of course not something. Since in Spinoza God is the Substance of so-called substances, He is really infinite and the one necessary being. God as Substance, however, cannot in itself be properly called "what,"--though it might be so called from the side of relative substances and finite beings--because "Substance" is that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, it can be conceived independently of the conception of anything else. In other words, for Spinoza, God may be said to be "what," but it is not that "what" is God.[1] This is because in Spinoza God is Substance.

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[1] Ibid., p. 41. [2] Ibid.

Further, "what" is not a creature determined by God as Substance. It may be said to be something coming from "what," something determined without determinator.[2] The different name for the Buddha-nature is ""determination-without-determinator." Accordingly, the Buddha-nature is neither transcendent nor immanent. However, according to Abe, one of the characteristics of Spinoza's philosophy lies in the immanent character of his idea of God--Deus sive natura.

The Buddha-nature rejects not only the common view that objectifies and substantializes "all beings" and the "Buddha-nature" but also the dualistic and the static character of the Ultimate Reality. This is why Zen Buddhists strongly emphasize the non-dualistic and especially dynamic oneness of "all beings" and the "Buddha-nature." In Hegel the contra-distinction of Being and Nothing sets the dialectic in motion, and the unity of Being and Nothing is Becoming. For Hegel, neither pure Being nor pure Nothing is true, and only Becoming as their unity or unseparateness is their truth.[3] This is strikingly similar to Dōgen's idea of "impermanence-Buddha-nature," mujō-busshō in Japanese. Like Hegel's "Becoming,"

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 42.

[3] Ibid., p. 56.

Dōgen's *mujō-busshō* is the unity of the Buddha-nature and no-Buddha-nature. However, despite Hegel's emphasis on the unseparateness and the mutual passing over of Being and Nothing, it cannot be overlooked that in his system Being is prior to Nothing. In Hegel the beginning of everything is Being as such, that is, Being is the supreme principle of Hegel's metaphysical logic. Hegel's dialectic movement develops itself in terms of Being(thesis), Nothing(antithesis), and Becoming (synthesis). However, it never involves a movement in terms of Nothing(thesis), Being(antithesis), and Becoming(synthesis).[1] In so far as it is so, however, dialectic "Becoming" as the unity,may be it is not a genuine Becoming but a quasi-Becoming which is after all reduced to Being. Dōgen's *mujō-busshō*, however, is already freed from the contradiction between the Buddha-nature and no-Buddha-nature. Herein Buddha-nature's possible priority over no-Buddha-nature is overcome. That is, in the world of "impermanence-Buddha-nature" every kind of duality and every sort of priority of one against the other is completely overcome. There is no irreversible relation. Everything is dynamically interrelated yet distinct.[2] For this reason, *mujō-busshō* is not a Becoming that can be reduced either to Being or to Nothing, but it is a genuine "Becoming." In expressing the genuine character of Becoming, Abe says:

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

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> They(the impermanence of all beings and the Buddha nature) are not the same. They are absolutely distinct, and yet unseparated and inseparable, each disappearing immediately in its opposite. Their truth is therefore this movement--in a word, Becoming.[1]

In this respect, the genuine character of Becoming is not a synthesis like Hegel's which presupposes two things as its basis, viz., Being and Nothing, the Buddha-nature and impermanence. Rather, a genuine Becoming takes place in the boundless, dimensionless dimension of "all beings." This is the essential difference between Hegel and Zen.

Finally, in the world of the Buddha-nature there is not the duality of potentiality and actuality. As stated before, the Buddha-nature is not a potentiality to be actualized sometime in the future but originally and always the basic nature of all beings. At each and every moment in the ever changing movement of all beings including men, the Buddha-nature manifests itself as "suchness."[2] Also, by "suchness is the Buddha-nature" we mean that the principle of the Buddha-nature is that it is not endowed prior to enlightenment. Unquestionably, Busshō is realized simultaneously with enlightenment.[3] The simultaneity of the Buddha-nature and enlightenment is realized only here and now at each and every moment in the ever changing world. At this point, the theological ideas of "participation" and "anticipation," according to Abe, are not acceptable because, though dialectical, they imply the Ultimate Reality beyond "here and now." They look to be well aware of man's finitude but are lacking a keen realization of impermanence common to all beings, which is fully realized only "here and now" at each and every moment in the ever changing world.[1] Further comparative discussion of the Christian idea of "participation" and the Buddhist idea of a complete "identity" of all beings and Buddha will be presented later.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 62.

[3] Ibid.

THE ZEN BUDDHIST ETHICS IN SUZUKI

The Ontological Character of the Busshō Ethics

Mahāprajnā and Mahākarunā

We have discussed Suzuki's basic thoughts underlying his *Busshō* ethics. Indeed, for Suzuki *sūnyatā*, Buddha-nature, or the ultimate reality, is the foundation on which not only his ethical thoughts but his whole Buddhist philosophy is built. Suzuki develops his intuitive *Busshō* ethics on this ultimate reality, that is, his Buddhist ethics grows out of the concept of Buddha-nature. This is the main reason why the present writer calls Suzuki's Zen ethics *Busshō* ethics. It goes without saying that the *Busshō* ethics is ontological. Before giving a general interpretation of the ontological character of the *Busshō* ethics, the present writer intends to examine the basic ontological structure and function of Suzuki's Zen ethics. That is, here we should see how Suzuki relates the Zen subjectivism and Mahayana ontology to the primary ethical question: Whence comes value? What is the relation of ethics and being, that is, being and doing? Suzuki constantly demonstrates the relation of these two forces through the Buddha-nature which is his basic metaphysical and ethical concept. The key word for understanding Suzuki's *Busshō* ethics is *mahākarunā*.[1] In order to expose the ontological character of *mahākarunā*, Suzuki first of all compares it with *mahāprajnā* which corresponds to the *Busshō*. That is, in the relation between *mahāprajnā* and *mahākarunā* Suzuki sees the basic ontological structure of his *Busshō* ethics. For Suzuki *mahākarunā* is one of the two pillars of Buddhism and one of the divine states resulting from the elimination of selfish inclinations.[2] Mahayana Buddhism, especially Zen Buddhism, stood on two legs, *mahāprajnā*, "the Great Wisdom," and *mahākarunā*, "the Great Compassion," for all living things. Buddha's *karunā* is great as it knows no limitation of any kind; his mercy is for all, the deserving and the undeserving; it is not for a short period of time but for aeons and aeons; the quality of his *karunā* is intense and

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[1] *Ibid*.

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[1] *Mahākarunā* means "A Great Compassion," "A Great Compassionate Heart." "*Mahā*" means "great," "*gigantic*," and "*Karunā*" means "compassion," "charity," etc. *Mahākarunā* is one of the two pillars which support Zen Buddhism.

[2] Humphreys, *Zen: A Way of Life*, p. 184.

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pure.[1] Further, *mahākarunā* and *mahāprajnā* are interrelated, interpenetrative, and interdependent. Wisdom spills into compassionate "right" action, and compassion which is wisdom uses the right means to the mutually needed end. Wisdom flows from the compassion and vice versa.[2] In other words, "Great Wisdom is Absolute Compassion." "Compassion comes out of Wisdom and Wisdom is Compassion."[3] This is the essence of Mahayana Buddhist teaching. According to Suzuki, both are in fact one, not mathematically united, but spiritually coalesced. Wisdom and compassion are two aspects of reality. Suzuki says:

> Zen is liable to emphasize *Prajnā*, and the *Karunā* side is apt to be neglected, but in fact *Karunā* and *Prajnā* are two aspects of Reality and the one complements the other. Without *Prajna* there will be no *Karuna* and without *Karunā*, no *Prajnā*; so wherever there is one there ought to be the other.[4]

The spiritually coalesced one, however, is not a finite one but the absolute one. Suzuki states:

> When we talk about *Karunā* and *Prajnā* we say that there are two things, but Reality is one, and that one is not a finite one but the Absolute one. Here is relativity and yet here is something beyond it.[5]

Here *mahāprajnā* and *mahākarunā* are mutually fused, i. e., are transformed into each other. Consequently, for Suzuki, *mahāprajnā* without *mahākarunā*, like *mahākarunā* without *mahāprajnā*, is one-

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[1] T. R. V. Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1960), p. 283.

[2] *The Essence of Buddhism*, p. 47.

[3] *The Field of Zen*, p. 40.

[4] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 39.

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sided; the totality of reality is missed. Suzuki says:

> When the *Prajnā* aspect is emphasized we see the metaphysical aspect of reality, suchness, things as they are. When we see things as they are, the *Karunā* element does not come in and to remain in *Prajnā* is a human weakness. When that weakness is overcome, *Prajnā* is *Karunā*. *Karunā* without *Prajnā*, like *Prajnā* without *Karunā*, is one-sided; the totality of reality is missed; that is the human defect.[1]

In this respect, for Suzuki both *mahāprajnā* and *mahākarunā* are mutually needed and interpenetrative. In summarizing the interpenetration between *mahāprajnā* and *mahākarunā*, C. Humphreys says:

> Wisdom and Compassion are inseparable. Wisdom is useless unless and until applied in compassionate action; love must be used with wisdom as its guide or it may do harm to the beloved.[2]

At this point, Suzuki's idea of relationship between ethics and being begins to be realized. For him the relationship of ethics and being is that of an absolute identity.

Suzuki's idea of *mahākarunā* is chiefly discussed in *Suzuki Daisetz Zenshyū*, Vol. VII.[3] It is clear that Suzuki owes very much his idea of *mahākarunā* to the Kegon philosophy. Suzuki's ethics is derived from the Kegon's idea of *jijimuge*, the interpenetration of all *dharmas* without obstruction, which can be expressed in terms of Kitaro Nishida's philosophy as "Self-Identity in Absolute Contradictions."[4]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 55.

[2] Humphreys, *Zen: A Way of Life*, p. 160.

[3] Edited by Shyōkin Huruta (Tokyo: Iwanami Co., 1970), pp. 44-79.

[4] For Nishida, out of the original undifferentiated oneness of our experience, contradictions must develop, and through conflict the will of man must work its way to a higher unity in which the primitive "direct experience" is manifested.

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Originally, the Kegon philosophy was mainly expounded by Fa-tsang's(643-720) idea of the Identification of Reality and Appearance, and Ch'eng-kuan's(738-839) Fourfold Dharmadhātu. The teachings of wu wei p'ien cheng, or the Five Relations between Particularity and Universality, maintained by Tung-shan Liang-Chieh, and of ssu liao chien, or the Four Processes of Liberation from Subjectivity and Objectivity, by Rinzai, are closely related to the doctrines of both Fa-tsang and Ch'eng-kuan.[1] In short, the fundamental idea of Kegon philosophy

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[1] In order to illustrate the unimpeded mutual solution between li and shih, Fa-tsang used the golden lion in the palace. He explains that the lion symbolizes shih which has no reality without the gold li; on the other hand, gold lacks meaningful expression without the form of the lion as its appearance. "Lion" and "gold" are interdependent. Both distinctly exist by themselves. Yet by mutual solution gold is lion and lion is gold. There is no dichotomy of any kind between shih and li. Also, Ch'eng-kuan's idea of Dharmadhātu was classified into the fourfold world: 1) a world of shih, or event, or appearance, or particularity, 2) a world of li, or reality, or universality, 3) a world of li and shih, completely interfused and identified, 4) a world of perfect unimpeded mutual solution between shih and shih, or between particularity and particularity. This harmonious interplay between particularities and also between each particularity and universality creates a luminous universe. In Dharmadhātu the boundaries of each particularity melt away, and the reality of each becomes infinitely interfused with every other being. Tung-shan's idea of wu-wei p'ien cheng and Linchi's ssu liao chien are based on these the Golden Lion and Fourfold Dharmadhātu. Tung-shan's wu wei p'ien cheng is also classified into the fourfold relationship of universality and particularity: 1) particularity in universality, or universality in particularity, 2) enlightenment emerging from universality, 3) enlightenment emerging from particularity, 4)enlightenment achieved between universality and particularity. Linchi's Four Processes of Liberation from Subjectivity and Objectivity are: 1) subjectivity, objectivity, 2) non-action(from which action emerges), 3) interfusion of action and non-action, 4) absolute freedom from both action and non-action. Suzuki's whole idea of jijimuge is based on these ideas of the interfusion of universality and particularity(Chang Chung-yuan, Original Teachings of Ch'an Buddhism [New York: Pantheon Books, 1969], pp. 41-57.).

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is the unimpeded mutual solution of all particularities. Prof. Chang Chung-yuan of University of Hawaii discusses the core of Kegon philosophy:

> Each particularity, besides being itself, penetrates all other particularities and is in turn penetrated by them. This harmonious interplay between particularities and also between each particularity and universality creates a luminous universe.[1]

Before we discuss the idea of *mahākarunā* in the Kegon philosophy we must be familiar with the basic ideas of *ri*(*li*) and *ji*(*shih*). Though previously stated, both should be more fully discussed here, for they are key words for understanding the realistic character of *mahākarunā* and the universe. In Chinese script *li* literally means the veins in a polished gem; figuratively, it refers to basic principles. This is why *li* means a universal principle and *shih* literally means events, that is, particular objects.[2] Further, for Suzuki, the two are interfused, and interdependent. He says:

> *Ri* and *Ji* are terms used very much in Kegon philosophy. *Ji* is a particular object or event, and *Ri* is a universal principle. As long as these two are kept separate, life loses its freedom and spontaneity, and one fails to be master of oneself.[3]

Psychologically speaking, this is the unconscious breaking into the field of consciousness when consciousness loses itself,

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 42.

[2] The original Japanese *ri* ordinarily means "something transcendental," "something standing in contrast to detailed actualities," and is concerned with the innerliness or supersensuousness of things."

[3] *The Essentials of Zen Buddhism*, p. 447n.

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abandoning itself to the dictates of the unconscious. Expressing it in another way, *ji* corresponds to *sūnyatā* and *ri* to *rupam*, "form." Both, however, are co-existent; where there is no form there is no emptiness. For emptiness is formlessness and has no self-hood, no individuality, and therefore it is always with form. That is, for Suzuki form is emptiness and emptiness is form. He says:

> *Rupām*=*Sūnyatā* and *Sūnyatā*=*Rupām*. Literally, it is: form is not different from emptiness, emptiness if not different from form; what is form is no other than emptiness, what is emptiness is no other than form. This is the basic philosophy of the *Prajnāparamita* group of Buddhist Sutras.[1]

This basic relationship between *ri* and *ji* is the foundation on which every inner relationship is built. This relation is, according to Suzuki, one of "Perfect Mutual Unimpeded Solution" which is the core of Kegon philosophy. According to this idea of "A Perfect Mutual Unimpeded Solution," *ri* is *ji* and vice versa. Also, *ri* and *ji* are *soku*, "identical," though the two terms appear to be antagonistic to and exclusive of each other, both are mutually merged, immersed. For Suzuki it is the state of *tathata*, "suchness" or "as-it-is-ness." Suzuki says:

> *Ji* has its existence by virtue of *Ri*, *Ji* is unable to subsist by itself. *Ji* is subject to a constant change. *Ri* on the other hand has no separate existence; if it has, it will be another *Ji* and no more *Ri*; *Ri* supplies to *Ji* a field of operation, as it were, whereby the latter

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[1] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 432n.

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> may extend in space and function in time; Ri is a kind of supporter for Ji but there is no real supporter for Ji as such on the plane of distinction. Identity does not exactly express the idea of soku, for identity suggests a dualism, whereas in soku the emphasis is placed on the state of self-identity as it is, and not on the two objects that are identical. For this state of "as-it-is-ness" the Buddhist has a special term nyo, meaning suchness.[1]

Here we should know the difference between soku and identity. In the world of suchness, soku, the connecting article, is a kind of sign of identity. But this idea of identity is more than identity, it goes beyond geometry; we can say that it is a kind of moving or living identity, in which each particular retaining its particularity is yet more than itself so that there is a state of universal interpenetration or interchangeability among all particulars.[2] Needless to say, suchness is beyond human intellectual understanding. It is to be experienced, i. e., to be intuited. Suzuki defines suchness as something one has to experience in oneself. Suzuki holds suchness to be the basis of all religious experience. That is, for Suzuki the enlightenment-experience is the manifestation of a higher power, a higher insight, a higher unification. It is beyond the sphere of relative consciousness which is the battleground for forces belonging to the same order. Here is the consciousness of intensive quality to which nothing more could be added. All is fulfilled, satisfied; everything here appears to it such as it is; in short, it is state of absolute suchness, of absolute emptiness which is absolute fullness, In fact, suchness, or isness defies all characterization or denotation. No words can express what it is, no concepts can reach it, no understanding can grasp it. Suchness transcends everything, it has no moorings. In this respect, for Suzuki there cannot be a philosophy of suchness, because suchness has no clear-cut definition as an idea. When it is presented as an idea it is lost; it turns into a shadow, and any philosophy built on it will be a castle on the sand. From the other point of view, suchness, according to Suzuki, is the contradictory concepts, emptiness and non-emptiness, in a state of self-identity.[1] That is, contrary to Hegel, suchness is not their synthesis but their self-identity as concretely realized in our everyday experience. It is, of course, not a result of rationalistic thinking but a plain direct description, and not dependent on a category, authority, knowledge, or any kind of information. It sees life as life, actuality as actuality; identity of contradiction, to use Nishida's words. Because, for Suzuki "life comes first and thought comes after."[2] This is why the present writer discusses mahākarunā in connection with mahāprajnā.

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[1] Suzuki Daisetz Zenshyū, Vol. VII, p. 47.

[2] The Essentials of Zen Buddhism, p. 221.

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[1] Ibid., p. 213.

[2] The Field of Zen, p. 39.

The Busshō Ethics and Being

Thus, for Suzuki all beings are interpenetrated and mutually unimpeded without obstruction in the enlightened world. All living beings are One, and vice versa. At this point, Suzuki develops his idea of the Busshō ethics. For Suzuki, all particular things are merely manifestations of an all-inclusive order of reality. In the first place, the ethical consequences of the Busshō concept consist in the elimination of all distinctions between good and evil. That is, for him good and evil are the same reality.[1] They are not qualitatively different. They are identical. "Since all things are good, evil is merely an illusion."[2] Suzuki asserts that when one's mind functions with nature, it is no more harassed by dualistic thoughts of good and evil, just and unjust, merit and demerit.[3] But spirituality goes beyond them. Morality, however, always binds itself with the ideas of good and evil, just and unjust, virtuous and unvirtuous, and cannot go beyond them. This is why the necessary distinction must be made between the "religious" and the "moral" in Suzuki. Suzuki states that "I think there is what we may designate as the spiritual life distinguishable from what is generally known as the moral life. They are not

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[1] Suzuki admits that this denial of ethical distinction leads to libertinism in Buddhist circles(An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, pp. 124f., 130).

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, p. 118.

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the same. They occupy, as it were, different compartments in the human field of activities. But the spiritual life is frequently confused with the moral life."[1] Suzuki continues to say:

> Some people think that there is no spiritual life apart from the moral life, that the latter is the same as the former, and that if there is anything outside the moral life which can be called spiritual, this kind of life is a false one mixed with a great many superstitions and abnormalities. These two are to be sharply and clearly separated.[2]

That is, for Suzuki the "religious" is the realm in which Zen operates, and the "moral" pertains to the dualistic world. Morality is of this world, and it belongs to a world of relativity, whereas spirituality transcends the relative world.[3] Therefore for the man who is enlightened his actions will permit no external standard of judgment, and as long as they are the inevitable overflow of his inner life, they are good, even holy.[4] Here Suzuki points out that Zen wants to live from within, not to be bound by rules. It is above moral judgments, for there is no deliberation, no discrimination. The valuation of good and evil presupposes discrimination, and where this is absent, no such valuation is applicable, it cannot be measured by the standards used for things finite.[5] In this respect, for Suzuki there is a difference between the saintly man and the moral man. The saintly man may not be strictly all-moral or scrupulously correct. But the moral man can never be saintly so long as he remains on the plane of morality which is the plane of relativity.[1]

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[1] Suzuki, "Ethics and Zen Buddhism," Moral Principles of Action, ed. by Ruth Nanda Anshen(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), p. 606.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series(London: Luzac & Co., 1927), p. 62.

[5] The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, p. 116.

This is why Zen philosophy aims at leading us to a realm of spirituality. For Suzuki, spirituality is neither moral nor immoral. That is, Zen is on the other shore of good and evil.[2] But it does not mean that he ignores morality. Suzuki neither makes nor gives any judgment, he takes things as they are.[3] As previously stated, Suzuki's *Busshō* ethics is not between good and evil, but it is, of a something which is neither good nor evil, becoming conscious of itself. It means that Suzuki leaves, as it were, morality where it belongs and as it is, and directly points to a world beyond morality while yet in morality.[4] Therefore, Zen does not try to give us any "ethical principles" so-called. If we find in Zen something like ethics, that is our finding, our deduction.[5] Here Suzuki's emphasis is to be found in the inner life of a man. Suzuki says:

> His(Man's) daily activities are not changed; what is changed is his subjectivity. There is not much to say about the Zen man's life here, because his outward behavior does not mean much; he is all involved in his inner life.[6]

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[1] "Ethics and Zen Buddhism," p. 607.

[2] *Selected Writings*, p. 258.

[3] Suzuki, *Living by Zen*(London: Rider & Co., 1950), p. 5.

[4] "Ethics and Zen Buddhism," p. 607.

[5] *Ibid*.

[6] *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, p. 74.

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In this respect, for Suzuki ethics and being are one. The really good is just so, and no more, no less. Accordingly, even the very moment we say, "it is good," the good loses its goodness.[1] The good is just-so-ness. That is, the good is the isness of things. So what a thing is genuinely in its isness, is valuable.[2] In this existential world, however, we live on the superficiality of things. Our ordinary life only touches the fringe of personality, it does not cause a commotion in the deepest parts of the soul. We may be clever and bright; but what we produce lacks depth and sincerity, and does not appeal to the inmost feelings. While Zen is primarily religious, it also molds our moral character. It may be better to say that a deep spiritual experience is bound to effect a change in the moral structure of one's personality. In this respect, a monkish life does not require the austere practice of asceticism, but it implies the rising of one's spiritual powers to their highest notch. They are the overflowing of a soul filled with deep experiences.[3] For this reason, one of the most striking features of Zen is its refusal to create or recognize a scientific ethical system. Zen emphasizes complete liberty of spirit: if you want to go, go; if you want to sit, sit; if you are hungry, eat; and so on. Thus liberated from burdensome laws, one acts in obedience to one's true self. In this respect, Nishida places the highest point of morality, not in thinking and reasoning and fidelity to law, but in the spontaneous doing of good which, however, is only possible when one has reached the Zen situation beyond subject and object. Nishida says:

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[1] Suzuki, "Human Values in Zen," New Knowledge in Human Value, ed. by A. H. Maslow(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 95.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Essentials of Zen Buddhism, p. 338.

> Only when subject and object are mutually forgotten and one arrives at a state wherein there is only the activity of a simple reality in heaven and earth, does one first attain to the consummation of good behavior.[1]

In other words, Suzuki's Busshō ethics is spontaneously, directly obedient to being, that is, Zennists act in accordance with the desires of the heart without breaking law.

The term "ethics" is described as "the science treating of morals" but since precise definition of the term is lacking it is necessary to state the ground which a consideration of ethics is intended to cover. This is why G. E. Moore refused to take as adequate a definition of "ethics" as dealing with the question what is good or bad in human conduct. Moore says that he intends to use "ethics" to cover more than this--a usage for which there is, he thinks, quite sufficient authority. He is using it to cover the general inquiry into what is good. In other words, ethics should be investigated ultimately in its final and absolute sense.[2] That is, we should ask: what is the ultimate standard of right conduct; what is the origin or source of our knowledge of the highest good or of right or wrong; what is the highest good of human conduct, or the motives which prompt right conduct. It means that for Zennists the good is something that we are, not something that we have or do. That is, one is all right as _he_ _is_. Suzuki says:

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[1] Kitaro Nishida, A Study of Good (Tokyo: Japanese Government Printing Bureau, 1960), p. 145.

[2] H. Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics (New York: George Braziller, 1970), p. 15.

> Whatever we may say about moral ideas of perfection, religion is after all the acceptance of things as they are, things evil together with things good..."You are all right as you are," or "to be well with God and the world," or "don't think of the morrow"--this is the final word of all religion.[1]

As stated in the previous section, all beings participate in the Buddha-nature; all are already ingredient in the _Busshō_. The whole of living things is Buddha-nature. This is why one is all right as _he_ _is_. Thus, Suzuki's ethics is placed in the inner life of man. Here in the inner life the will is operative. The will is operative in the process from _samsara_ to _nirvana_, that is, in the process of attaining enlightenment. For Suzuki, the will is something basic which lies at the root of all beings, and it is also being itself, to use Suzuki's terms, "Cosmic Unconscious," which is the fountain of infinite possibilities. In stating the concept of the will, Suzuki says:

> The will in its primary sense is more basic than the intellect because it is the principle that lies at

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[1] _Essays in Zen Buddhism_, Second Series, p. 283.

> the foot of all existences and unites them all in the oneness of being. The rocks are what they are--this is their will. The rivers flow--this is their will. The plants grow--this is their will. The birds fly--this is their will. Human beings talk--this is their will. The seasons change, heaven sends down rain or snow, the earth occasionally shakes, the waves roll, the stars shine, each of them follows its own will. To be is to will and so is to become. There is absolutely nothing in this world that has not its will. The one great will from which all these wills, infinitely varied, flow is what I call the "Cosmic(or ontological) Unconscious," which is the zero-reservoir of infinite possibilities. The "*Mu!*" thus is linked to the unconscious by working on the conative plane of consciousness.[1]

Consequently, "DON'T COMMIT EVIL," the major subject of the *Busshō* ethics, is not merely a rule. It must become my subjectivity; it must not remain an externally imposed rule. When it is truly my subjectivity and my true self, then my self is no longer that separate, finite ego of which I once boasted, but is none other than the Buddha-nature, the Absolute, the Eternal Truth. That is, the subjectivizing of the "DON'T COMMIT EVIL" can be likened to the growth within us of the seed of the Buddha-nature, and this seed, the favorable conditions for its growth, and the process of growth are all alike the Unborn.[2] It is the self-expression of the Buddha-nature. The practice of it is the Buddha-nature itself in action. The "DON'T COMMIT EVIL" is not something contrived by any mere man. It is the *Bodhi* turned into words.[3]

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[1] *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, p. 51.

[2] Douglas A. Fox, "Ethics and Zen: Dōgen," *Philosophy: East and West*, Vol. XXI(Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1971), p. 37.

[3] *Bodhi*(Sanskrit) means enlightenment. The spiritual condition of a Buddha or *Bodhisattva*. The cause of *Bodhi* is *Prajnā* and *Karunā*. It is not accumulated knowledge, but is realization of the essential truth.

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It is the very speaking of Enlightenment. Here is the ground of the injunction to do good, and here is the power to fulfil the injunction, and both are one. The "DON'T COMMIT EVIL" is, in a sense, the verbal self-expression of the Absolute and its fulfilment is the active self-expression of the same Absolute. That is, this man is now free from the power of evil and free for good because the power of the Truth finds expression in him and even as him. He does not merely know truth, he is Truth and consequently does Truth, which is to say that he inevitably does no evil.[1] Suzuki places the ground of ethics within us. It is in this essentially absolute nature of whatever is that the values which must find expression as the "good" of our lives arise. When the "DON'T COMMIT EVIL" has fully become our subjectivity--that is, when we have overcome the illusion that our irrevocable and unique particularity is the final Truth--we know that there is no distinction in essence between being and doing: the command and its fulfilment are one. This is why the fully awakened man acts without hesitation, naturally and spontaneously. His acting is his being. From this ontological view of the Busshō ethics, Suzuki's idea of sin can be also understood. For Suzuki that we are sinful does not mean that we have so many evil impulses, desires, or proclivities, which, when released, are apt to cause the ruination of oneself as well as others; the idea goes deeper and is rooted in our being itself, for it is sin to imagine and act as if individuality were a final fact. As long as we are what we are, we have no way to escape from sin, and this is at the root of all our spiritual tribulations.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 39.

Finally, the present writer intends to expose Suzuki's idea of value. For him, there is something "new" in the way of evaluating human behavior. However, this something "new" is really not at all new, it is very ancient, and its being ancient makes it new because there is nothing new under the sun and what is old is new when it is viewed from an angle hitherto neglected.[2] In order to re-evaluate human values Suzuki sees that which ultimately constitutes their values. Suzuki discovers that all values come from unselfish motives. That is, any act with its base in an egotistic source is bad, hateful, and ugly, and goes against the general welfare of humanity. Egoism is thus always found at the basis of such an act. The ego, according to Suzuki, is the mischief-maker. Further, he states that even when we do something, objectively speaking, good and benefiting all of us, the act may not be judged as genuinely if we find the shadow of ego lurking behind it.[3] For Suzuki, values have two aspects: subjective and objective. Needless to say, Suzuki emphasizes the subjective.

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[1] Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series, p. 265.

[2] "Human Values in Zen," p. 94.

[3] Ibid., p. 95.

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He states that a value is valueless when it is not subjectively free from an egoistic impulse. In terms of Mahayana Buddhism, the value is a value when it is a no-value. Psychologically, when all the values are shut up in the depths of the unconscious or in the limbo of oblivion, we have the values in their genuine form.[1] Also, Suzuki talks about the creation story of Genesis in which God saw the world created in response to his fiat, "Let there be light," He said "it is good." Here Suzuki states that this "good" has nothing to do with any human way of evaluating things. The good, as stated before, is the isness of things, not something added to them from something external. Anything of value is something inherent in being. From this point of view, for Suzuki there are some differences between karma and value. Karma controls and binds the individual to the conditions of suffering, that is, the principle of karma is "whatever a man sows that will he also reap," and in fact what makes up one's individuality is nothing else than his own karma.[2] Unlike karma, value is inherent in the cosmic condition, and it frees, liberates, and delivers beings from existence. Also, value points to the cessation of suffering and leads to Nirvana. For this reason, all ethical rules are not to be considered as

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series, p. 253.

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commandments because these precepts are interpreted as "ways of training," not rules commanded by one authority to the followers. Also, for him a painted beauty is no beauty, The beautiful need not claim itself to be beautiful, it stands before us and we all know it is beautiful.[1] This kind of beauty or goodness is divine. What is humanly valuable is so only because it is divine, because the human and the divine are one. Suzuki says:

> Some again may protest, "How presumptuous and arrogant you are, to confuse what is divine and what is human!" But I protest on my part: "How self-degrading you are not to identify what is human with what is divine!" How can we exist even for a moment without being divine? That we are at all is of God, we owe everything to God. Even not to be of God is of God. How can we escape from being of God? Things are humanly valuable just because they are of God.[2]

According to Suzuki, when we pursue this line of thought, everything we judge to be of value, to be meaningful, to be worth preserving or conserving as humanly desirable, is all of God. Human values so called then acquire a new, fresh, and inspiring significance.

The Busshō Ethics and Self-realization

In this respect, what Zen proposes is to seek enlightenment. The *Busshō* ethics should never be a mere system of theoretical discussions or speculations on ethical problems; it must be associated with enlightenment in metaphysical truths and their realization in one's own life. The fundamental principle of the Busshō ethics, therefore, consists in the Middle Path which is not the way between right and left, but the way to the realization of the ultimate end--the extinction of the pains arising from egoism. It is the solid way, in contrast with the crooked; the holy or noble, in contrast with the false, or base, and it leads to the perfect enlightenment.[1] When we are awakened we may experience in ourselves the eternal Buddha-hood in its full illumination, and in this way, the communion with all the Buddhas may be realized. Zen ethics is the way to this realization, and makes us tread the one and same way of the Buddhas. Indeed, Busshō ethics is possible on this foundation of our essential fellowship with the Buddhas and of the absolute identity of our mind with their mind. That is, Zen ethics is the actualized bodhi-citta which is the universalia ante res of morality. In other words, the bodhi-citta is the "stability of truths" translated to the inner heart of man, it is the bodhi seen not as an attainment or acquisition but as the original possession of man's mind.[2]

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[1] "Human Values in Zen," p. 95.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 96.

In summarizing positively the highest aim of Buddhist morality, we might say it consists in entering into the communion of all Buddhas and Saints, through the oneness and eternity in one's own personality. Not only insight and wisdom but morality and mental training are possible on the ground of this assumption, and all virtuous acts flow from this metaphysical source. Here we can see very clearly the close connexion between morality and self-realization, "enlightenment," in Buddhism. This characteristic of Buddhist morality is, again, closely related to its idea of universal salvation. This universal ideal is further expressed in the thought that every being is essentially a Buddha. Zen does not make the mistake of using the experience "All living beings are the Buddha-nature" as the premise for an ethics of universal brotherhood.[1] Suzuki's idea of universal brotherhood will be discussed later on.

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[1] Masaharu Anesaki, "Buddhist Ethics and Morality," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. V, ed. by James Hastings(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1924), p. 6.

[2] Ibid., p. 14.

In short, true morality is a direct result of intemporal realization. In this respect, all morality, before satori, is premature.[2] Also, this realization makes us free. Zen is the art of seeing into the nature of one's own being, and it points the way from bondage to freedom. It liberates us from all the yokes under which we finite beings are usually suffering in this world. Suzuki says that we are born free

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[1] Alan Watts, The Way of Zen(New York: The New American Library, 1957), p. 146.

[2] Hubert Benoit, The Supreme Doctrine(New York: The Viking Press, 1959), p. 14.

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and equal. Whatever this may mean socially or politically, Zen maintains that it is absolutely true in the spiritual domain.[1] Also, the enlightened man who has entered into union with life resolves the dualism of conformity vs. antinomianism. For this reason, there is only one way to be moral and that is to have transcended the dualism of rules and no rules and to do the right thing at the right time in the right way, and this calls for an act of creation in the living context.[2] Zen especially applies to the artificial distinctions of "good" and "bad," but Zen does not have any moral code. Zennists make the self of the people their self. That is, to the good they act with goodness; to the bad they act with goodness. C. Humphreys asks an interesting question: "Why formulate rules unless the original sense of "right" has been somehow paralysed?"[3] As Kaiten Nukariya points out, "man is not Good-natured or Bad-natured, but Buddha-natured."[4] In this respect, it is not right conduct which matters, but right thinking, thought which springs from the Essence of Mind. Right conduct may be performed in obedience to a moral code, and have no relation to the mind. Right thinking, however, liberated from the illusion of the opposites, will automatically produce "right action."[1] Zen ethics, therefore, is fed by the understanding of this fact which flows the increasing light of enlightenment, "self-realization." The man who has attained "realization" does "good": but we note that this good is a simple consequence of the inner process which has led the Divine Reason of this man to a constant activity in the process of realizing his triple synthesis. According to Hubert Benoit, this "good" is a simple consequence of a liberating understanding integrated in the total being: and this understanding has done away with all belief in the illusory pre-eminence of the positive inferior principle of "Good." This man no longer does anything but "good" but precisely because he no longer idolizes it and does not devote more attachment to it than to "evil."[2] Thus, for Suzuki the full realization of Busshō and the attainment of enlightenment are necessarily associated with the final uprooting of fundamental vice, viz. ignorance and karma arising from it.

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[1] The Essentials of Zen Buddhism, p. 335.

[2] Ibid., p. xxix.

[3] Humphreys, Zen Buddhism, p. 61.

[4] Kaiten Nukaria, Religion of the Samurai (Tokyo: Iwanami Co., 1913), p. 105.

For this reason, the aim of the Busshō ethics is to bring us to the attainment of enlightenment. In other words, Zennists' obligation is not merely to do good in an amorphous fashion, but especially to do good which will provoke the awakening of our fellows. The need--especially but not exclusively for enlightenment--of our fellows is the root of our ethical behavior and therefore ethical theory may never be legalistic, reduced to a fixed program of rules and regulations, but must be contextual and flexible. Mahayana Buddhists including Suzuki are commonly bound by karunā which often means the transcending or suspension of the law.

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[1] Humphreys, Zen Buddhism, p. 63.

[2] Benoit, The Supreme Doctrine, pp. 13-14.

As the Dharma is absolutely unaware of all distinctions, moral, psychological, and epistemological, which means that it is the Unconscious, the seekers after it are to transcend discrimination in all its forms and to see into the functioning of prajñā itself. In other words, realization or emancipation is the end sought. This is the prajnā-samadhi. When this prajnā-samadhi is understood, there is realized a state of mu-nen or mu-shin, "no-thought-ness" or "no-mind-ness." Psychologically, it is the unconscious not in its usual psychological sense, nor in the sense given it by the analytical psychologists, who find it not very much deeper than mere lack of consciousness, but probably in the sense of the "abysmal ground" of mystics, or in the sense of the Divine Will before its utterance of the Word.[1] This is why all our conscious thoughts and feelings grow out of the Unconscious which is Mind. Here Zen is more concerned with experience and hence with psychology. The original Chinese which corresponds to *mu-nen* or *mu-shin* is *Wu-hsin*, and literally means "no-thought," or "no-mind." But *nien* or *hsin* means more than thought or mind. Both are the same experience: they point to the same state of consciousness. In stating both characters of *nien* and *hsin*, Suzuki says:

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[1] The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, p. 120.

> The character *hsin* originally symbolizes the heart as the organ of affection, but has later come to indicate also the seat of thinking and willing. *Hsin* has thus a broad connotation, and may be taken largely to correspond to consciousness. *Wu-nien* is "no-consciousness," thus the unconscious. The character *nien* has *chien*, "now," over the heart, and might originally have meant anything present at the moment in consciousness. In Buddhist literature, it frequently stands for the Sanskrit *Ksana*, meaning "a thought," "a moment regarded as a unit of time," "an instant," but as a psychological term it is generally used to denote "memory," "intense thinking," and "consciousness." *Wu-nien* thus also means "the unconscious."[1]

Also, both *nien* and *hsin* are completely interrelated to *Wu*. In other words, "to have thoughts as not having them" or would it be better to translate: "to have thoughts and yet not to have them?" This evidently means to be conscious of the Unconscious or "to find the Unconscious in consciousness."[2] That is, "facing all environing objects the mind remains unstained;" that is, no thoughts are raised in the mind. By environing objects a world of consciousness is meant, and not to be stained in it points to the Unconscious, a state where no thoughts, no consciousness, interfere with the functioning of the mind. Seeing all things and yet to keep your mind free from stain and attachment, this is no-thought-ness.[1]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 57.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 126.

Mu-nen, or *mu-shin*, is primarily derived from *muga*, *anātman*, which is the principal conception of Buddhism, both Theravada and Mahayana. *Muga* is no philosophical concept, it is one's very experience. Consequently, whatever theory developed around it was a later intellectual framework to support the experience. This is why the *Prajnāpāramitā-Sūtras* all emphatically deny the notion of a person, of a being, of a creator, of a substance, etc.[2] *Anātman* and *sūnyatā* are practically the same teaching. In this respect, for Suzuki the idea of *anatta* is the same as the doctrine of no-mind-ness. That there is no ego-substance or ego-soul means that the notion of an ego is only possible by contradicting itself; that is, the apperceiving mind is no-mind-ness itself.[3]

As stated before, *karma* intends to emphasize individual freedom, moral responsibility, and feeling of independence; and further, from the religious point of view, it does not necessitate the postulate of a God, or a creator, or amoral judge, who passes judgments upon human behaviors, good or bad.[1] According to the idea of anātman, "I" or individual, however, is an illusion. Consequently, when "I" is an illusion, all that goes on in the name of this agent must be an illusion too, including moral sins, various kinds of feelings and desires, and hell and the land of bliss. With the removal of this illusion the world with all its multiplicities will disappear, and if there is anything left which can act, this one will act with utmost freedom, with fearlessness, like the Dharma-king himself, indeed as the One.[2] In other words, individuals are recognizable only when they are thought of in relation to something not individual; though paradoxical, they are individuals so long as they are not individuals. For when an individual being is singled out as such, it at once ceases to be an individual. The individual self is an illusion. Thus the self has no absolute, independent existence. Moral responsibility, therefore, seems to be a kind of intellectual fiction.[3] For this reason, Suzuki seeks the super-individualistic powers of the Buddha-nature. By this Suzuki means the feeling of compassion going beyond individualism. This is a threatening feeling, to say the least; it goes directly against the instinct of self-preservation. But there is no doubt that its roots are deeply laid, and in fact it makes up the very foundation of human nature. He is no more a self-reliant individualist, he now wants to identify himself with a power that holds in itself the whole universe with all its multitudinousness.[1]

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 120-121.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 144.

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[1] Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series, p. 257.

[2] The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, pp. 115-116.

[3] Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series, p. 259.

Thus, the Buddha-nature is not to be conceived as something of substance. It is not the self, or the soul, or the spirit, as ordinarily regarded. It is not something belonging to any categories of the understanding. It does not belong to this world of relativities. Nor is it the highest reality which is generally ascribed to God or to Atman or to Brahman.[2] In this Buddha-nature there is a movement, an awakening, and the Unconscious becomes conscious of itself. This is not the religion where the question "why?" or "how?" can be asked. The awakening or movement or whatever it may be called is to be taken as a fact which goes beyond refutation. The rise of consciousness in the Unconscious, according to Suzuki, is a matter of experience; no mystery is connected with it, but, logically stated, there is an apparent contradiction, which once started goes on contradicting itself. Whatever this is, we have now a self-conscious Unconscious or a self-reflecting Mind. Thus transformed, the Buddha-nature is known as prajnā.[3] Prajnā, which is the awakening of consciousness in the Unconscious, functions in a twofold direction. The one is towards the Unconscious and the other towards the conscious. According to Suzuki, the Unconscious prajnā points to Self-nature(Buddha-nature), and is Self-nature. No-mind-ness is the issue of it and through prajnā it is directly connected with Self-nature. The conscious prajnā develops into the apperceiving mind where Self-nature comes in communication with the external world which acts upon the psychological mind, and is in turn acted upon by the latter. The apperceiving mind is where we form the notion of self-hood, and when this notion forgets the fact that its very existence is backed by no-mind-ness, personal egoism is asserted. Thus, prajnā is a double-edged sword.[1] Accordingly, for Suzuki there are two planes of living: the one is the plane of consciousness, and the other is that of unconsciousness. Activities belonging to the first plane with a yu-hsin are governed by the laws of karma, while those of the second plane are of the Unconscious, of non-discriminating prajnā, are characterized by purposelessness and therefore meritlessness. The genuinely religious life takes its start from here, and bears its fruit on the plane of consciousness. That is, the Buddha with all his worldly activities among us lives on the plane of unconsciousness, in a world of effortlessness and meritlessness, where no teleological categories are applicable.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 267.

[2] The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, p. 123.

[3] Ibid., p. 124.

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[1] Ibid., p. 125.

The Busshō Ethics and *Anabhogakaryā*

From the point of view of *mu-nen* or *mu-shin*, there is no thought or mind in our doings. In other words, a life of *mu-nen* is that of non-teleology, non-responsibility, effortlessness, meritlessness. In short, the Zen Buddhist life is that of *anabhogakaryā*, letting the Unconscious live its life. Expressing it in another way, one awakens the mind while abiding nowhere, and this means nothing less or more than a non-teleological interpretation of life.[2] Teleology, is a term belonging to a world of time, relativity, causality, morality, and so on, while Zen lives beyond all these limitations. As long as the lilies of the field and the fowls of the air live just to demonstrate the glory of the divine life, they are living a purposeless life. So are human beings.[3] Suzuki says:

> When we live not trying to add one cubit to our stature, or without worrying about the morrow as to what to wear or what to eat, but letting the evil of the day take care of itself, is not this kind of life just as glorious as that of the fowls or of the lilies? Will not this kind of life be the life God wanted us to live, that is, free from all teleological vexations and humanly intentional complexities?[4]

That is, the aimless life goes beyond consequential action. However, this is the very life of the universe, which is

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 73f.
[2] *Selected Writings*, p. 265.
[3] *Ibid*.
[4] *Ibid*.

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complete at every moment and does not need to justify itself by aiming at something beyond. Also, non-teleological life does not suggest anything depressing. On the contrary, it suggests the freedom of clouds, and mountain streams, wandering nowhere, of flowers in impenetrable canyons, beautiful for no one to see, and of the ocean surf forever washing the sand to an end.[1] Accordingly, the aimless life is effortless. The effortless life is the perfection of passivism. That is, the effortless life is attained when a Bodhisattva passes from the seventh to the eighth stage of spiritual life by realizing what is known as the "acceptance of all things as unborn."[2]

When one's mind functions with Nature, he is also not responsible for whatever deeds he commits, and consequently no course of karma is attached to them. He behaves like the wind, and who blames the wind when it leaves havoc in its wake? "The wind blows wherever it wishes; you hear the sound it makes, but you do not know where it comes from or where it is going. It is the same way with everyone who is born of the Spirit."[3] According to Suzuki, when you are like this, no karma can tie you up to any form of obligation or responsibility, though, of course, this does not mean that you escape the laws of causation which regulate this empirical world of ours. These laws may be artificial, human-made, being the outcome of moral deliberations, but they work just the same.[1] Because the Unconscious cannot be held responsible for its deeds. They are above moral judgments, for there is no deliberation, no discrimination. The evaluation of good and bad presupposes discrimination, and where this is absent, no such valuation is applicable. If it is at all applicable, it is for those who cherish discrimination, and as those living in the Dharma share the nature of the Dharma, or rather as they are of the Dharma itself, they are the Free Spirit, they live entirely for the love of God, they cannot be measured by the standards used for things finite, they are guiltless in every possible sense of the word.[2] Also, without ego there will be no individual; without an individual there will be no responsibility. Without the idea of responsibility morality ceases to exist.[3] That is, Zen's attitude toward moral responsibility is this: "not my will, but thy will be done." This is, of course, not shunning it. Zen is ready to bear it to its full extent, if necessary, to sacrifice life itself; but the point is that Zen practices the virtue of dana, "giving," the first of the six paramitas, on the plane of tathata, as if "cutting the spring breeze in the midst of a lightening flash."[1]

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[1] Watts, The Way of Zen, p. 146.

[2] Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series, p. 313.

[3] John, 3:8.

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[1] The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind, p. 118.

[2] Ibid., pp. 116-117.

[3] The Field of Zen, p. 58.

This is why Suzuki criticizes the teleological life of moral man. Generally, an ethical man, for Suzuki, performs acts of service which are praiseworthy, but he is all the time conscious of them, and, moreover, he may often be thinking of some future reward. Hence we should say that his mind is tainted and not at all pure, however, objectively or socially good his deeds are. Zen abhors this. Life is an art, and like perfect art it should be self-forgetting; there ought not to be any trace of effort or painful feeling.[2] Life, according to Suzuki, ought to be lived as a bird flies through the air or as a fish swims in the water. As soon as there are signs of elaboration, a man is doomed, he is no more a free being. Suzuki states that you are not living as you ought, you are suffering under the tyranny of circumstances; you are feeling a constraint of some sort, and you lose your independence. Zen aims at preserving your vitality, your native freedom, and above all the completeness of your being. That is, here Zen wants to live from within. Not to be bound by rules, but to be creating one's own rules--this is the kind of life which Zen is trying to have us live.[3] Thus, a man who attains enlightenment has a life of no striving, of no effort, of no responsibility. In other words, an awakened one is an absolute conquer whom Zen describes as a man of *anabhogakaryā*. For Suzuki *anabhogakaryā* means "an effortless, purposeless, useless man"[1] who has all his mental disturbances quieted and is free from discrimination, detached from all works of effort: he has attained effortlessness, has put an end to strivings mental, verbal, and physical, and is beyond discrimination as he has put away all forms of vexation.[2] Thus, *anabhogakaryā* is a life of no effort, of no usefulness. In other words, it is "by doing nothing" that "all things are done," or "everything is done by non-doing," "usefulness of non-usefulness," "Man of Unborn," "Man of Emptiness."[3] Especially the *Prajnāparamitā* literature is devoted to the expositions of this wonderful life of *anabhogakaryā*. *Anabhogakaryā*, *mukuyū* in Japanese, is one of the most important ideas in Buddhist ethics. Emptiness is a metaphysical term for it. That is, *sūnyatā* is *anabhogakaryā* when it is applied to everyday life. Here *anabhogakaryā* has a moral connotation, and is especially concerned with inner motivation rather than its objective behaviorial expressions. Such terms as purity and defilement play a role of far greater significance than good and evil.[4] Western philosophers often wonder how *sūnyatā* can be related to moral values such as good and evil, right and wrong. The Buddhist conception of morality however, is more subjective than objective. A man of *anabhogakaryā*, then, is one who lives the *myō* in its ethico-aesthetic sense, as well as in its ontological sense. "All the moral values and social practice," says Suzuki, "come out of this life of non-strivings, of just-so-ness, of Suchness which is Emptiness."[1] Suzuki continues to say that "when all defilements and accretions are wiped away, purged, purified, the original light of creativity will illumine one's whole being; and whatever one does will be "good." [2]

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[1] Selected Writings, p. 266.

[2] An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, p. 64.

[3] Ibid.

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[1] Suzuki, *Studies in the Lankāvatāra Sūtra* (London: George Routledge and Sons, Ltd., 1932), p. 43.

[2] *On Indian Mahayana Buddhism*, pp. 114-115.

[3] "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," p. 444.

[4] *Ibid*.

Finally, here we should know in what light *anabhogakaryā* or *mu-nen* or the Unconscious is to be understood when it is related to our ethical life. In other words, what are the outward expressions or behaviors of the Unconscious? As far as the seeing into one's inner being, known as self-nature, is concerned, the matter is more or less on the epistemological plane, and does not seem to affect our practical life from the ethical point of view. But when *prajnā* is considered not from the point of view of seeing but from the point of view of acting, it goes directly into the very heart of life. This is why Zennists usually say that "One's everyday thought is the *Tao*."[3] As stated before, *hsin* is used for "thought" or "mind" in the state of consciousness we have in ordinary

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind*, p. 106.

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circumstances, in our everyday life, when we live like the sun which shines on the just and on the unjust, like the lilies of the field which bloom in their full glory even when not admired. The mind in "everyday mind" has thus no reference to our psychological conception of mind or soul; it is rather a state of mind in which there is no specific consciousness of its own workings, reminding one of what the philosophers call "transcendent apperception."[1] This may correspond to what Suzuki has called the Unconscious. In the following examples we will try to see into the inner working of *prajnā* in their daily behavior. "In summer we seek a cool place, and when cold we sit by a fire." "When I am hungry, I eat, when I tired, I sleep." Are these not our everyday acts, acts done naturally, instinctively, effortlessly, and unconsciously? Indeed, such terms as "housekeeping," "living one's everyday life," or "thinking one's everyday thought" bring Zen intimately into our life.[2] The Unconscious does not seem to lie too deeply in our life. For this reason, "if you really wish to get into the truth of Zen," says Suzuki, "get it while walking, while standing, while sleeping or sitting, while talking or remaining silent, or while engaged in all kinds of your daily work. When you have done this, see whose doctrine you are following, or what sutras you are studying."[3]

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Ibid*., pp. 106-107.

[3] *Ibid*., p. 110.

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The Realistic Character of the Busshō Ethics

The Kegon Philosophy and Mahākarunā

We have discussed the static aspect of the Busshō ethics as an ontological element in connection with being. For Suzuki, the Buddha-nature, however, is "becoming" itself rather than a state or condition. That is, the Buddha-nature is not a static "something" unmoved and unmoving. It is dynamic. In this respect, the Buddha-nature is the ground not only of being but of becoming, and therefore of all endeavor including ethics and morality. This is the main reason why Kegon philosophy takes the dynamic character of the Buddha-nature as its core. The central idea of Kegon is to grasp the Dharmadhātu dynamically whose characteristic is to be forever in the mood of moving, which is life.[1] Actually, Suzuki's realistic idea of his Busshō ethics is based on this Kegon philosophy of "becoming." Also, here is the central or pivotal point around which Zen moves. It goes without saying that this "becoming," however, is connected with "being" itself. That is, for Suzuki there are two aspects, the static and the dynamic, in reality itself. Here the relationship between being and ethics also begins to be realized in Suzuki's Zen Buddhist philosophy.

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[1] The Essence of Buddhism, p. 53.

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In Kegon terms, the dynamic aspect of reality goes on in the world of *ji* as seen in the light of *ri*. Here Suzuki states five modes of *ri*'s functioning:

> Simultaneous mutual self-identification, simultaneous mutual turning-into, self-identity of the acting and the being acted upon, self-identity of the One and the Many, and simultaneous abrupt rising.[1]

All these phases, according to Suzuki, are known as *jijimuge* in the world of *ji*. *Jiji* means each individual item in the world of *ji* and *muge* is "unimpededness."[2] Consequently, *jijimuge* is that the manifold items in the world of form are "unimpededness." In summarizing the main idea of *jijimuge* C. Humphreys says:

> *Jijimuge* is the unimpeded interdiffusion of all *ji* meaning things, facts, objects. The summit of intellectual understanding of the non-duality of manifestation. *Jijimuge* is beyond even unity. It is the supreme teaching of the Kegon School of Japanese Buddhism.[3]

Each individual *ji*, however, is not only dissolved unimpededly in *ri* but also each in the other, individually, mutually, and totally. In order to make the Kegon way of thinking more understandable, Suzuki introduces another set of Kegon terms: (1) pervading and embracing, (2) taking-in and entering-into. Suzuki says:

> When the one is set against all the others, the one is seen as pervading them all and at the same time embracing them all in itself, and this functioning may be reversed...When the whole set is the latter and

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 52.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] Humphreys, *Zen Buddhism*, pp. 183-184.

> at the same time the latter is seen as being-taken-in by the forming; for the entering-into is the being-taken-in and the being-taken-in is the entering-into.[1]

This means that, as Junjiro Takakusu points out, "the world of all realities or practical facts are interwoven or identified in perfect harmony." "...All distinct facts or realities will, and ought to, form a harmonious whole by mutual penetration and mutual identification so as to realize the ideal world of One-true."[2] Takakusu continues to say: "To harmonize such a state of being and to make all things go smoothly, the word of mutual reliance or interdependence ought to be created. Such an idea world is called 'the fact and fact world perfectly harmonized'."[3] For Suzuki the formula expressive of the Kegon world of jijimuge is fully discussed in his The Essence of Buddhism. He says:

> When one is taken-in by all, one enters into all;
> when all is taken-in by all, all enters into one;
> when one is taken-in by one, one enters into one; and
> when all is taken-in by all, all enters into all.[4]

Of another formula, Suzuki says:

> One enters into one by taking-in one; one enters into one by taking-in all; all enters into one by taking-in all; all enters into all by taking-in all.[5]

These two formulas, however, are the same event taking place in the world of *ji*. Nevertheless, it seems to the present writer that the fourfold of the latter more adequately expresses the character of *jijimuge* rather than the former in the light of its original meaning.

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[1] Suzuki Daisetz Zenshyū, Vol. II, p. 49.

[2] Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1947), p. 119.

[3] Ibid.

[4] p. 54.

[5] Ibid.

Here the Kegon philosophy of *jijimuge* exposes the Universe, the Ultimate Reality, the Buddha-nature, as something dynamic. That is, there is an infinitely complicated interplay of all forces and all units in the Ultimate Reality. The world of *jijimuge* is that a world of *ri* and *ji* are perfectly interfused. Further, for Suzuki we have an absolute identity of *ji* and *ji*. As stated before, it is the direct relation between all things which is seen as flowing events or minor whirlpools on the surface of becoming.[1] It is needless to say that though the idea of *jijimuge* in the thought of Suzuki is conceivable intellectually, it can only be intuitively experienced. The real significance of *jijimuge*, therefore, will not be understood by us until we have the enlightenment which opens up the new world-vista for us. That is, for Suzuki the moving power in the Kegon world of *jijimuge* can be realized by the enlightenment experience, "*satori*." Such a moving power in the Kegon world of *jijimuge*, is nothing less than the Great Compassionate Heart,"*Mahākarunā*."[2] Moreover, the world of

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[1] Humphreys, *Zen Buddhism*, p. 151.

[2] *The Essence of Buddhism*, p. 65.

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jijimuge can be moved by *mahākarunā*. It is an expanding power break-through and beyond itself and identifies itself with other. Suzuki states:

> The moving power in the Kegon world of *jijimuge* is the Great Compassionate Heart by which our self breaks down its limits, expands beyond itself, and becomes other selves. The heart is like a heavenly body of light; an all expanding energy emanates from it, and by entering into all other bodies identifies itself with them; they are it and it is they; they affect it and it affects them.[1]

Expressing it in another way, Zen is not just an assertion of life as we live it. "Zen," says Suzuki, "sees into the will which moves in life and identifies itself with this will--which might be called the cosmic will, Buddha-mind."[2] The Buddha-mind, as stated before, is not a mere state, but it sees here the working of *mahākarunā*. That is, for Suzuki, there is something in every one of us which breaks through our limited relative ego-centered self and asserts itself boldly as the transformation of ego-centered love in something universal. In other words, *mahākarunā* is a cosmic glue.[3] C. Humphrey's following statement might be helpful for understanding Suzuki's cosmic idea of *mahākarunā*:

> In the world of *jijimuge*, when you and I are one, even though we never cease to be ourselves, why prate of compassion or love for one's fellow men? Love is a cosmic glue; it sticks together the parts of the whole until we realize that, being one, they don't need

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] "Ethics and Zen Buddhism," p. 610.

[3] *Ibid*.

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> sticking together. He who has even glimpsed the sunlight of jijimuge must know himself to be one with all humanity, all things, all life, and acts accordingly.[1]

For this reason, for Suzuki if mahākarunā were just to reflect one individual ji after another in the mirror of ri, the world would cease to be a living one, becoming simply an object of contemplation for the hermit or Arhat. It is the Heart indeed that tells us that our own self is a self only to the extent that it disappears into all other selves, non-sentient as well as sentient.[2]

Consequently, the most eminent characteristic of the Dharmadhātu, the interfusion or interpenetration, is the Great Compassionate Heart. From this we can realize that our individual self rising from the absolute point of "here-and-now" gains its significance only when it is merged in all other selves. In this respect, for Suzuki there is actually no individual self as such.[3] It means that an individual self begins to be realized when it is interfused with others in the world of jijimuge. Suzuki's social ethics begins to be realized. His idea of jijimuge is the foundation on which not only his social concern but his whole idea of the Busshō ethics is based. There are no other ethical principles or moral injunctions given by outside agent. Because, for him love is not a command given us by an outside agent. "Love need no external, all powerful agent to exercise itself."[1]

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[1] Humphreys, Zen Buddhism, pp. 152-153.

[2] The Essence of Buddhism, p. 65.

[3] Ibid., p. 66.

When the things of the phenomenal world are recognized as manifestations of the Buddha-nature, nothing is disagreeable, nothing is repulsive. Everything is welcomed with warmhearted delight. This is the attitude of *mahākarunā*. Although *mahākarunā* welcomes all things, it desires nothing. *Mahākarunā* has no temptation to fight, to steal, to kill, to covet. It is patient, and it is free from fear and pride. *Mahākarunā* brings serenity in the midst of ceaseless changes of the phenomenal world. *Mahākarunā* finds joy in everything.[2] Also, for Suzuki, the man who lives the life of *mahākarunā* works "silently for the welfare of his fellow beings" without any selfish motive. His whole being is devoted to the good of others.

There are some practical moral virtues arising from the experience of *mahākarunā*, or stated conversely, where there are these virtues they issue from the experience. They are highly characteristic of the religious life. According to Suzuki, the virtues thus realized are generally estimated at six which are the characteristics of Zen-man: *Dāna*, *Sīla*,

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[1] Suzuki, "Love and Power," *Middle Way*, Vol. XXXIII, ed. by C. Humphreys(London: Buddhist Society, 1958), p. 91.

[2] Tucker N. Callaway, "The Contrast Between Christian Ethics and the Ethics of Japanese Buddhism," *Japanese Religions*, Vol. 1, No. 3, ed. by Masatoshi Doi(Kyoto: NCCJ, 1959), p. 16.

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Kshānti, Vīrya, Dhyāna, and Prajnā.[1] The Mahayanist life is summed up in them. First, Dāna means charity, or giving, which is to give away for the benefit and welfare of all beings anything and everything one is capable of giving: not only material goods, but knowledge, worldly as well as religious or spiritual.[2] That is, it is the practice of charity, which in Buddhism also involves the giving up of one's life to the cause. Second, Sīla means the observance of the moral precepts, given by Buddha, which are conductive to moral life. In the case of the homeless ones, the precepts are meant to maintain the order of the brotherhood. The brotherhood(sangha) is a model society the ideal of which is to lead a peaceful, harmonious life.[3] The present writer wishes to give special consideration to one or two classical instances of Kshānti and Vīrya, both of which he takes to be closely connected with the life of the Buddha-nature and the philosophy of sūnyatā. That is, for Suzuki Kshānti is generally understood to mean "patience," but it really means patiently, or rather with equanimity, to go through deeds of humiliation. In other words, no Buddhist devotees would feel humiliated when they were not fully appreciated, no, even when they were unjustly ignored. They would also go on patiently under all unfavorable conditions.[1] According to Suzuki, Vīrya etymologically means "virility." It is to be always devoted and energetic in carrying out everything that is in accordance with the Dharma. Dhyāna is a term fundamental in Buddhism. Even though we find various meanings in it, the basic meaning is "meditation." That is, Dhyāna, according to Suzuki, is retaining one's tranquil state of mind in any circumstance, unfavorable, and not being at all disturbed or frustrated even when diverse situations present themselves one after another. This requires a great deal of training.[2] Finally, Prajnā generally means "transcendental wisdom," "divine intuition," and also it is one of the two pillars of the Mahayana philosophy. However, there is no corresponding English word for it. For Suzuki, Prajnā is the experience a man has when he feels in its most fundamental sense the infinite totality of things, that is, psychologically speaking, when the finite ego, breaking its hard crust, refers itself to the infinite which envelops everything that is finite and limited and therefore transitory. Suzuki takes this experience as being somewhat akin to a totalistic intuition of something that transcends all our particularized, specified experiences.[3] Needless to say, for Suzuki, all these six cardinal virtues are based on his idea of mahākarunā, which is the ultimate principle on which man's moral life depends.

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[1] Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series, p. 291.

[2] Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 72.

[3] Ibid., p. 73.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 74.

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Before concluding, I should like to state the personification of mahākarunā. Here Suzuki further develops the idea of mahākarunā into that of pranidhana or purvanidhana and makes each of the Bodhisattva an incarnation of mahākarunā. Amida is one of the personifications of mahākarunā and is a manifestation of compassion. That is, "Amida comes from compassion, compassion giving the substance to itself."[1] By personification Suzuki means two things; the one is something animate and the other is something inanimate. The inanimate thing is now endowed with sentiment and transformed into an animate being. Expressing it in another way, by personification Suzuki tries to mean life as life, actualities as actualities. He says:

> It is only the intellect which makes the distinction between animate and inanimate, sentient and non-sentient. From the spiritual point of view, all is alive and the object of affectionate regard. Nor is this a case of symbolism, but a taking of actualities as actualities. This is the life of jijimuge and Buddhist experience.[2]

Consequently, for Suzuki Amida is not a concept personified as this might be usually understood. He is the ground from which all spiritual revelations grow and to which all personalities are related. Here Amida is not conceived as an individual in time and space. That is, Amida as a mere historical figure is not meaningful for human being. Amida has more metaphysical foundation than objective historical fact. He says:

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[1] The Field of Zen, p. 42.

[2] The Essence of Buddhism, p. 67.

> Is Amida a real being? My understanding of this part of Shin doctrine is that this sutra, the larger sutra especially, of eternal life, is related in a mythical way. It has almost nothing to do with so-called history.[1]
>
> What we call facts are not really facts, are not really so dependable and objective. Real objectivity is in metaphysical subjectivity, you might say, metaphysical truth or poetic legend or religious myth...Amida story has more objective and spiritual reality than mere historical truth or fact, and Amida has more metaphysical foundation than objective historical fact. Amida is really ourselves.[2]

In this respect, when Amida attained his enlightenment he enters the spiritual world where he and we human beings are one and not distinguished one from another, and therefore his enlightenment means our enlightenment and ours his. Suzuki says:

> The very fact that Amida obtained his enlightenment shows that we also have already obtained our enlightenment. We received it when Amida attained his so many kalpas ago. We can say, "we are Buddhas from the very first, from the beginningless beginning."[3]
>
> When Amida obtains enlighenment and all beings do not obtain enlightenment, he may attain the highest enlightenment. Therefore, his attainment of enlightenment is dependent upon our obtaining of enlightenment.[4]

In other words, for Suzuki what takes place in the one is reflected in the other in the spiritual world of non-distinction. It is a complete relationship between Amida and his devotees. That is, self-hood is revealed in otherness and otherness in self-hood, which means a complete interpenetration of subject and object, *Amida* and Buddhists. And we can see that *Amida* and Buddhists are after all one, and remain so in spite of apparent diversity. Thus, the selfish concern ceases only when *Amida* actually enters into our beings. It is then all *Amida* and no self. Life in *Amida* has gained full potency, has interfused into the manyness of things, has transformed the static spatial conception of the *jijimuge* into a most lively temporal functioning technically known as the "simultaneous awakening of multitudes." This is the foundation on which Suzuki's idea of "brotherhood" and social ethics are based. Thus, enlightenment is found in *Amida*, with *Amida*, and through *Amida*, but *Amida* is no other person than our own self in this world. In this respect, Suzuki says that *Amitabha* is not one who lived many years ago and had his *prajnā* to save all beings but I myself am *Amitabha*.[1]

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[1] Suzuki, Shin Buddhism(New York; Evanston, and London: Harper & Row,1970), p. 35.

[2] Ibid., p. 36.

[3] Ibid., pp. 31-32.

[4] Ibid., p. 31.

The other personification of *mahākarunā* is *Kwannon Bosatsu* who is the rescuer within our worldly evils and calamities. That is, when one is in the midst of worldly disasters such as war, earthquake, and death, etc., *Kwannon* gives *abhayadana*, "fearlessness."[2] Needless to say, Suzuki's idea of *Kwannon* is derived from *The Kwannon-Sūtra* which is generally known as *Kwannon-gyo* in Japanese. In stating the nature of *Kwannon*, the Sūtra says:

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[1] *The Field of Zen*, p. 91.

[2] *The Essence of Buddhism*, p. 77.

> Kwannon is thoroughly pure and holy and is really a refuge and protector in trouble, grief, death, and disaster.[1]
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> He is in possession of all merits, regards all things with an eye of compassion, and like the ocean holds in himself an inestimable mass of virtues. For this reason he is to be adored...Kwannon is the one who views the world in truth, free from defilement, with knowledge extending far, and full of love and compassion; he is to be always prayed to and always adored.[2]

Needless to say, for Suzuki fearlessness is spiritual, not merely moral. It is concerned with the Buddhist faith, that is, the intuition of the Unconscious. Suzuki says:

> Faith is another word for intuition of the Unconscious. The Bodhisattva Kwannon Bosatsu is the "giver of fearlessness," and those who believe in him are given fearlessness, which is faith and intuition. All the Haiku poets are worshipers of Kwannon and in possession of fearlessness,...[3]

Also, for Suzuki fearlessness does not mean recklessness or desperation. It is a calm acceptance of the inevitable, or rather, being in a contemplative mood over the vicissitudes of life. Thus, Kwannon's power, his compassionate heart, is in one's own being, it is looking up to the beyond, it is coming to one's existential limits and jumping over the precipice which opens up before one. According to Suzuki, fearlessness rises from this, that is, the love of Kwannon consists in imparting to all beings this spirit of fearlessness.[4] Also, by fear Suzuki means that which hinders compassion to pass from one body to another. Further, Suzuki states fear as the spirit of self-fortification which destroys the functioning of the Great Compassionate Heart. In stating the nature of fear, Suzuki says:

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[1] Manual of Zen Buddhism, pp. 37-38.

[2] Ibid., p. 37.

[3] Zen and Japanese Culture, pp. 252-253.

[4] The Essence of Buddhism, p. 78.

> Fear erects all forms of obstruction between two souls and prevents them from interfusing, to build up the Kegon world of *jijimuge*. The self is afraid of going out to the not-self. Fear, breeder of doubts, suspicions, and jealousy, makes the self fortify against everything that surrounds it. This spirit of self-fortification destroys the functioning of the Great Compassionate Heart which is the moving force of the Kegon world of *jijimuge*.[1]

For Suzuki, fearlessness, however, breaks down all possible barriers between self and not-self, or rather this taking down of the barriers is fearlessness.

As an incarnation of *mahākarunā*, a *bodhisattva* also would revolve the identity-wheel of opposites or contradictions: black and white, dark and bright, sameness and difference, the one and the many, the finite and the infinite, love and hate, friend and foe, etc.[2] That is, while in the midst of clouds and dust, infinitely variegated, the *bodhisattva* works with his head and face all covered with mud and ashes. Where the utmost confusion of passions rages in its indescribable furies, the *bodhisattva* lives his life in all its vicissitudes, as the Japanese proverb has it, "seven times rolling up and down,

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis*, p. 69.

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and eight times getting up straight."[1] This is the life of *Ken chū shi*. *Ken* means "both" and refers to the dualism of black and white, good and evil, love and hate--which is the actuality of the world in which the Zen-man leads his life now. *Ken chū shi* is life itself shorn of its intellectual paradoxes, or rather, it includes indiscriminately, undifferentially, or better, totalistically, everything that is intellectual or affective or conative. It is the world as we have it with all its "brute facts" irrevocably facing us. The Zen-man has now "set his feet"(*shi*) right into them. His real life starts here. This is the meaning of *Ken chū shi*: "He has now come to into the midst of dualities(*ken*)." Here, really, in all actuality begins the Zen-man's life of love(*karunā*). Here we have one of the wonderful *mondōs*. Suzuki says:

> One day a monk visited Jōshū and said: "O Master, your stone bridge is noted all over the empire, but as I see it it is nothing but a rickety log bridge." Jōshū retorted, "you see your rickety one and fail to see the real stone bridge." The monk asked, "what is the stone bridge?" Jōshū: "Horses pass over it; donkeys pass over it."[2]

In interpreting this *mondō* of Jōshū's stone bridge, Suzuki says:

> Jōshū's bridge resembles the sands of the Ganges, which are trampled by all kinds of animals and incredibly soiled by them, and yet the sands make no complaint whatever. All the footprints left by creatures of every description are effaced in no time; and as to the filths, they are all effectively absorbed, leaving the sands as clean as ever.

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 68.

> So with Jōshū's stone bridge: not only horses and donkeys but nowadays all kinds of conveyances, including heavy trucks and trains of cars, pass over it and it is ever willing to accommodate them. Even when they abuse it is complacency is not at all disturbed. The Zen-man of the fourth step is like the bridge. He may not turn the right cheek to be struck when the left one is already hurt, but he works silently for the welfare of his fellow beings.[1]

That is, Jōshū has no selfish motive here. His whole existence is devoted to doing good for others. In comparing Jōshū with Christ, Suzuki states that "Christ declares, I am the Way. He calls others to be saved through him. Jōshū's spirit is also Christ's. There is no arrogant self-centered spirit in either of them. They simply, innocently, wholeheartedly express the same spirit of love."[2]

However, there are differences between Christian and Buddhist understandings of love. Perhaps one of the most noticeable facts in this life is that the notion of love as it is understood by Buddhists lacks the demonstrative feature of eroticism which we observe strongly manifested by some of the Christian saints. Their love is directed in a very special way toward Christ, whereas Buddhists have almost nothing to do with Buddha but with their fellow beings, nonsentient as well as sentient. Their love manifests itself in the form of unbegrudged and self-sacrificing labor for others.[3] This is why Yuima said: "I am ill because all beings are ill." Here we have another mondō:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 69.

[3] Ibid., p. 75.

> When Monju asked Yuima about his illness, the latter answered, "I am ill because all beings are ill. My illness is curable only when they are cured. They are constantly assailed by Greed, Anger, and Folly."[1]

Thus, love and mahākarunā are the essence of a bodhisattva. These "passions" make them stay with all beings as long as there is any one of them still in the state of unenlightenment. A Japanese proverb says: "To this world of patience they come and go for eight thousand times," meaning that Buddhas and bodhisattvas would for an indefinite number of times visit this world of ours, which is full of unendurable sufferings, just because their love knows no bounds.[2] That is, as the Lotus-Sūtra stated, "as long as there is one single solitary soul not saved, I(the bodhisattva) am coming back to this world to help him." "He(the bodhisattva) would stay on among all beings and work for their edification and enlightenment. He would see to it that he was not to shun any amount of suffering if it were at all conducive to the general welfare."[3]

Society and the Zennists' Life

Suzuki's idea of mahākarunā also gives rise to his social concern. We have already discussed the basic meaning of mahākarunā from the view point of its two aspects: "ontological" and "realistic." Throughout the previous discussion we have dealt with such important ideas as "brotherhood," "unity," and "equality." It goes without saying that these ideas are the key-words for understanding Suzuki's social ethics. Suzuki's idea of society is based on the interfusion and interpenetration in the jijimuge world. Society is a sort of organism whose component parts and units are most intimately related to one another in every conceivable way.[1] Consequently, if any one part of it suffers, the other parts are sure to share the suffering. For this reason, Suzuki compares society with the human body. Suzuki says:

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[1] Ibid., p. 70.

[2] Ibid., pp. 70-71.

[3] Ibid., p. 70.

> It(society) is like our own body, even a little scratch on the skin may cause immediate death due to a poisonous infection. Every unit, therefore, is to be carefully guarded against possible injuries, and at the same time its healthy growth is to be prompted by all means. The health and development of the entire body depend upon these individual units; the latter are of as much importance as the former.[2]

That is, for Suzuki, society is established on the mutuality of mahākarunā and thus the logic of interdependence of all things in mahākarunā came to be the same as the theory of the organic unity of society. The logic of cooperativism in a big family system produced the ethics of the middle path or harmony which determined the relationship between capital and labor, for example, as a cooperative relation. In this respect, for Suzuki the proletariat is not to be set against the bourgeoisie. Both are rooted in mahākarunā. Suzuki says:

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[1] The Essence of Buddhism, p. 85.

[2] Ibid.

> Both (capital and labor) are equally needed for industry. And the proletariat is not to be set against the bourgeoisie, nor the latter against the former. Mutuality is of utmost necessity for the welfare of the whole community, and this mutuality works to the best advantage when it is based on equality and freedom of the will. All these are available only when they are rooted in the fertile soil of the Great Compassionate Heart, "Mahākaruna."[1]

Here the very important thing for Suzuki is the idea of "equality." For Suzuki "equality" is the foundation on which man and society are built. Here the Buddhists, especially Zen Buddhists, try to expound the term "equality" by Buddhahood, or Buddha-nature. According to Doshō (died 434), who first found what is the Buddha-nature, every being, man or no-man, is in possession of the Buddha-nature.[2] By Buddha-nature Suzuki, as previously stated, means prajnā which is possessed by every one of us, but owing to the confusion of thought we fail to realise it in ourselves. In short, it is "Ultimate Reality," or "Human Nature Itself." That is, we all have equality because we all have Buddha-nature in ourselves. Here Hakugen Ichikawa's idea of man and society is helpful for understanding Suzuki's social concern. Ichikawa says:

> We human beings are equal only in the respect that all possess the seeds of Buddhahood and therefore have the potentiality of realizing Buddhahood. The diversity of all social positions, capabilities and circumstances was explained as the result of the inevitable consequences of merits and demerits in a previous existence.[3]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 85-86.

[2] Studies in Zen, p. 195.

[3] Hakugen Ichikawa, "The Problem of Buddhist Socialism in Japan," Japanese Religions, Vol. 6, No. 3(1970), pp. 16-17.

Further, we not only have the Buddha-nature but also we are the Buddha-nature, as previously stated, The idea that "all sentient-beings have the Buddha-nature innately" is the religious foundation of the principles of the equality of man and the dignity of individuals and respect for life. This gives a metaphysical foundation to ward off the self-alienation from nature caused by science and industry.[1] Moreover, the idea of equality is derived from the idea of "identity" on which the whole Mahayana Buddhist philosophy, especially Zen philosophy, is based. The idea of "identity" was fully discussed in the previous section.

For further understanding Suzuki's social concern, it is very important to take into consideration the Zennist life. The life of the Zen monk is something altogether out of keeping with modern life. We can say that everything modern and many things ordinarily regarded as symbolic of a pious life are absent here. Suzuki states that instead of labour-saving machinery, what may appear as labor-wasting is encouraged. Commercialism and self-advertisement are banned. Also, scientific, intellectual education is interdicted. Comfort, luxuary, and womanly kindness are conspicuous for their absence.[2] In the Zennist life there is a spirit of grim earnestness, with which higher truths are sought; there

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[1] *Ibid*., pp. 35-36.

[2] Suzuki, *The Training of the Zen Monk* (Kyoto: The Eastern Buddhist Society, 1934), p. 4.

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is determined devotion to the attainment of superior wisdom, which will help to put an end to all the woes and ailments of human life, and also to the acquirement of the fundamental social virtues, which quietly pave the way to world-peace and the promotion of the general welfare of all mankind. The Zen life thus, according to Suzuki, aims besides maturing the monk's spiritual development, at turning out good citizens of society.[1] From the ethical point of view, the Zen life may be analyzed into three aspects: life of humility, of service, and of labour. The chief means of supporting the Zendō life is begging, and it is also one of the characteristics of the Zen training. Begging has, besides its economic value, a two-fold moral signification: the one is to teach the beggar humility and the other is to make the donor accumulate the merit of self-denial. Both, according to Suzuki, have a great social value when they are understood in their proper bearings, and what is most strongly emphasized in the monk's life is this social meaning, and not necessarily its economic importance. Also, the donor is not to know who the beggar is, nor does the beggar observe who the donor is. That is, for Suzuki the deed of charity is to be practised altogether, free from personal relationships.[2] When the latter are present the deed is apt to lose its spiritual sense. It is just an act of favouritism, that is, it harbours in it on the one side the feeling of personal superiority and on the other the degrading consciousness of subserviency.[1]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 23.

In the Zen life, service is also very important for the brotherhood. For Suzuki, the brotherhood is a community of men pursuing one common object, and the spirit of mutual help and service is everywhere evident in its life. Democracy is also made one of the principles governing this social body. Each monk, therefore, endeavours, on the one hand, to give others the least trouble for his own sake, while on the other he will do his utmost to do the most good he can for the general welfare of the community. This is why Zennists think that those who have successfully graduated from the Zendō life are some of the most efficiently trained and the most thoroughly equipped members of society.[2]

The meaning of service, according to Suzuki, is to do the work assigned ungrudgingly and without thought of personal reward material or moral. The only desire the worker cherishes in the execution of his service is to turn its merit to the general treasure-house of all-knowledge.[3] That is, for Suzuki to do service does not always mean to do something for others. If it is done with the thought of a reward or without the sense of gratitude and humility, it is not at all service, but a deed of mean commercialism.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., p. 53.

[3] Ibid., p. 47.

Therefore, the Zen monk ought to be above that. A life of service, therefore, is closely related to that of humility and gratitude.[1] That is, for Suzuki the spirit of service is "secret virtue," it is the deed for its own sake, not looking for any form of compensation anywhere, either in heaven or on earth.[2] In other words, the Zen point of view is not to look at the matter economically or dynamically: rather, "livingly" or "creatively." Merit, virtue, benefit, service, and other terms belonging to this category are conventionally religious. The way Zen handles so-called truths is satisfyingly fresh and stimulating; and there is at the same time a certain reverential attitude towards nature and her resources.[3] Accordingly, for Suzuki the trouble with our social life is that we are always seeking for a reward, and more frequently for one enormously out of proportion to the merit of the deed itself. When this is not forthcoming, we are dissatisfied, and this dissatisfaction causes all sorts of trouble in our daily walk of life.[4]

Human life, according to Suzuki, is not always governed by economic principles: there is "something more" in it, and the peace and happiness we all seeking are attained only when this "something more" is understood. However, for Suzuki, it is most unfortunate that our modern life is systematically moving away from this thought, in fact deliberately trying to stifle the inner voice.[1] This is why Suzuki earnestly urges us to grasp the doctrine of sūnyatā not only philosophically but in the most practical way. Unless this is done, the practice of secret virtue will be something artificial and, therefore, hypocritical.[2] When this is understood, service becomes a fact of our daily life, and the practice of secret virtue is no longer Pharisaism.[3] Any work ceases to be coercive and is willingly undertaken in the best possible manner. This attitude of mind is cultivated apart from its moral or social value, as we have already seen. Yet for Suzuki the training of Zendō is not only for the development of man's inner psychic powers but for that of his moral character as a social being. In other words, Zendō is not meant just to be a hiding place from the worries of the world; on the contrary, it is a training station where a man equips himself for life's battlefield, that is, to do all that can possibly be done for his community.[4]

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[1] Ibid., p. 53.

[2] Suzuki in his The Essentials of Zen Buddhism says that "Secret Virtue" means practicing goodness without any thought of recognition, neither by others nor by oneself. Zen calls it "a deed without merit(p. 276)."

[3] The Training of the Zen Monk, p. 54.

[4] Ibid., p. 58.

Labour, according to Suzuki, is the Zennist life itself. Suzuki's idea of labour is based on Paichang's (720-814) philosophy of work. Both "A day of no work is a day of no eating" and "If I do not work, I have no right to take my meal" are the famous words of Paichang.[1] For Suzuki, Paichang's motive of work evidently came from his feeling of humility, but in fact manual labour forms one of the most essential features of the Zen life. Actually, before Paichang the Buddhist monks were devoted to learning, meditation, and observing the vinaya percepts. But he was not satisfied with this; he aspired to follow the example of Hui-neng who was a farmer in southern China and earned his living by cutting wood and selling fuel. When Paichang organized a new monastry exclusively for Zen monks one of his rules was to work; each monk, including the master himself, was to engage in some manual, menial labor.[2] Indeed, Paichang's idea of work saved Buddhism, Theravada and Mahayana, from sinking into a state of lethargy and a life of mere contemplation. That is, it saved especially Zen Buddhism from deteriorating into quietism or mere intellectual gymnastics. Suzuki says:

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 59-60.

[4] Selected Writings, p. 274.

> Paichang's insistence upon manual work has saved Zen from falling into the pitfall of antinomianism or from becoming a hallucinatory mode of mind...Zen would say, "pour it out in work," meaning by work the active and concrete realization of love.[3]

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[1] Paichang is the founder of the Zen monastery system in distinction from other Buddhist institutions.

[2] Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 71.

[3] Essays in Zen Buddhism, First Series, pp. 317-318.

For this reason, Suzuki highly evaluated Paichang for his psychological insight. "Paichang," says Suzuki, "was a great Zen master who had a wonderful insight into the working of human psychology. If not for him, Zen as we have it might never come into existence. In this respect, we owe a great deal to the Chinese genius."[1] In fact, however high and soaring to the sky our ideas may be, we are firmly fixed to the earth; there is no way of escaping this physical existence. Whatever thoughts we may have, they must definitely be related to our body, if they are to have the power to influence life in any way.[2] Zen masters have, therefore, always been anxious to see their monks work hard on the farm, in the woods, or in the mountains. In fact, they themselves would lead the labouring party, taking up the spade, the scissors,or the axe, or carrying water, or pulling the cart.[3] There was also a democratic spirit here in action. Suzuki says:

> The term pu-ching, "all-invited," means to have every member of the Brotherhood on the field. No distinctions are made, no exemptions are allowed; for the high as well as the low in the hierarchy are engaged in the same kind of work. There is a division of labour, naturally but no social class-idea inimical to the general welfare of the community.[4]

It goes without saying that Paichang's idea of "no work, no eating" did not necessarily originate from an economic or ethical valuation of life. Paichang's motive was not that nobody deserved his daily bread if he did not earn it with the sweat of his brow. Truly, there is a virtue in not eating the bread of idleness, and there have been many Buddhists since the early days of Buddha who thought it a most disgraceful thing to be living on other's earnings and savings. The Paichang's object, while it might have been unconsciously conceived, was more psychological in spite of his open declaration, "No work, No eating." In other words, the spirit of work refused to make use of the shadoof and did not mind doing any amount of work just for the love of it. This is not in accord with the Western and, indeed, the modern idea of labor-saving devices of every description. When they have thus saved themselves from labor and gained plenty of time for their pleasures or other employments, modern people are busy making up all sorts of complaints about how dissatisfied they are with life, or inventing weapons whereby they can kill thousands of human beings by simply pressing a button.[1]

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[1] The Training of the Zen Monk, p. 38.

[2] Ibid., p. 33.

[3] Ibid., p. 34.

[4] Ibid.

Thus, work, according to Suzuki, was to save the Buddhist monks from mental inactivity or in unbalanced development of mind which too often results from the meditative habit of the monkish life. Zennists were perfectly aware of the deep meaning in everything they did, whether with hand or mind. There was no dualistic discrimination in their way of thinking and feeling.[2] Further, there was no separation between being and doing. For this is, according to Suzuki, the only way to study Zen and to live it. Nothing can ever really be learned until it works through the nerves and muscles.

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[1] Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 71.

[2] The Training of the Zen Monk, p. 38.

Thus, the Zen life is considered finished not only when the truth of sūnyatā is intuitively grasped, but when this truth is demonstrated in every phase of practical life with its multitudinous trials, duties, and complications, and also when a great heart of Karunā is awakened in the way rain falls on the unjust as well as on the just, or in the way Jōshū's stone-bridge is trodden on by all sorts of beings,--by horses, donkeys, tigers, jackals, tortoises, hares, human beings, etc.[1] According to Suzuki this is the greatest accomplishment man can achieve on earth, and when the Zen monks grasp this, they take leave of the Zendō and begin their real life among their fellow-beings, as members of the great community known as the world.[2]

International Affairs

Here Suzuki's attitude towards international affairs, especially his thought on world-peace in connection with non-ego, is examined. In short, Suzuki's international politics is rooted in his idea of Sōgō-rikai and Kan-yō, "mutual understanding, and tolerance," but not in a power-concept. Suzuki states:

The ideal of world-peace will become realisable when

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[1] Ibid., p. 115. [2] Ibid.

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> the idea of tolerance and mutual understanding is fully appreciated. As long as international politics as based on power there will always be fear, suspicion, and secret designing between nations, which will most assuredly call forth warlike engagements again over the whole surface of the earth.[1]

That is, Suzuki's idea of world-peace is based on the universal brotherhood and the oneness of all things in the Dharmakaya. Only in this world of universal brotherhood can we understand and be tolerant to each other. For this reason, for Suzuki the foundation of the international troubles is ego-soul. Suzuki's ideas of world-peace are mainly discussed in his essay on "Why Do We Fight?" which was submitted to the Conference of the League of Nations. In the essay he states that the basic international problems of whatever kind are rooted in ego-soul, that is, in the erroneous conception of ego-soul, or in the fixed idea of an individual soul-substance, "ātma,"[2] That is, most of the international difficulties come from one nation's asserting itself too much at the expense of other nations. In stating the nature of ego-soul, Suzuki says:

> It is the ego that stands rigidly against things coming from the outside, and it is this ego rigidly that makes it impossible for us to accept every thing that confronts us...Without the sense of an

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[1] The Essence of Buddhism, p. 86.

[2] The Eastern Buddhist, Vol. I, No. 4(1922), p. 271.

> ego, there is no moral responsibility, but the divine transcends morality.[1]

Mahayana Buddhism, however, teaches that each individual ego gains its significance only when it loses and finds itself in the greater ego. Through the *ānatta* doctrine of Mahayana Buddhism the nations maybesaved from self-destruction as well as from mutual destruction. That is, when ego-soul is removed the positive notion of universal brotherhood and of the oneness of all things in the *Dharmakaya* or the Law-Body will assert itself freely and gloriously. What we call an ego has no real existence; for Suzuki, therefore, when we think of one we have to think of others, we are all interrelated. At this point the Zen Buddhist social ethics posits itself. Strictly, there seems to be very little awareness of the basic differences between a purely personal morality and morality in the larger social realm.[2] According to Suzuki, to assert the ego beyond the legitimate limits of the interrelationship of things means moral violence. The noblest act will naturally be to promote the unity and harmony of the whole, which may sometimes involve the sacrifice of the self in life or in possessions. In this respect, Mochizuki Shinko says:

> The main thing is to recognize the truth of Buddhism which teaches the oneness of all things in Buddha-

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[1] *The Essentials of Zen Buddhism*, p. 144.

[2] James Chuck, "Zen Buddhism and Paul Tillich" (Unpublished Th. D. Dissertation, The Holbrook Library, Pacific School of Religion, 1962), p. 321.

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> nature existing in them and making them move and keeping them alive. When we are united in this Buddha-nature, free from ignorance and irrational self-assertion, we know how to preserve multitudinousity without interfering with its essential oneness.[1]

Harmony will thus prevail not only in one's individual life but in international relations. This is why Mochizuki continues to say:

> Permanent peace can never be attained by merely appealing to diplomacy or to the subtle machination of political strategies, however, highly trained in their profession. Religion must come in and the spiritual truth must be put in active operation in order to establish the real and permanent foundation of peace.[2]

Also, this is the main reason why the Buddhist scholars, especially Zennists, strongly emphasize spiritual insight whenever they discuss the international affairs of any kind. Because, in spiritual insights lies the permanent principle of peace. Sonyu Ōtani, one of the Japanese Buddhist scholars, says regarding Buddhist participation in an international peace conference:

> We do not necessarily expect of our worthy representatives achieving a diplomatic success or anything like it, but we do expect them to be able to infuse into the Conference something spiritual and make the nations grow conscious of something looking far into the real welfare of humanity, or something that goes deep into

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[1] Shinko Mochizuki, "The Possibility of Permanent Peace," _The Eastern Buddhist_, Vol. I, No. 4(1922), pp. 267-268.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 268.

the root of all human difficulties.[1]

Mochizuki also says:

> The Conference has to have an eye on the spiritual phase of human life, where really lies the permanent principle of world-peace, and not to be carried away by too narrow national interest and self-asserting, power-coveting policies which are sure to bring the Conference into a tragic comedy or burlesque.[2]

In short, Suzuki's idea of world-peace is rooted in non-self. The idea of non-self is basically derived from his idea of _sūnyatā_. All phenomena, according to the philosophy of _sūnyatā_, arises from innumerable causes and conditions functioning mutually. For this reason, all phenomena are changeable, appearing and disappearing, and are unstable and unsubstantial which is called _sūnyatā_.[3] Such a view of life and the world produced the doctrine of non-self and this doctrine made the independence of an individual personality impossible. And the doctrine of non-self produces principles which were equivalent with natural laws that are the very basis of human rights and justice.[4] In this respect, the doctrine of non-ego is the foundation of the Buddhist ethics, both Theravadin and Mahayanist. But the latter develops the doctrine. The doctrine is known as the doctrine of _nirātman_ or _ānatta_. Suzuki says that when we realize that the _ātman_

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[1] Sonyu Ōtani, "The Washington Conference from the Buddhist Point of View," _The Eastern Buddhist_, Vol. I, No. 4(1922), p. 264.

[2] Mochizuki, "The Possibility of Permanent Peace," p. 268.

[3] Ichikawa, "The Problem of Buddhist Socialism in Japan," p. 18.

[4] _Ibid_.

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is non-existent, mahākarunā asserts itself, as mahākarunā constitutes the Buddha-heart, and the Buddha-heart is no other than the human heart. Also, for Suzuki there is from the beginning no ego and therefore that there is no need of crucifying it.[1] Here we have some differences between the Christian understanding of crucifixion and the Zen Buddhist idea of ānatta.

It is, however, a misunderstanding to construe the doctrine of ānatta as negativistic. The misunderstanding, in fact, rises from grammar. The prefix a or an is privative. But the ānatta is not to be interpreted from the purely linguistic point of view, for the doctrine is based on existential experience. The denial of ego does not stop just with the denial. Experience goes much more deeply and is more informative of reality than linguistic.[2] Consequently, Suzuki states:

> When Buddhists deny the existence of an ego or ego-substance, or when they talk about the transiency of things, this is not an expression of negativity. Underneath, behind the apparent negative statement there is a grand, basic primary affirmation.[3]

Further, the non-ego is a state of mind known as mu-nen or mu-so, "no-thought" or "no-reflection." This does not mean just to be without thought, ideas, feelings, etc. For Suzuki it means letting your natural faculties act in a consciousness free from thoughts, reflection, or affections of any kind. This state of mind is also known as egolessness in which you cherish no egoistic thoughts, no consciousness of your own attainments.[1] Literally, in Haiku there was no artificial or intellectually calculated scheme for any kind of effect; that is, there was no "ego" on the part of the author aiming at its own glorification.[2] Haiku, like Zen, abhors egoism in any form of assertion. This is the main reason why in Zen Buddhism wars of any kind cannot take place. R. Linssen says:

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[1] The Essentials of Zen Buddhism, p. 345.

[2] Ibid., p. 346.

[3] The Field of Zen, p. 81.

> No one can deny the eminently social character of Buddhism. It is the only religion which has never started a war, because if avidity and egoism are removed from the heart of man as an individual, these negative tendencies also disappear from the actions undertaken by communities which are the sum of these individuals.[3]

For this reason, Suzuki asks: "Why Do We Fight?" This is also a subject of his essay on "world-peace." To this serious question Suzuki answers that "because each ego wants to predominate over others, not always in accordance with the principle of Anātman."[4] Suzuki continues to state that

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[1] Zen and Japanese Culture, pp. 126-127.

[2] Ibid., p. 225. Haiku is a special form of Japanese poetry in three lines, the first having five syllables, the second having seven, and the third again five. Haiku poems are not for instruction, but are for deep enjoyment of sentiments or of knowledge.

[3] Robert Linssen, Living Zen(New York: Grove Press, 1960), p. 199.

[4] "Why Do We Fight?" p. 271.

> National pride in its narrow and arrogant form, and racial prejudice against people not of the same color, and imperialistic militarism never satiated but always for self-aggrandisement,--these are the vices that nowadays set up one nation against another. Names are often fine and look innocent and sometimes quite rational; but at the bottom the ghost of ego-self lurks. The ego-centered thoughts always breed inharmony and end in destrcution all around.[1]

For Suzuki, every human being, therefore, must be based upon this spiritual insight which tells us the uselessness and irrationality of all kinds of pride and prejudice and arrogance. In this respect, for him the greatest of human tragedies is ignorance and ego-centricity. This basic truth is the key to success or failure for understanding Suzuki's international concern.

Further, Suzuki's Buddhist socialism is based on his idea of _Sūnya_-Anarchist-Communism.[2] For understanding Suzuki's thought on the structure of Buddhist socialism, we must pay attention to Ichikawa's essay on "The Problem of Buddhist Socialism in Japan." In interpreting Suzuki's idea of Buddhist socialism, Ichikawa says that Suzuki said in his "Neo-Essay on Religion" written in 1896 that religion wishes to straighten out social complications with freedom as the sword and with equality as a shield but never approves of radical socialism such as anarchism. After World War II, Suzuki signed his name to "The Declaration of Japanese Scientists for Peace and War" which was socialistic. Again Suzuki said "I think religion must be like an-archism. Anarchism is not self-indulgence. It is individual freedom without interfering with others. If we all understand this, and if everything works out right, it is anarchism I believe."[1] In short, Suzuki's idea is to realise an anarchistic world through religious enlightenment. It is never limited to any nationality. In expressing his idea of non-nationalism,[2] Suzuki says:

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[1] _Ibid_.

[2] The term "_Sunyā_-Anarchist-Communism" is used by Ichikawa for presenting Suzuki's type of socialism.

> Theoretically speaking, Zen has nothing to do with nationalism. As long as it is a religion, its mission has universal validity, and its field of applicability is not limited to any one nationality.[3]

From the view point of history, however, it is subject to accidents and particularization. In other words, Japanese Zen has been connected to Japanese nationality. According to Suzuki, the reason is that Zen was not received in Japan in its pure form. Accordingly, Zen became identified with the patriotic spirit which Shintoism gave. Suzuki says:

> When Zen first came to Japan, it became identified with persons steeped in Confucianism and patriotic spirit, and Zen naturally took their color unto itself; that is to say, Zen was not received in Japan in its pure form, free of the effect of all accidents of place and time.[4]

Actually, since the introduction of the Sung philosophy to

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[1] Ichikawa, "The Problem of Buddhist Socialism in Japan," p. 24.

[2] Suzuki's idea of non-nationalism is discussed in many places, especially in Suzuki Daisetz Zenshyū Vol. VIII, pp. 311-338, 338-362, 363-389, Vol. IX, pp. 141-149, 261-267, 271-295, 401-423, and Vol. XXIII, pp. 134-141.

[3] Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 47.

[4] Ibid.

Japan there has been a constant attempt to syncretize the three teachings, Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shintoism. One remarkable fact deserving notice at this point in the history of Japanese thought is that Shintoism, which is regarded as the official embodiment of the national spirit of Japan,[1] did not assert itself as doctrinally independent of either Confucianism or Buddhism. The most probable reason for this is that Shintoism has no philosophy of its own to stand on; it is awakened to its own consciousness and existence only when it comes in contact with one of the others, and thereby learns how to express itself.[2] In this respect, Zen Buddhism, historically speaking, is subject to Japanese nationality.

Further, Suzuki's idea of an anarchistic world is related to pacifism and complete disarmament. Buddha's world is a brotherly world without classes, exploitation and a state. That is to say, it, as Bhikkhu Thittila points out, is the whole society, the whole country and the world without distinction whatsoever with regard to class, color or creed.[3] In a socialistic society, production and distribution must be co-managed by people according to the fundamental principles of this world. Also, Zen Buddhism always seeks the principle of the Middle Path which is the neutral social thought. This neutralism is not middle thought between an ultra leftist thought and ultra rightist thought. It is the art of living as enlightenment and mediation by common neutralism and social reformationism.[1] In short, for Suzuki the structure of Buddhist socialism will be, to use Ichikawa's terms, *Sūnya*-Anarchist-Communism. Here *sūnya*, in this case, is the foundation of a social revolution on a vertical plane. It is also the foundation of a humble and flexible spirit which has purified itself of dogmatism, self-absolutism and the revolutionary will to power at the age of fundamental choice. That is, the *Sūnya*-Anarchist-Communism is in origin humanism.[2] This is to realize the complete return and release of the relationship between estranged man and man, estranged man and nature. This original humanism will try to discover the significance of living as man, devoted to creating oneness of tranquility and untranquility within the constant-individual or collective practice in actuality, in the dialectical process of theory and practice.[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 57. [2] Ibid.

[3] Bhikkhu Thittila, "The Art of Compassion," Middle Way, Vol. XXVII, No. 1(1952), p. 12.

Love and Power

Suzuki's discussion of love and power is mainly given in his statement on "Love and Power" which he made in the Hall of the International Exihibition at Brussels on 28th

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[1] Ichikawa, "The Problem of Buddhist Socialism in Japan," pp. 19-20.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 36.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 36-37.

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May, 1958, at the Conference "In Defense of Spiritual Values in the Contemporary World." In this essay Suzuki strongly connects both love and power with social problems. As stated before, for Suzuki the individual is non-existent when he is isolated from other individuals and cut off from the group to which he belongs, whether the group be biological or political or cosmological. This means that the existence of each individual owes something to an infinitely expanding and all-enwrapping net of loving relationship, which takes up not only every one of us but everything that exists.[1] It goes without saying that Suzuki's idea of mutual dependence is based on the Kegon idea of interfusion or interpenetration or interrelatedness or mutual unabstractedness. At this point, Suzuki's thought on love begins to be realized. For Suzuki, love grows out of the realization of interrelatedness. He says:

> When this philosophy of the interrelatedness of things is rightly understood, love begins to be realized, because love is to recognize others and to take them into consideration in every way of life. To do to others what you would like them to do to you is the keynote of love and this is what naturally grows out of the realization of mutual relatedness.[2]

On the contrary to his idea of love, for Suzuki power excludes his idea of mutual relationship in _jijimuge_ world on which love is built, Suzuki says:

> The notion of power excludes the feelings of personality, mutuality, gratitude, and all kinds of inter-

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[1] "Love and Power," _Middle Way_, Vol. XXXIII, No. 3 (1958), p. 90.

[2] _Ibid_.

> relationship. Whatever benefits we may derive from the advancement of the sciences, ever-improving technology, and industrialization in general, we are not allowed to participate in them universally because power is liable to monopolize them instead of disturbing them equally among our fellow beings.[1]

In other words, for Suzuki power is something brought from outside into a structure of inner relationship. However, love is not a command given us by an outside agent. That is, love needs no external, all-powerful agent exercise itself. Power is usually used arbitrarily and alienatingly and exaggerately. Accordingly, it makes the social problems more difficult, Suzuki says:

> What troubles us these days is no other than a crookedly exaggerated assertion of the power-concept by those who fail to see into its true nature and therefore are not capable of using it for the benefit of all.[2]

While power, superficially strong and irresistible, is in reality self-exhausting, love, through self-negation, is ever creative, for it is the root of existence. Love is life and life is love. Further, love creates life. Being an infinitely complicated network of interrelationship, life cannot be itself unless supported by love. Wishing to give life a form, love expresses itself in all modes of being.[3] Here we have Suzuki's idea of an ontological character of love. Love is reality itself in the deeper sense. Love in its penetration into the core of reality, far beyond the finiteness of the intellect, is infinity itself. According to Suzuki, without love one cannot see the infinitely expanding net work of relationship which is reality.[1] Further, for Suzuki love is affirmation, a creative affirmation. Love and creativity are two aspects of one reality. It is never destructive and annihilating, because unlike power it is all-embracing and all-forgiving. Love enters into its object and becomes one with it, that is, separateness is overcome by love. Love, however, maintains separateness at the same time. B. Phillips says:

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 91.

[3] *Ibid.*

> Love overcomes separateness and yet maintains it at the same time. Were the separateness something final there could be no real contact and no love. Without the separateness, on the other hand, there would be no poles for the love to exist between.[2]

Expressing it in another way, it means that for Suzuki love makes the ego lose itself in the object it loves, and yet at the same time it wants to have the object as its own. This is a contradiction, and a struggle that is a tragedy of life.[3] On the contrary, power is always dualistic, rigid, self-assertive, and exclusive, whereas love is self-humiliating and all-comprehensive. Power represents destruction, even self-destruction, quite contrary to love's creativeness.[4] Love dies and lives again, while power kills and is killed.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 92.
[2] *The Essentials of Zen Buddhism*, p. xv.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 330.
[4] "Love and Power," p. 92.

Consequently, it turns against itself and destroys itself when it has nothing to conquer. This is in the nature of power, and is it not this that we are witnessing today, particularly in our international affairs?

Also, love is never blind; it is the reservoir of infinite light. Because for Suzuki love flows out of rightly seeing reality as it is, that is, in its suchness. Being blind and self-limiting, on the contrary, power itself is unreal, and thus all that comes in contact with it turns into unreality. Power thrives only in a world of unrealities and thus it becomes the symbol of insincerity and falsehood.[1] Expressing it in another way, for Suzuki power utterly fails to see that its existence is dependent upon something infinitely greater than itself. Not knowing this fact, power plunges itself straight into the pit of self-destruction. That is, the eye deceives itself and it becomes suspicious of anything that confronts it and desires to destroy it. This is why Suzuki says that power should be enlightened. He says:

> The cataract that blinds the eye must be removed in order that power may experience enlightenment. Without this experience everything becomes unreal to the myopically veiled eye of power.[2]

Thus, for Suzuki both love and power seemed to be diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive. Where there is power there cannot be any shadow of love, and where love is no power can ever intrude upon it. However, for Suzuki, love belongs to an order higher than power, and it transcends power. It is only power that imagines itself to be opposed to love. In truth, for Suzuki love, however, is all-enveloping and all-forgiving; it is a universal solvent, and infinitely creative and resourceful agent.[1]

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 93.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 92.

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[1] *Ibid*.

CHAPTER III

PAUL JOHANNES TILLICH

The Ontological Ground of Tillich's Theonomous Ethics

Ontology

Paul Tillich's idea of theonomous ethics is mainly discussed as the correlation between the doctrine of Holy Spirit and that of human life in his Systematic Theology, Vol. III.[1] In dealing with ethics, Tillich intends to describe it ontologically, as he also treats other doctrines. For Tillich, ontology becomes the foundation on which his thought of ethics is built up. For this reason, we should inquire about what ontology is meant by Tillich before discussing his thought on theonomous ethics.

Ontology, according to Tillich, deals with being-itself. The ontological question, therefore, is: What is being-itself?[2] That is to say, ontology is the attempt to understand the meaning of being. It is the study of being.[3] First of all, being, according to Tillich, is that which is not a special being or a group of beings, not something concrete or something abstract, but rather something which is always thought implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, if something is said to be.[1] In other words, ontology inquires of the ultimate reality beyond the superficially realistic, and it treats the power of being in all beings. Indeed, what does it mean that a thing is or that a thing is not? For Tillich, this ontological question is the basis of philosophy. Tillich says:

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[1] Tillich maintains that morality and ethics are matters of the gracious presence of the Spirit. Tillich has rightly seen that ethics has to do with grace and not law, that it is established by God's love which creates the possibility of man's love in response.

[2] Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 163.

[3] Alexander J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich(New York: A Delta Book, 1966), p. 103.

> Ontology is the rational explanation of the structure of Being itself. Philosophy always was and always will be in the first place ontology, whether the philosophers admit it or not. The classical philosophers never were in doubt about this fact. Those who pretend not to presuppose an ontology deceive themselves. Even a skeptical epistemology such as present-day logical positivism is based on a hidden interpretation of the structure of Being itself.[2]

For Tillich, ontology asks the question of being as being. It investigates the character of everything that is in so far as it is. This is its basic task, and the answer it provides determines the analysis of all special forms of being.[3] That is why Tillich calls it "first philosophy." It does not try to describe the nature of beings, either in their universal, generic qualities, or in their individual, historical manifestations. That is, ontology does not ask about stars and plants, animals and men. Also, it does not ask about events and those who act within these events. But it inquires about the ontological question, that is, "the structure of being itself." Tillich says:

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 163.

[2] Tillich, "Being and Love," Moral Principles of Action, ed. by Ruth Nanda Anshen, p. 661.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 163.

> Ontology deals with the structure of Being itself, not with the nature of a special being or a special realm of beings. Ontology asks the question: What does it mean that something *is* and is not *not*? Which characteristics show everything that participates in Being? The ontological question presupposes the attitude of a man who has experienced the tremendous shock of the possiblity that there is nothing, or--more practically speaking--who has looked into the threatening abyss of nothingness.[1]

That is, this ontological question arises in something like a "metaphysical shock"--the shock of possible non-being.[2] For Tillich ontology is the elaboration of the "logos" of the "*on*"(ὄν), in English of the "rational word" which grasps "being as such."[3] Thus, ontology asks the simple and infinitely difficult question: *What does it mean to be? What are the structures, common to everything that participates in being?* The ontological question is not something speculative, but deals with the problem how does the basic structure of being exist.[4] In this respect, first of all, Tillich intends to make clear the basic structure of being from the standpoint of the levels of ontological concepts. He distinguishes four levels of ontological concepts: a) the basic ontological structure which is the implicit condition of the ontological question; b) the elements which constitute the ontological structure; c) the characteristics of being which are the conditions of existence; and d) the categories of being and knowing. An elaboration of these renders a definition of being and gives basis and content to the ontological question.

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[1] "Being and Love," p. 661.

[2] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 163.

[3] Tillich, *Love, Power, and Justice*(New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 18.

[4] *Ibid*., p. 19.

As a first level of ontological analysis, the basic structure of being, according to Tillich, lies in the polarity of self-world. The ontological question presupposes a subject who asks and an object about which he asks. That is, the very fact of the ontological question implies that being has a subject-object structure. This subject-object structure, in turn, presupposes the self-world structure as the basic articulation of being.[1] "A self," says Tillich, "is not a thing that may or may not exist; it is an original phenomenon which logically precedes all questions of existence."[2] By "self" Tillich means a centered structure which includes both the central point from which actions and reactions occur and the environment, area, or world in terms of which is defined. Thus, everything has centeredness and self-hood. Man is a fully developed and completely centered self.[3] But the self

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[1] John H. Randall, Jr. "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," The Theology of Paul Tillich, ed. by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall(New York: Macmillan Co., 1964), p. 152.

[2] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 169.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 169-170.

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does not stand alone; man experiences himself as having a world to which he belongs. Then man, according to Tillich, is a part of the world.[1] Here in the analysis of the basic ontological structure, as John H. Randall, Jr., points out, Tillich is following Martin Heidegger's thought on Dasein. That is, following Heidegger's Being and Time, Tillich finds "being there"(Dasein)--the place where the structure of being is manifest--given to man within himself.[2] Therefore, Tillich states that "Man is able to answer the ontological question himself because he experiences directly and immediately the structure of being and its elements."[3] Further, man is always related to his world either dependently or independently. That is, self and world stand in polar relation. "The self without a world," says Tillich, "is empty; the world without a self is dead."[4] For Tillich, such an "interdependence of self and world is the basic ontological structure and implies all the others."[5]

The second level of ontological concepts is that of the elements which constitute the basic ontological structure and are found in every being. According to Tillich, there are the three pairs of polar elements: "Individualization and Participation," "Dynamics and Form," and "Freedom and Destiny." Like the structure of being, they, too, are polar and each is meaningful only in relation to its opposite pole. In Tillich's ontological theology, "individualization and participation" are the first pair of ontological elements. As stated above, for Tillich the self is a structural center and everything that is has such a center, or self. Individualization, therefore, is not a characteristic of a special sphere of being. It is a quality of everything. It is implied in and constitutive of every self, which means that at least in an analogous way it is implied in and constitutive of every being.[1] For this reason, for Tillich, individualization is an ontological element. Individualization, however, implies participation. Individualization and participation stand in polar relation and are interdependent on all levels of being.[2] Man is an individual who participates in his world. In other words, the individual self is a part of the world. This means that a self includes within itself that in which it participates. Participation is essential in individualization. For Tillich, the perfect form which individualization reaches is called a "person."[3] But it cannot come to existence without the encounter with other persons.

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[1] For Tillich being is man encountering the world. This logically and experientially precedes all other structures. Man experiences himself as having a world to which he belongs, and it is from the analysis of this polar relationship between man and the world that the basic ontological structure is derived(Randall, "The Ontology of Paul Tillich," p. 152.).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 169.

[4] Ibid., p. 171.

[5] Ibid.

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[1] Ibid., pp. 174-175. [2] Ibid., p. 177.

[3] Ibid., p. 176.

This means that when individualization reaches the perfect form, participation reaches the perfect form which Tillich calls "communion." Therefore, for Tillich there is no person without communion. Persons can grow only in the communion of personal encounter.[1] In this respect, for Tillich individualization and participation are correlated. In stating the nature of the polarity of individualization and participation, Tillich says:

> In polarity with individualization, participation underlies the category of relation as a basic ontological element. Without individualization nothing would exist to be related. Without participation the category of relation would have no basis in reality. Every relation includes a kind of participation. This is true even of indifference or hostility. Nothing can make one hostile in which one does not somehow participate, perhaps in the form of being excluded from it. And nothing can produce the attitude of indifference whose existence has not made some difference to one. The element of participation guarantees the unity of a disrupted world and makes a universal system of relations possible.[2]

"Dynamics and form" are the second pair of ontological elements. According to Tillich, being something means having a form.[3] The form which makes a thing what it is, is its content, its essentia, its definite power of being.[4] For this reason, there is no being without form. For Tillich, form, however, is not a dormant or static concept. Every form forms something, and this something Tillich calls dynamics. But Tillich does not consider dynamics "to be," it is not something that "is," but is something "about-to-be." Dynamics, cannot be conceptualized but only symbolized, for it has no form, and yet it is not pure nothingness. It is the *me on* (μη ὄν), "the potentiality of being," which is nonbeing in contrast to things that have a form, and the power of being in contrast to pure nonbeing. [1] The polarity of dynamics and form appears in man's immediate experience as the polar distinction of "validity" and "intentionality."[2] "The dynamic element in man," Tillich says, "is open in all directions." "Man is able to create a world beyond the given world."[3] This is man's vitality. But his vitality is directed and formed toward meaningful contents by his intentionality. For Tillich neither vitality nor intentionality can exist alone. They are interdependent, like the other polar elements.

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[1] Ibid., p. 177.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., p. 178.

[4] Ibid.

For Tillich, "freedom and destiny" form the third ontological polarity. This polarity is most important for Tillich's ontological theology especially from the ethical point of view. Only man is free, but he has freedom only

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[1] McKelway, *The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 108.

[2] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 180. For Tillich vitality is the power which keeps a living being alive and growing. Intentionality is the actualizing of reason, being related to meaningful structures, living in universals, grasping and shaping reality. The two are the basis of self-transcendence and self-conservation.

[3] *Ibid*.

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in polar interdependence with destiny. That is, for Tillich man experiences himself as a bearer of freedom, but within the larger structure to which he belongs.[1] Destiny points to this situation in which man finds himself, facing the world to which he belongs. Destiny, and not necessity, is the polar correlate of freedom. Freedom, according to Tillich, is experienced by man as deliberation, decision, and responsibility.[2] That is, freedom is experienced by man deliberation, in which he weighs arguments and motives, being free of all of them; it is experienced as decision, in which real possibilities are "cut off"; and it is experienced as responsibility, which reflects man's awareness that his decisions are not determined by anything outside of himself, or any part of himself, but by his whole, centered self. In each case freedom is bound to the situation in which it is experienced.[3] If freedom is seen in this way, the meaning of destiny becomes understandable. For Tillich, the destiny of man is that out of which our decisions arise, and it is the basis of freedom. And man's freedom participates in shaping his destiny.[4] That is, only who has freedom has a destiny. Things have no destiny, because they have no freedom. Therefore, where there is no destiny there is no freedom. Thus, for Tillich freedom and destiny penetrate each other, and freedom shares in shaping destiny and destiny also is the basis of freedom. Neither can exist without the other. Such a polarity of freedom and destiny constitutes a basic polarity of being.

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[1] Ibid., p. 182. [2] Ibid., pp. 183-184.

[3] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 109.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 185.

For Tillich, the third level of ontological concepts centers in the characteristics of being which are the conditions of existence. Man, according to Tillich, is always threatened by nonbeing because his being does not assure him against it. The roots of finitude go as deep as the question of being and nonbeing raised by the ontological shock. Being, when it is limited by nonbeing, is finitude.[1] By nonbeing Tillich means the "not yet" and the "no more" of being.[2] But he feels that the mystery of nonbeing can be handled only dialectically. In other words, for Tillich nonbeing is *me on* which is opposed to *ouk on*(ουκ ὄν). He says:

> *Ouk on* is the "nothing" which has no relation at all to being; *me on* is the "nothing" which has a dialectical relation to being, The Platonic school identified *me on* with that which does not yet have being but which can become being if it is united with essence or ideas. The mystery of nonbeing was not, however, removed, for in spite of its "nothingness" nonbeing was credited with having the power of resisting a complete union with the ideas.[3]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 189.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 188.

That is, nonbeing as me on is related to being in the sense of resistance to being. But it is conquered by the power of being. Being is the power of being which resists nonbeing. Tillich says:

> If one is asked how nonbeing is related to being-itself, one can only answer metaphorically: being "embraces" itself and nonbeing. Being has nonbeing "within" itself as that which is eternally present and eternally overcome in the process of the divine life. The ground of everything that is is not a dead identity without movement and becoming; it is living creativity. Creatively it affirms itself, eternally conquering its own nonbeing.[1]

Nonbeing, however, is not overcome in man. It, according to Tillich, "exists" in polar tension with his being and is always present as a danger and a threat. Man is a mixture of being and nonbeing. For Tillich this is what is meant by finite being.[2] Even though nonbeing is not overcome in man, he is more than finite at the same time. "In order to experience his finitude," Tillich says, "man must look at himself from the point of view of a potential infinity."[3] This power of imagining infinity is an expression of man's belonging to that which is beyond nonbeing, namely, being-itself. Hence, Tillich understands "infinity" in the sense of infinite self-transcendence. "Being-itself manifests itself to finite being in the infinite drive of the finite beyond itself."[4]

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[1] Tillich, The Courage To Be (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966), p. 43.

[2] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 111.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 190.

[4] Ibid., p. 191.

For Tillich, the distinction between essence and existence is absolutely central in ontology. Essence means that which makes a thing what it is and that against which a thing is judged. It is the power of being and the criterion of being.[1] For Tillich existence is actuality; it is that which is fallen from essence. "Whatever exists, that is, stands out of mere potentiality, is more than it is in the state of mere potentiality and less than it could be in the power of its essential nature."[2] Christianity, according to Tillich, must view existence as the fulfilment of creation, as the actualized expression of being-itself in God's creativity. It also points out the split between essential created goodness and its existential distortion. For Tillich, then, it must see the unity and estrangement of essence and existence. "The distinction between essence and existence," Tillich says, "which religiously speaking is the distinction between the created and the actual world, is the backbone of the whole body of theological thought."[3] The transition from essence to existence will be fully discussed later on.

The fourth level of ontological concepts deals with those concepts which traditionally have been called the categories: Time, Space, Causality, and Substance. For Tillich, these are the forms in which the mind grasps and shapes reality. But they are not mere logical forms, only indirectly related to reality itself; they are ontological, present in everything. Unlike the elements of being, they are not polar. Since they are forms of finite being, they participate in the mixture of being and nonbeing. Hence, Tillich prefers to discuss them in terms of courage and anxiety. Time is the central category of finitude. Time unites the anxiety of transitoriness with the courage of a self-affirming present.[1] This anxiety of transitoriness is potentially present in every moment. It permeates the whole of man's being. The past is no longer man's own, and the future is not yet his own; and even the present is not his own completely. In other words, for Tillich time is movement. He says:

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[1] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 112.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 203.

[3] Ibid., p. 204.

> They point to the movement of time from a past that is no more toward a future that is not yet through a present which is nothing more than the moving boundary line between past and future.[2]

In this respect, if a thing is said to be, it must be "present"; therefore, if the present is illusory, being is conquered by non-being. This means that being is always threatened by nonbeing. This anxiety concerning temporal existence, however, is conquered by a courage which affirms temporality. According to Tillich, this courage to affirm being over nonbeing is "ontological."[3]

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[1] Ibid., p. 193. [2] Ibid.

[3] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 114.

The present implies space. Time creates the present through its union with space. Like time, for Tillich space unites being with nonbeing, anxiety with courage. For to be, according to Tillich, means to have space.[1] Not to have space, therefore, is not to be. All beings must have space. But the very fact that all beings must have space means that they are threatened by nonbeing, for man is constantly losing his space. Then to be spatial means to be subject to nonbeing.[2] No finite being possesses a space which is definitely its own. Also, ultimately man knows he will lose every space, for he will die. "The loss of space," Tillich says, "includes the loss of temporal presence, the loss of the present, the loss of being."[3] But in the face of this threat man nonetheless "courageously" affirms his space. Then this anxiety is balanced by the ontological courage which affirms the present and space. Courage accepts its ontological insecurity and reaches a security in this acceptance.

Causality, according to Tillich, affirms the power of being by pointing to that which precedes a thing or event as its source.[4] At the same time causality, however, expresses nonbeing, for if a thing has a cause, it is not its own cause; it does not possess its own power of being. That is, causality presupposes that things do not possess their own power of coming into being. They are contingent: as Martin Heidegger points out, they have been "thrown" into being. Heidegger says:

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 194.

[2] Ibid., p. 195. [3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

> The "throw" of Dasein's Being-thrown into the world is one that does not authentically get "caught." The movement which such a "throw" implies does not come to "a stop" because Dasein now "is there."[1]

Also, the negative side of causality, according to Tillich, is expressed in man in the anxiety "of not being in, of, and by one's self." This is man's anxiety about the lack of necessity of his being.[2] It is the anxiety implied in the awareness of causality as a category of finitude. But man is endowed with an "ontological courage" to face the fact of his contingency and at the same time to rest in and depend upon himself. That is, courage ignores the causal dependence of everything finite, and accepts contingency.

In contrast to causality, substance is something underlying the flux of appearances, something which is relatively static and self-contained.[3] Everything that is has substance and accidents. Therefore there is no substance without accidents.[4] The problem of substance, however, is seen in the problem of change. The process of change, that is, threatens the substantiality of a thing. This is the root of man's fear of change; it is not that he fears the change itself, but the threat of nonbeing which accompanies change, That is, everything finite is innately "anxious" that its substance will be lost.[1] But for Tillich this threat is accepted by ontological courage in which man affirms the attributes of his identity, which are really accidental, by attributing to them substantiality.

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[1] Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tr, by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson(London: SCM Press, 1962), p. 400.

[2] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 115.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 197.

[4] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 115.

Thus, in analysing the nature of being, Tillich finds that it has a polar structure which is expressed in the correlates self and world. This structure contains the elements of individuality and participation, dynamic and form, and freedom and destiny. Tillich has also noted the distinction between being and nonbeing, the infinite and the finite, and essence and existence. Essential being includes within itself nonbeing, but is not disrupted or split by this inclusion. Finite and existential being, however, is split, disrupted, and threatened by nonbeing. The four categories of time, space, causality, and substance show the dialectical nature of finitude. They express the union of being and nonbeing in everything finite. They can also serve to articulate the courage which accepts the anxiety of nonbeing.

The Ontological Character of Theonomous Ethics

In his Love, Power, and Justice, Tillich briefly defines what ethics means. "Ethics," Tillich says, "is the science of man's existence, asking for the roots of the moral imperative, the criteria of its validity, the sources of its contents, and the forces of its realization."[1] It goes without saying that for Tillich the answer to each of these questions is dependent on his ontological analysis of being. In other words, ethics has its foundation in the basic structure of being which I have previously stated, and it therefore can be elaborated only in terms of an analysis of man's being and universal being. Here Tillich's idea of the relation of being and ethics begins to be realized. In his The Religious Situation, Tillich briefly states the correlation between ontology and ethics. "The question about ethics," Tillich says, "is the question about activity directed toward the Unconditional."[2] It is not simply one of behavior. "Ethics can come to fulfilment only as a religious ethics."[3]

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 197.

There are, however, some theories which intend to make ethics independent of ontology. The philosophy of values, according to Tillich, is one of them. Values, according to this philosophy, practical as well as theoretical, have a standing of their own. They are not dependent on the order of being. Since the ontology of their time was materialistic the philosophers of value rejected any attempt to give an ontological foundation to the realm of value. The good, the beautiful, and the true are beyond being. They have the character of "ought to be" but not of "is."[1] Then by the way of the independence of man's being the value-philosophy attempts to save the validity of ethical norms. Values, however, demand to be actualized in existence and through existence. Hence the problem arises. This is why Tillich asks: "How can commandments coming from beyond existence possess obligation for existing beings with whose being they have no essential relationship?"[2] Tillich says:

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[1] p. 72.

[2] Tr. by Richard Niebuhr(New York: Meridian Books, 1959), p. 150. Tillich states that back of all problems in the practical sphere lies ultimately the question about ethics, i. e., the question about activity directed toward the Unconditioned.

[3] Ibid., p. 153.

> The question then arises: How is this possible, if there is no ontological participation of values in existence, but an unbridgeable gap between them? How can a commandment coming from beyond existence have any influence no existence? This question is completely unanswerable if existence is described in terms of mechanical necessity.[3]

Also, Tillich continues to say: What is the ontological foundation for values? How are what have been called values rooted in being itself? Further, is it meaningful to maintain the value theory at all? Is it not more adequate to inquire into the structure of reality on which ethics are based? These questions the philosophy of values was unable to answer.

Secondly, pragmatism also intends to make ethics independent of ontology. "Ethical norms," pragmatism argues, "are the objectivation of human experiences." "They establish rules describing the pragmatically most adequate behavior."[4]

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[1] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 73.

[2] Ibid., pp. 74-75.

[3] Ibid., p. 74.

[4] Ibid., p. 75.

However, the problem arises: adequate to what? The pragmatic escape from ontology is barred by the question of the criterion of pragmatic adequacy, and there its limit appears.

Finally, we have the theological attempt to make ethics independent of ontology. Tillich calls it "a heteronomous ethics." Ethical norms are given by God. This solution seems to account for that quality of ethical experience for which neither pragmatism nor value theory has an explanation, the unconditional character of the moral imperative. A heteronomous ethics, however, understands the moral commandments as expressions of a divine will,[1] which is sovereign and without criterion. It cannot be measured in terms of adequacy to human nature, but it must be obeyed as it is given through revelation.[2] In a word, a heteronomous ethics attempts to establish the basis of absoluteness of the moral commandments by identifying the divine will with ethical norms. In other words, it derives its norms from "out there." J. A. T. Robinson briefly analyses the nature of heteronomous ethics:

> Such an ethics is "heteronomous," in the sense that it derives its norm from "out there"; and this is, of course, its strength. It stands for "absolute," "objective" moral values and presents a dyke against the floods of relativism and subjectivism.[3]

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 76. [2] *Ibid*.

[3] J. A. T. Robinson, *Honest To God* (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), pp. 112-113.

However, this is its profound weakness. Hence we should criticize the Roman Catholic ethics. For it harms the essence of the moral imperative. Masatoshi Doi says:

> The Catholic Church insists that since the church law is the expression of the will of God it must be obeyed, regardless of whether it relates to the concrete situation of human being, or not. It is a typical heteronomous ethics. It harms the essence of the moral imperative by stifling the freedom which is the basis of building man's personality.[1]

Thus, viewing Catholic ethics from the standpoint of the relationships of ethics to changing historical situations, Tillich dubs it a "static supra-naturalistic solution."[2] Hence, the ethical system of Catholicism has failed to adapt to the modern world.

This is the main reason why autonomous ethics opposes such a heteronomous ethics. The revolt in the field of ethics from heteronomy to autonomy, from supernaturalism to naturalism, began with the grandeur of Immanuel Kant's autonomous ideal, perhaps the greatest and most objective of all ethical systems.[3] According to Tillich, Kant, however, established a system of ethical forms without ethical contents.[4] More and more it loses the spiritual foundation, it becomes emptier, more formalistic, or more factual and is driven towards scepticism, towards the loss of meaning and purpose. Autonomy, however, is not in itself demonic. As David H. Hopper states, for Tillich autonomy is not self-will or arbitrariness: it is obedience to the law of the self, obedience to the structure of human intellect and conscience.[1] As such it is not in itself evil; it does not represent the rebellion of man against God. Hence, Tillich criticizes F. Gogarten for his understanding of autonomy. If the autonomy of the human spirit were simply "fall and rebellion," Tillich argues, then Gogarten's own critique of Hirsch would share in that "fall and rebellion," since all the words and concepts that Gogarten uses, according to Tillich, are the creation of the autonomous human spirit.[2] Accordingly, what must be fought against, as David Hopper points out, is not autonomy as such, but the demonic and self-destroying misuse of autonomy.[3] In this respect, autonomy must be fulfilled by theonomy. Actual theonomous ethics is autonomous ethics under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, the religious substance--the experience of an ultimate concern.[4] Further, the Spiritual Presence creates a theonomous morality. Philosophy, being free(autonomous) and objective in its analysis, may, if grasped by the Spiritual Presence, become theonomous ethics. Hence Tillich denies the possibility of independent theological ethics. For this reason, Tillich's ethics is philosophical. In summarizing Tillich's thought on the philosophical nature of theonomous ethics, Alexander J. McKelway states:

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[1] Doi, Tillich(Tokyo: UCCJ, 1963), p. 167.

[2] Tillich, The Protestant Era, tr. by James Luther Adams(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 151.

[3] Robinson, Honest To God, p. 113.

[4] Tillich, Theology of Culture, ed. by Robert C. Kimball(New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 135.

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[1] David H. Hopper, Tillich; a theological portrait (Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1968), p. 45.

[2] Tillich, "What is Wrong with Dialectical Theology?" Journal of Religion, Vol. XV, No. 2(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1935), pp. 141-143(Quoted from David H. Hopper's Tillich).

[3] Hopper, Tillich, p. 45.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, pp. 267-268.

> If the theologian speaks of morality and the moral imperative, he does so as a "philosophical ethicist." This is so because ethics as such has to do with "the nature of the moral function and judges the changing contents in the light of this analysis." Theological assertions, says Tillich, do not apply to arguments about the nature of the moral imperative. The Spiritual Presence makes itself outside the realm of the Church and theology, and it does this by creating theonomous ethics in which "the religious substance--the experience of an ultimate concern--is consciously expressed through the process of free arguing and not through an attempt to determine it."[1]

That is, for Tillich ethics, according to McKelway, because of the changing nature of its contents, must be the task of philosophy and not theology. Revelatory authority should not be claimed for ethical analysis.[2]

For Tillich, the only way to a theological foundation of the moral imperative is the theonomous one. It avoids the destructiveness of the heteronomous way, and it gives religious foundation to the autonomous way. First of all, what does Tillich mean by the word "theonomy"? As J. A. T. Robinson points out, it corresponds with his concern to push "beyond

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[1] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 211-212.

[2] Ibid., p. 212.

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supernaturalism and naturalism" to a third position, in which the transcendent is nothing external or "out there" but is encountered in, with and under the Thou of all finite relationships as their ultimate depth, ground, and meaning.[1] It means accepting as the basis of moral judgments the actual concrete relationship in all its particularity, refusing to subordinate it to any universal norm or to treat it merely as a case, but yet, in the depth of that unique relationship, meeting, and responding to the claims of the sacred, the holy and the absolutely unconditional.[2] It is, as Dietrich Bonhoeffer states, the claim of home, of the personal ground of our very being, it does not come as anything foreign.[3] Just for this reason the theonomous ethics becomes ontological. The theonomous ethics, according to Tillich, asserts that the law given by God is man's essential nature, put against him as law.[4] In this respect, if man were not estranged from himself, if his essential nature were not distorted in his actual existence, no law would stand against him. The law is not strange to man. It is natural law. It represents man's true nature from which he is estranged.[5] For this reason, for Tillich every valid ethical commandment is an expression of man's essential relation to himself, to others and to the universe.[1] This alone makes it obligatory and its denial self-destruction. This alone accounts for the unconditional form of the moral imperative.[2] In this respect, the moral imperative is not a strange law, imposed on us, but it is the law of our own being. In the moral imperative we ourselves, in our essential being, are put against ourselves, in our actual being. No outside command can be unconditional, whether it comes from a state, or a person, or God--if God is thought of as an outside power, establishing a law for our behavior. Nor can we take unconditionally the content of the moral imperative from human authorities like traditions, conventions, political or religious authorities. There is no ultimate authority in them. The moral command is unconditional because it is we ourselves commanding ourselves. That is, for Tillich morality is the self-affirmation of our essential nature of being. This makes it unconditional, whatever its content may be.[3] The theonomous solution, therefore, leads inescapably to ontological problems. Consequently, theonomous ethics includes ontology. For it inquires about the essence of man and investigates the ontological structure of man. Further, theonomous ethics, as George Tavard states, is neither a law, nor lawlessness, but it is ecstatic.[1] It perceives, in the power of revelatory event, that both good and evil are self-condemned for they are both self-centred.[2] It is really above morality and immorality. As previously stated, it demands nothing but your being open and willing to accept what is given to you. Further exposition of the nature of theonomous ethics has been given in the second section "The Significance of Ontological Ethics" of chapter I.

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[1] Robinson, Honest To God, p. 114.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics(New York: The Macmillan Co., 1955), p. 121.

[4] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 76.

[5] Ibid., pp. 76-77.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 77.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Theology of Culture*, p. 136.

The Religious Dimension of Morality in Paul Tillich

For further understanding of Tillich's ontological ethics, his thought on the relationship between religion and ethics should be examined. Tillich sees clearly what the ethical problem is. He inquires into the basic problem of morality, and makes clear its religious foundation. Tillich refuses the narrowness of moralism, because for him morality is the essential nature of man which is given by God. Thus it cannot be considered apart from its religious foundation. Accordingly, the problem of morality, as previously stated, has to be made fundamentally clear by ontological analysis. For Tillich there is the religious dimension in the moral life of man, and every spiritual action, as far as it roots in the essential structure of being, has a religious character. Hence, the immanence of the religious in the moral shall be considered from three directions. Tillich calls them "The Religious Dimension of the Moral Imperative," "The Religious Source of the Moral Demands," and "The Religious Element in Moral Motivation."[1]

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[1] George H. Tavard, Paul Tillich and the Christian Message(London: Burns & Oaths, 1962), p. 145.

[2] Ibid.

The Religious Dimension of the Moral Imperative

The purpose of this section is to search for the religious dimension of the moral imperative as the immanence of the religious in the moral in Tillich's theonomous ethics. Tillich's thought on the religious dimension of the moral imperative is mainly discussed in his Morality and Beyond.[2] First of all, it is necessary to know what the phrase "The Moral Imperative" means in Tillich before discussing his thought on the religious dimension of the moral imperative. In order to understand the meaning of the phrase "The Moral Imperative," Tillich distinguishes the three basic functions of the human spirit: morality, culture, and religion.[3] When Tillich calls them functions of man's spirit, he points to the dynamic unity of body and mind, of vitality and rationality, of the conscious and the unconscious, of the emotional and intellectual.[1] According to Tillich, in every function of the human spirit the whole person is involved. Hence he revives the term "spirit" as designating a natural quality of man. The three functions of the spirit must be distinguished, but relate to each other. In this respect, for Tillich morality is the constitution of the bearer of the spirit, the centered person; culture points to the creativity of the spirit and also to the totality of its creations; and religion is the self-transcendence of the spirit toward what is ultimate and unconditioned in being and meaning.[2]

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[1] For Tillich three main problems of the moral law confront ethical inquiry: the unconditional character of the moral imperative, the norms of moral action, and moral motivation. The ambiguity of life in the dimension of the spirit is manifest in all three.

[2] Indeed, this work makes a remarkable contribution to understanding the philosophical and theological problems bound up in the ethics of love. It seems that Tillich sees very clearly what the ethical problem is. Tillich treates of such diverse topics as the structure of life, its numerous ambiguities, the manifestation of the Spiritual Presence in the human spirit in ecstasy, faith and love, the ambiguities of religion, culture and morality. The unity amidst diversity makes for an extraordinary book(Quoted from the cover).

[3] Ibid., p. 17.

The moral imperative, according to Tillich, is the demand to become actually what one is essentially and therefore potentially. For him it is the power of man's being, given to him by nature, which he shall actualize in time and space.[3] In other words, in the moral imperative man's true being shall become his actual being. Every moral act is an act in which the individual self establishes itself as a person.[4] That is, the encounter with another person implies the unconditional command to acknowledge him as a person. Further, Tillich states that the moral imperative demands that one self participate in the center of the other self and consequently accept his particularities even if there is no convergence between the two individuals as individuals.[1] This acceptance of the other self by participating in his personal center is the core of love in the sense of agape.[2] The unconditional character of the moral imperative is experienced in the encounter of person with person. Therefore, a moral act is not an act in obedience to an external law, human or divine. For Tillich, it is the inner law of our true being, of our essential or created nature, which demands that we actualize what follows from it.[3]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid., pp. 17-18.

[3] Ibid., p. 20.

[4] Ibid., pp. 20-21.

Thus, for Tillich the nature of the moral act has its all-permeating character and its immanence in the whole of man's spirit. We must now ask: what is the religious dimension of the moral imperative? The religious dimension of the moral imperative is, according to Tillich, its unconditional character.[4] Hence, what Tillich wants to point to is the absolute character of the moral imperative. For him it means that if something is demanded of us morally, this demand is an unconditional one.[5] The fact that the contents of the moral imperative change does not change the formal absoluteness of the moral imperative itself. Tillich, therefore, points out that in the moment in which we acknowledge something as our moral duty, under whatever conditions, this duty is unconditional.[1] This absoluteness was most sharply formulated by Immanuel Kant when he spoke of the "categorical imperative," another way of expressing an unconditional, non-hypothetical imperative. What Kant has called the "categorical imperative" is nothing more than the unconditional character of the "ought-to-be," the moral commandment. Whatever its content may be, its form is unconditional. That is, the term "categorical imperative" indicates that it is impossible to derive a moral imperative from other sources than its own intrinsic nature.[2] If we could derive it from fear of punishment it would be a conditional imperative. One can rightly criticize Kant because he established a system of ethical forms without ethical contents. But just this limitation is his greatness. It makes as sharp as possible the distinction between morality which is unconditional, and moralism which are valid only conditionally within limits.[3]

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[1] Systematic Theology, III, p. 45.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Morality and Beyond, p. 20.
[4] Ibid., pp. 22-23.
[5] Tillich, My Search for Absolutes(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969), p. 93.

Thus, Tillich asserts that there is an intrinsically religious character in the moral imperative. In reality, however, it has always been trespassed, broken, violated; and we violate it continually.[4] In other words, the commandments of the moral law are valid because they express man's essential nature and put his essential being against him in his state of existential estrangement. Now we ask: why is this imperative unconditionally valid? Because, according to Tillich, it is our own true or essential being that confronts us in the moral command, demanding something from us in our actual being with all its problems and distortions.[1] In this respect, if we act against this command from our true being, we violate ourselves. Such an assertion as Tillich's can be criticized from different points of view. For theology strongly affirms the unconditional character of the moral imperative, but denies that this character makes it religious. Moral commands are religious because they are divine commandments. They are ultimately serious because they express the "Will of God." This alone makes them unconditional.[2] In criticizing such an argument, Tillich rejects the thought of the "Will of God." For Tillich the phrase the "Will of God" is a symbolic way of speaking, and it must be interpreted in order to deprive it of connotations of arbitrariness on the part of a heavenly tyrant. God's will, according to Tillich, is given to us in the way we are created, which means it is given through our true nature, our essential being. He says:

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Theology of Culture, p. 135.

[3] Ibid., pp. 135-136.

[4] My Search for Absolutes, p. 95.

> It("Will of God") is not an external will imposed upon us, an arbitrary law laid down by a heavenly tyrant, who is strange to our essential nature and therefore

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Morality and Beyond*, p. 23.

> whom we resist justifiably from the point of view of our nature. The "Will of God" for us is precisely our essential being with all its potentialities, our created nature declared as "very good" by God,..[1]

That is, the "Will of God" is manifest in our essential being; and only because of this can we accept the moral imperative as valid.[2] In this respect, the moral imperative is not outside law that demands our obedience, but the "silent voice" of our own nature as man, and as man with an individual character.[3] Further, to Tillich one's own nature is certainly a moral demand intrinsic to one's being. If we were united with our essential being, there would be no command. We would be what we should be, and what we should do. There would be no "ought-to-be," no command, but only simple being.[4] In reality, however, we are separated from our true, our essential being, and therefore it stands against us.

There are two concepts in particular in which the unconditional character of the moral imperative is experienced. The one, according to Tillich, is "conscience," the channel through which the unconditional character of the moral imperative is experienced, and the other is the term "religious."[5] For Tillich, conscience is neither the infallible voice of God, nor the infallible awareness of the natural law. It is, as Heidegger points out, the call, often the silent call, of man to be himself.[1] But the self to which the conscience calls is the essential, not as Heidegger believes, the existential self. It calls us to what we essentially are, but it does not tell with certainty what that is. Regarding the concept of religion, Tillich can restrict himself to the following summary: the fundamental concept of religion is the state of being grasped by an ultimate concern, by an infinite interest, by something one takes unconditionally seriously.[2] Such a religious element as above is intrinsic to the moral imperative.

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[2] *Ibid.*

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] *My Search for Absolutes*, p. 96.

[5] *Morality and Beyond*, p. 30.

To summarize: Tillich maintains his basic assertion on the unconditional character of the moral imperative is its religious quality. No religious heteronomy, subjection to external commands, is implied if we maintain the immanence of religion in the moral command. That is, the moral imperative is unconditional because it is we ourselves commanding ourselves. In other words, morality is the self-affirmation of our essential being. This makes it unconditional. All this, according to Tillich, is the first and fundamental step toward an understanding of the absolute that is present in the moral imperative. That is, what commands us is our own essential nature, our unique and eternally significant true being.

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[1] For Heidegger, when we designate the conscience as a call, this call is an appeal to the thy-self in its Self; as such an appeal, it summons the Self to its potentiality-for-Being-its-self, and thus calls Dasein forth to its possibilities(Being and Time, pp. 288ff., 313-325).

[2] Morality and Beyond, p. 30.

The Religious Source of the Moral Demand

Secondly, Tillich attempts to deal with the problem: "Is there a religious source of the moral demands? If so, how is it related to the formal answer given before, that the moral imperative demands that man becomes actually what he is essentially, a person within a community of persons? What does this mean concretely? What norms of moral action are implied in this demand?[1] As previously pointed out, the question of the ethical content--the question of what we must do--is what we must become what we essentially are, persons. But it is so formal that it does not offer any concrete advice.[2] Such advice is, however, necessary for the life of man. So also are principles,which are at the same time abstract and concrete, so that support for moral decisions can be derived from them. Are there such principles of moral action? If so, how can they be related to the ever changing conditions of existence?

Hence Tillich attempts to deal with the positive aspects and limitations of ethical relativism. And then he shows that in the discussion of relativism basic ethical norms must unite an absolute element and a relative element. They must be, according to Tillich, universally valid and, at the same time, adaptable to the concrete situation.[3] This tension appears conspicuously in the contrast between the Roman

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[1] Ibid., p. 36. [2] Ibid., p. 31. [3] Ibid., pp. 31-32

Catholic and a possible Protestant theory of natural law. The Roman Catholic theory, according to Tillich, asserts that it is possible to derive a considerable number of particular demands from certain universal principles through rational deduction. Such demands, if reached by sound methods of reasoning, are supposed to be valid for all times and all situations.[1] According to the Roman Catholic theory of natural law, no revelatory event is necessary in order to discover them, and no change of the historical conditions can undercut their validity.[2] But there is a point of uncertainty: those who analyze and deduce are human beings and, accordingly, open to errors and distortions. For this reason, for Roman Catholic theory the church must decide what is the real natural law. Only the supernatural can confirm the validity of the natural, although the natural is true in itself. A possible Protestant theory of natural law is, however, quite different from that of the Roman Catholic. In Protestantism, not as much theory of natural law has been developed as in Roman Catholicism. This is due to the fact that Protestant biblicism attempted to derive ethical demands directly from the Bible, and to the general Protestant distrust of reason, an implication of the doctrine of man's depravity in all parts of his nature, in mind as well as in body, in reason as well as in instincts.[3] Moreover, the Protestant principle denies that there can be any human institution, including a church with its doctrines and ethical demands, above the dynamics of history. Consequently, for Tillich a system of unchangeable laws of concrete morality contradicts the creative powers in life and spirit, and it contradicts the transforming work of the divine Spirit within and outside the church.[1] Protestantism can accept the element of relativity in ethics and can develop with its help doctrine of the natural moral law.[2]

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 35. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 35-36.

This, however, cannot be done without an answer to the question: is there a religious source of the moral demands? If so, how can it be related to the ever changing conditions of existence? That is to say, what does the statement mean concretely: "the question of what we must do is that we must become what we essentially are, persons"? Hence, Tillich examines the phrase "within a community of persons." According to Tillich, "in the encounter of person with person within a community of persons, community also expresses involvement because it implies mutual participation, and, by participation, union."[3] In other words, for Tillich interpersonal community is implied by the polarity of individualization and participation. Tillich says:

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 36. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

> The community itself is a phenomenon of life which has analogies in all realms. It is implied by the polarity of individualization and participation. Neither pole is actual without the other. This is as true of the function of self-creation as it is of the function of self-integration, and there is no self-transcendence of life except through the polar interdependence of individualization and participation.[1]

Love is the desire for union of this polarity of individualization and participation, that is, for union of the separated (which is ultimately re-union). For this reason, for Tillich all communions are embodiments of love, the urge for participation in the other one.[2] Justice is taken into love if the acknowledgement of the other person as person is not detached but involved.[3] In this way, love becomes the ultimate principle, including justice and transcending it at the same time. Hence, we must fight against the misinterpretations of the principle of love. Above all things, it must be emphasized that if love takes justice into itself, justice is not diminished but enhanced. It has become, according to Tillich, creative justice in the sense of the Old and the New Testament concepts of the Tsedaqah and Dikaiosyne of God that both judges and saves.[4] Tillich states how the principle of justice, as found in the Old Testament, has the element of righteousness. This is more than formal acknowledgement of the other person and more than proportionate justice that gives to each one what he deserves.[1] Tsedaqah can be called "creative justice," because it does something to the other person; it changes his condition. Tsedaqah raises to a higher state him to whom it is given.[2] It raises the proportion of what is due to him. In the New Testament, justice has an additional element that does not deny any of the others. This element is love, in New Testament Greek, agape. Agape, according to Tillich, is the fulfillment of the creative justice of the Old Testament.[3] Its highest expression is self-sacrifice for him who is loved and with whom in this way a profound union is created. Therefore agape-love goes far beyond the acknowledgement of the other person as a person. It wants reunion with the other and with everything from which one is separated.[4] That is, love, as previously stated, is the desire for union of the separated. In other words, for Tillich the life which separates itself from itself and drives toward the reunion with itself. Also, all communions are embodiments of love, the urge for participation in the other one. For Tillich, such love is a principle of life and presents itself under the domination of its agape quality. That is, the religious source of moral demands is manifest in such agape-love. Then it means the religious source of the moral demands is love under the domination of its *agape* quality, in unity with the imperative of justice to acknowledge every being with personal potential as a person.[1] That is, the *agape* quality of love expresses the self-transcendence of the religious element in love.[2] If love is the ultimate norm of all moral demands, its *agape* quality points to the transcendent source of the content of the moral imperative. Also, love as *agape* has the basic principle of justice within itself. *Agape* also must not to be confused with other qualities of love: *libido*, friendship, compassion, pity, *eros*. Certainly *agape* is related to and can be combined with all of them, but it also judges all of them.[3] Further discussion of *agape*-love in Tillich will be undertaken later.

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 41.

[2] Morality and Beyond, pp. 38-39.

[3] Ibid., p. 39.

[4] Ibid.

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[1] My Search for Absolutes, p. 107.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., pp. 107-108. [4] Ibid., p. 108.

Thus, in calling love the source of moral norms we can answer the first question of the relativity of ethics. For love is both absolute and relative by its very nature. The *agape* quality of love, an unchanging principle, nevertheless always changes in its concrete application. It "listens" to the particular situation. For this reason, Tillich calls *agape* "listening love."[4] "Listening love," according to Tillich, is a listening to and looking at the concrete situation in all its concreteness, which includes the deepest motives of the other person. That is, agape acts in relation to the concrete demands of the situation--its conditions, its possible consequences, the inner status of the people involved, their hidden motives, their limiting complexes, and their unconscious desires and anxieties.[1] For Tillich, love perceives all these--the more deeply the stronger the agape element is.[2] This is why Tillich states:

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[1] *Theology of Culture*, pp. 144-145.
[2] *Morality and Beyond*, p. 40.
[3] *My Search for Absolutes*, p. 108.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 109.

> Love alone can transform itself according to the concrete demands of every individual and social situation without losing its eternity and dignity and unconditional validity.[3]

That is, for Tillich love can adapt itself to every phase of a changing world. Love alone is able to determine standards of conduct that will respect the changing human situations while safeguarding the divine content of every human action in which man is ultimately concerned. For Tillich the absoluteness of love is its power to go into the concrete situation, to discover what is demanded by the predicament of the concrete to which it turns.[4] In love, the absolute becomes relational. Man is totally dominated by the divine ground of love, and totally committed to all other human beings. Hence the conflict between absolutism and relativism is overcome by love.[5] Such a "listening love," as stated above, takes the place of mechanical obedience to moral commandments. Such commandments are derived from ethical insights, then become degraded to the status of moral codes. No moral code, however, can spare us from a decision and thus save us from a moral risk.[1]

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[1] Morality and Beyond, p. 42.

[2] Ibid., pp. 42-43.

[3] The Protestant Era, p. 155.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 152. For Tillich love, therefore, can never become fanatical in a fight for an absolute, or cynical under the impact of the relative. This refers to all realms of rational creativity.

[5] Ibid.

Thus, for Tillich the religious source of the moral demands is love under the domination of its agape quality, in unity with the imperative of justice to acknowledge every being with personal potential as a person, being guided by the divine-human wisdom embodied in the moral laws of the past, listening to the concrete situation, and acting courageously on the basis of these principles.[2] Only on this basis can love be called the ultimate source of moral demands.

The Religious Element in Moral Motivation

Finally, we should ask whether there is a religious element in the process of moral motivation. The problem leads to the concept of law. As previously stated, for Tillich the law is experienced as law in the human existential situation, since in the existential situation man is estranged from the structural law of his essential being, namely, to become a centered person. This is why the moral imperative puts our essential being against our actual being, and it appears to us as law. Expressing it in another way, a being which lives out of its essential nature is law to itself. For this reason, for Tillich moralism is legalism. Even love becomes law for man--"thou shalt love..."[1] If we, however, were not estranged from the structural law of our essential beings, the moral law would be an expression of our being, and it would never become a commanding law. In the state of mere potentiality or created innocence, according to Tillich, there is no law, because man is essentially united with that to which he belongs: the divine ground of his world and of himself. What ought to be and what is are identical in the state of potentiality. In existence, however, this identity is broken, and in every life process the identity and non-identity of what is and what ought to be are mixed.[2]

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[1] My Search for Absolutes, p. 109.

[2] Morality and Beyond, p. 46.

Hence, in quoting St. Paul's thought of the law in the New Testament, Tillich says that for St. Paul the law is the expression of what man essentially is and therefore ought to be but what he actually is not, as the law shows to him. For Tillich this is one facet of St. Paul's evaluation of the law. But just at this point its deepest and most dangerous ambiguity appears. It is that which drove Paul to his revolutionary experience. That is to say, the law as law expresses man's estrangement from himself.[3] This other side of St. Paul's evaluation of the law is based on his experience that the law commands us to do the good that we cannot do because we are estranged from it and under a power that contradicts our true being.[1] Thus, the law shows us our essential nature and our estrangement from it at the same time. It is also obvious that St. Paul does not consider the law as a power of moral motivation. He was aware of the fact that the commanding law produces all kinds of wrong desires, but does not motivate the conquest of these desires and the reunion of his actual will with his essential will.[2] The problem of the law as motivating power appeared again in its profundity and explosive power in the Protestant Reformation. The Reformers took the moral imperative without compromise and without self-deception, and concluded that the naked moral law has no motivating power. Therefore, they looked for something that had this power, and they found it in the religious element which they called grace.[3]

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[1] Theology of Culture, p. 141.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 48.

[3] Ibid.

Following the Reformer's thought of grace as the motivating power, Tillich intends to make clear what is the religious element in moral motivation. For Tillich grace is the answer to the question: how can we conquer the estrangement from the essential nature. That is, such a question is resolved only by the religious element: grace as the moral motivation.[1] St. Paul and Luther, according to Tillich, say that the law is only fulfilled if it is fulfilled with joy, and not with resentment and hate. But joy cannot be commanded.[2] The law brings us into a paradoxical situation. That is, it commands, which means that it stands against us. But it commands something which can be done only if it does not stand against us, if we are united with what it comands. This is the point where the moral imperative drives towards something which is not command but reality.[3] Therefore, for Tillich only the "good tree" brings "good fruits." Only if being precedes that which ought-to-be, can the ought-to-be be fulfilled. Morality can be maintained only through that which is given and not through that which is demanded; in religious terms, through grace and not through law.[4] Without the reunion of man with his own essential nature no perfect moral act is possible. Moralism necessarily ends in the quest for grace.

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[1] Morality and Beyond, p. 53.

[2] Ibid.

[3] The Reformers fought the idea that man's "good work," his fulfilment of the law, could be a contributing factor in salvation. Not the fulfilment of commandments, but the acceptance of the message that we are accepted, is the motive of moral action(Ibid., p. 54.).

Following the Christian thought of grace, Tillich distinguishes between "common grace" and "special grace." For Tillich common grace works in all realms of life and in all human situations, and special grace is bestowed upon those who are grasped by the new reality that has appeared in

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[1] Ibid., p. 62.

[2] Theology of Culture, p. 142.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid.

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the Christ.[1] In both respects, the problem of moral motivation is decisive. That is, what common and special grace accomplish is to create a state of reunion in which the cleavage between our true and our actual being is fragmentarily overcome and the rule of the commanding law is broken. Therefore, where there is grace there is no command and no struggle to obey the command.[2] This is true of all realms of life. And there is grace in every reunion of being with being. Tillich says:

> A reunion of something separated has already taken place, and with it a partial fulfilment of the moral imperative. As a gift of grace, it is not produced by one's will and one's endeavor. One simply receives it. In this way we may say: there is grace in every reunion of being with being, insofar as it is reunion and not the misuse of the one by the other, insofar as justice is not violated.[3]

Tillich continues to state:

> It is the reality of that which the law commands, the reunion with oneself, with others, and with the ground of one's self and others. Where there is New Being, there is grace, and vice versa.[4]

Thus, for Tillich grace permeates everyone's life. Also, grace is the healing power that overcomes the split between what we essentially are and what we actually are, and with split the estrangement of life from life and the hidden or open hostility of life against life.[5] For this reason, without the reunion of man with his own essential nature no perfect moral act is possible. In this respect, morality can be maintained only through that which is given and not through that which is demanded. Whenever elements of grace appear, the moral command is fulfilled. What was demanded, therefore, now is given.

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[1] Morality and Beyond, p. 61.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Ibid., pp. 61-62.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 274.

[5] Morality and Beyond, p. 62.

Grace, according to Tillich, unites two elements: the overcoming of guilt and the overcoming of estrangement.[1] In other words, his thought of grace contains a polarity between the element of forgiveness and the element of fulfilment. The first element appears in theology as "forgiveness of sin," or in more recent terminology, as "accepting acceptance though being unacceptable." Here the Pauline term "justification," according to Tillich, should be replaced by "acceptance." Tillich says:

> Since it(the Pauline term "justification") is a biblical term, it cannot be rejected in the Christian churches either, but it should be replaced in the practice of teaching and preaching by the term "acceptance," in the sense that we are accepted by God although being unacceptable according to the criteria of the law(our essential being put against us) and that we are asked to accept this acceptance. Such terminology is itself acceptance by people for whom the Old and New Testament phrasing has lost all meaning, although there is a most serious existential meaning for them in the reality to which this phrasing points.[2]

The second element appears in theology as "regeneration," or in more recent terminology, as the "the entering into the New Being" which is above the split between what

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[1] Theology of Culture, p. 142.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, pp. 224-225.

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we are and what we ought to be.[1] This can be stated as the gift of the Spirit or infusion of love controlled by agape. The former, according to Tillich, conquers the pain of morally unfulfilled existence and the latter grants the blessedness of an at least fragmentary fulfilment.[2] For Tillich neither is possible without the other, for only he who is grasped by the Spirit can accept the tremendous paradox that he is accepted. The great "in spite of" is inseparable from the concept of grace.[3] One may ask whether the paradox of grace diminishes the power of moral motivation in those who accept that they are accepted, although unacceptable. But such a question, according to Tillich, is not justified in principle because it shows that one has not understood that the courage to accept the unacceptable is a work of grace, a creation of the Spiritual power.[4] Consequently, the problem of moral motivation can be answered, in Tillich's word, "transmorally."[5] In this respect, for Tillich the problems of ethics, as the present writer pointed out, can be fulfilled only by religious ethics.[6] For the law cannot forgive and accept, even though it demands and judges. Therefore, the two elements of forgiveness and acceptance which are the conditions of the fulfillment of the law must come from something above the law, or more

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[1] Theology of Culture, pp. 142-143.

[2] Morality and Beyond, p. 63.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 274.

[4] For Tillich only if the acceptance of the unacceptable is misunderstood as a merely intellectual act does it remain without motivating power.

[5] Morality and Beyond, p. 64.

[6] The Religious Situation, p. 153.

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precisely, from something in which the split between our essential being and our existence is overcome and healing power has appeared. The conquest took place in the Christ, the New Being, in whom a new reality beyond the cleavage appeared.

Thus, the relation of religion and morality in Paul Tillich is not an external one, but the religious dimension, source, and motivation are implicit in all morality. In short, for Tillich morality is religious in its very essence. The unconditional character of the moral imperative, love as the ultimate source of the moral demands, and grace as the power of moral motivation are the concepts through which the question of the relation of religion and morality is fundamentally answered. That is, it stands in opposition to both moral legalism and amoral lawlessness. It affirms morality and points it to its religious foundation.

The Transition From Essence To Existence

The Fall

For further understanding Tillich's theonomous ethics from another angle, his idea of the Fall and sin should be treated here before discussing his ethical concepts. For Tillich the Fall is one of the crucial points in his whole theological system. The Fall, according to Tillich, describes the human situation universally. That is, the Fall has a universal anthropological significance and accurately symbolizes the basic reality of the human situation. In other words, man in his actual existence is estranged from his true and essential being. Consequently, Tillich maintains existence as "fallen" from essence. In order to stress this understanding of the meaning of the Fall Tillich speaks of it as the "transition from essence to existence."

The Fall, for Tillich, should not be read historically or literally. Indeed, the Fall, as Tillich himself states, "is the profoundest and richest expression of man's awareness of his existential estrangement and provides the scheme in which the transition from essence to existence can be treated."[1] Thus, summarizing the central conviction of anthropology, Tillich says "Man as he exists is not what he essentially is and ought to be. He is estranged from true being." Here the question, however, arises: How is this transition possible? In other words, how is the transition made from this possibility to an actuality in human life which is universal, and yet neither accidental nor necessary? What is the nature of the process by which man passes from the one state to the other? What makes the transition possible in the first place, and what motivates toward it? In answering these questions, Tillich gives four steps, that is, for Tillich the transition from essence to existence points, first, to the possibility of the Fall; second, to its motives; third, to the event itself;

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1957), p. 31.

and fourth, to its consequences.

Tillich's first step to the answer is that the transition is mediated by freedom. "We," Tillich says, "can answer the question of how the transition from essence to existence is possible in terms of 'freedom,' which is always in polar unity with destiny."[1] However, for Tillich this is only a first step to the answer. Tillich describes man's awareness of his finitude and of finitude universally, and he analyses the situation of being related to and excluded from infinity.[2] According to Tillich, this provides the second step toward an answer. It is not freedom as such, but finite freedom which makes possible the transition from essence to existence.[3] Finally, man is free, in so far as he has the power of contradicting himself and his essential nature.[4] According to Tillich, man is free even from his freedom; that is, he can surrender his humanity. This final quality of his freedom provides the third step toward the answer to the question of how the transition from essence to existence is possible.[5] But the freedom of self-contradiction is limited by destiny, with which freedom in general always stands in polarity. That is, for Tillich man's freedom is not absolute; it operates within the context of universal destiny. This means, for Tillich, that finite freedom produces the human transition from essence to existence not individually and accidentally but within the framework of a universal destiny. Tillich says:

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid. [3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 32. [5] Ibid.

> As finite freedom, it is possible only within the context of the universal transition from essence to existence. There is no individual Fall. In the Genesis story the two sexes and nature, represented by the serpent, work together. The transition from essence to existence is possible because finite freedom works within the frame of a universal destiny.[1]

For Tillich, that is the fourth step toward the answer. Thus, the possibility of the Fall, according to Tillich, is identical with man's freedom. It is the expression of the image of God in man. That is, the Fall is possible because man is made in the image of God. Only he who is the image of God has the power of separating himself from God.[2] Also, man would not be man without the possibility of the Fall. Man's greatness and his weakness are identical.

The motives for the Fall, according to Tillich, are mirrored in the state of "dreaming innocence." The word "dreaming innocence" indicates a state of pure non-actualized potentiality. "Dreaming innocence" did not "happen"; it is not temporal; it is not real. But it contains both the real and the actual in terms of anticipation. In analyzing the nature of "dreaming innocence," Tillich states:

> Dreaming is a state of mind which is real and non-real at the same time--just as is potentiality. Dreaming anticipates the actual, just as everything actual is

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[1] _Ibid_.

[2] _Ibid_., p. 33.

> somehow present in the potential...Certainly, reality is different from the images of the dream, but not totally different. For the actual is present in the potential in terms of anticipation. For these reasons the metaphor "dreaming" is adequate on describing the state of essential being.[1]

For Tillich, the state of "dreaming innocence" is appropriate for symbolizing the non-actualized, non-spatial and non-temporal character of the state of essential being. In other words, this state of non-actualized potentiality is Adam's state before the Fall. For Tillich "Adam's state before the Fall" must be understood as a state of potentiality, without actualization in any place or time. It may be symbolized either theologically as the state of "being hidden in the ground of the divine life" or psychologically as "the state of dreaming innocence."[2] Also, it is a stage of innocence, an example of which Tillich finds in the child's original innocence of his sexual potentialities, which is gradually replaced by experience, responsibility, and guilt.[3] However, dreaming innocence is not a stage of perfection; it is a state in which temptation is experienced. Tillich states:

> The possibility of the transition to existence is experienced as temptation. Temptation is unavoidable because the state of dreaming innocence is uncontested and undecided. It is not perfection...Mere potentiality or dreaming innocence is not perfection. Only the conscious union of existence and essence is perfection, as God is perfect because he transcends essence and existence.[4]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Bernard Martin, Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man (Digswell Place: James Nisbet & Co., 1963), p. 116.

[3] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 148.

[4] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 34.

Further, this temptation, according to Tillich, is experienced as the desire of man to actualize his freedom. It occurs when finite freedom becomes conscious of itself. Thus, for human being there is the desire to experience freedom. However, there is also the demand to keep intact dreaming innocence. This is so because the state is not one of stable perfection but rather of uncontested and undecided potentiality. That is, it is a state which is charged with the possibility of tension and disruption, and the fundamental expression of the fact that it is so charged is man's anxious awareness of his finite freedom. Further, in the state of "dreaming innocence" man's freedom and destiny are in harmony, but neither of them is actualized nor is their unity actualized; both of these elements, as well as their unity, are still only essential or potential.[1]

Thus, man is caught between the desire to actualise his freedom and the demand to preserve his dreaming innocence. In other words, man experiences a double threat, which is rooted in his finite freedom and expressed in anxiety. He experiences the anxiety of losing himself by not actualising himself and his potentialities and the anxiety of losing himself by actualising himself and his potentialities. He stands between the preservation of his dreaming innocence without experiencing the actuality of being and the loss of his innocence through knowledge, power, and guilt. The anxiety of this situation is the state of temptation. However, in the power of his finite freedom man decides for actualisation, thus producing the end of dreaming innocence.[1]

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[1] Martin, Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man, pp. 116-117.

In what sense is the Fall an event? According to Tillich, the human transition from essence to existence should be understood not as an event of the past but as something that occurs in all three modes of time. That is, the Fall is not an historical event that happened "once upon a time."[2] It is the original fact in that it is an ontological condition that precedes but touches all of creation. In this respect, all other facts are proceed from this original fact, the Fall. Tillich states:

> The transition from essenc to existence is the original fact. It is not the first fact in a temporal sense or a fact beside or before others, but it is that which gives validity to every fact. It is the actual in every fact. We do exist and our world with us. This is the original fact. It means that the transition from essence to existence is a universal quality of finite being. It is not an event of the past; for it ontologically precedes everything that happens in time and place. It sets the conditions of spatial and temporal existence. It is manifest in every individual person in the transition from dreaming innocence to actualization and guilt.[3]

In order to indicate that "the very constitution of existence implies the transition from essence to existence," Tillich uses the term "transcendental Fall." By a "transcendental Fall" Tillich seeks to indicate an ontological quality and not an act, a state of being and not an event. However, insofar as this state of finite being called the Fall is expressed in human beings in temptation, desire, or "aroused freedom," it requires self-consciousness in man--at least a concsiousness of his finite freedom.[1]

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 35-36.

[2] For Tillich, theology must clearly represent "the Fall" as a symbol for the human situation universally, not as the story of an event that happened "once upon a time"(Ibid., p. 29).

[3] Ibid., p. 36.

Through Tillich's acount of man's transition from essence to existence, the coincidence between creation and the Fall begins to be realized despite their logical difference. That is, creation has as its end, in the case of man, the actualization of his finite freedom, but this very actualization is also the beginning of the Fall, since it separates man from the creative ground of the divine life. For Tillich "actualized creation and estranged existence are identical." Tillich says:

> Creation and the Fall coincide in so far as there is no point in time and space in which created goodness was actualized and had existence. This is a necessary consequence of the rejection of the literal interpretation of the paradise story. There was no "utopia" in the past, just as there will be no "utopia" in the future. Actualized creation and estranged existence are identical ...If God creates here and now, everything he has created participates in the transition from essence to existence. He creates the newborn child; but if created, it falls into the state of existential estrangement. This is the point of creation and the Fall. But it is not a logical coincidence.[2]

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[1] McKelway, *The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich*, p. 149n.

[2] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. II, p. 44.

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In this respect, creation is good in its essential character. If actualized, it falls into universal estrangement through freedom and destiny. Thus, actual creation is not good. At this point, man and nature are both involved in the transition from essence to existence; neither is "innocent." That is, both man and nature partake mutually of the estrangement of existence from essence. The universal fall of nature indicates the element of destiny in man's actualization of his freedom and subsequent estrangement.[1]

Sin as Estrangement

We must now analyze this "fallen" situation itself in terms of sin. In other words, what are the results of the Fall? According to Tillich, man's situation is one of "estrangement," which means that "man as he exists is not what he essentially is and ought to be." That is, as Tillich himself puts it, "the state of existence is the state of estrangement. Man is estranged from the ground of his being from the other beings, and from himself. This transition to existence results in personal guilt and universal tragedy."[2] Here Tillich prefers "estrangement" to the traditional word "sin" because it expresses the truth that "one belongs essentially to that from which one is estranged." Estrangement means a splitting apart of that which was formerly united. Separation presupposes a prior unity. If man is now alienated from God, he was once united with him. Another dimension of estrangement is revealed when this separation is seen to exist within a person. Man is separated from his true self, and yet he cannot be completely separated, even if he is hostile to himself. Tillich says:

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[1] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 149-150.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 44-45.

> The profundity of the term "estrangement" lies in the implication that one belongs essentially to that from which one is estranged. Man is not a stranger to his true being, for he belongs to it. He is judged by it but cannot be completely separated, even if he is hostile to it. Man's hostility to God proves indisputably that he belongs to him. Where there is the possibility of hate, there and there alone is the possibility of love.[1]

For Tillich sin is the personal act of turning away from that to which one belongs. Sin is "separation," "estrangement from one's essential being." Sin is "the unreconciled duality of ultimate and preliminary concerns, of the finite and that which transcends finitude, of the secular and the holy."[2] In this respect, sin must not be understood as "sins," that is, particular acts which are considered morally evil. "Sins," according to Tillich, are the expressions of sin; their sinfulness lies not in disobedience to a law, but in the estrangement from God, from self to which they bear witness. That is, for Tillich the term "Sin" is singular, not plural. In other words, here Tillich tries to reinterpret sin religiously rather than morally. In following St. Paul's idea of sin, Tillich states:

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[1] Ibid., p. 45.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 218.

> Paul often spoke of "Sin" in the singular and without an article. He saw it as a quasi-personal power which ruled this world. But in the Christian churches, both Catholic and Protestant, sin has been used predominantly in the plural, and "sins" are deviations from moral laws..,the characteristics of sin are here considered under the heading of "estrangement" itself implies a reinterpretation of sin from a religious point of view.[1]

This is why Tillich criticizes the traditional Christian idea of sin. At this point, for Tillich the term "estrangement" is a crucially important tool for the reinterpretation of sin. For estrangement points to the universal character o[illegible]in, expressing the element of destiny. Tillich says:

> Man's predicament is estrangement, but his estrangement is sin. It is not a state of things, like the laws of nature, but a matter of both personal freedom and universal destiny. For this reason, the term "sin" must be used after it has been reinterpreted religiously. An important tool for this reinterpretation is the term "estrangement." Both point to the universal character of estrangement, expressing the element of destiny in estrangement. But both words are so much burdened with literalistic absurdities that it is practically impossible to use them any longer...It is not the disobedience to a law which makes an act sinful but the fact that it is an expression of man's estrangement from God, from men, from himself. Therefore, Paul calls everything sin which does not result from faith, from the unity with God.[2]

Man's sinful or estranged state is expressed, according to Tillich, by three major attitudes or qualities which serve as its identifying marks. For Tillich these are unbelief, _hubris_, and concupiscence. Unbelief is the act of man's turning away from God, _hubris_ is man's self-elevation to the place of the divine, and concupiscence is the unrestricted desire to seize the whole of reality and pull it into oneself. Each of them needs reinterpretation in order to mediate insights into man's existential predicament. Unbelief, as Tillich puts it, is not the rejection of church doctrine, but rather the expression of the fact that in his existential self-realization man "turns toward himself and loses his essential unity with the ground of his being and his world." It means the act or state in which man in the totality of his being turns away from God and toward himself, in the actualization of his freedom. Further, it is neither the "denial" of God nor "disobedience" to a moral law. It is separation from God. In expressing the nature of unbelief, Tillich says:

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[1] _Systematic Theology_, Vol. II, p. 46.

[2] _Ibid_., pp. 46-47.

> Unbelief...is not the unwillingness or inability to believe the doctrine of the church, but, like faith, it is an act of the total personality, including practical, theoretical and emotional elements... Unbelief means the act or state in which man in totality of his being turns away from you... Man in actualising himself, turns to himself and away from God in knowledge, will, and emotion. Unbelief is the disruption of man's cognitive participation in God. It should not be called the "denial" of God... He who asks for God is already estranged from God, thought not cut off from Him. Unbelief is the separation of man's will from the will of God. It should not be called "disobedience"; for command, obedience, and disobedience already presupposes the separation of will from will.[1]

Also, for Tillich unbelief is un-love. Both mean man's estrangement from God. Following the Augustinian interpretation of sin, he says:

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 47.

> If unbelief is understood as man's estrangement from God in the centre of his self, then the Augustinian interpretation of sin as love turned away from God to self can be accepted by Protestant theology. Unfaith is ultimately identical with un-love; both point to man's estrangement from God. For Augustine, sin is the love which desires finite goods for their own sake and not for the sake of the ultimate good...The disruption of the essential unity with God is the innermost character of sin. It is estrangement in terms of faith as well as in terms of love.[1]

The second mark of man's estrangement, hubris, is simply the other side of unbelief. That is, for Tillich, having turned away from the divine center to which he essentially belongs, man makes himself the center of his world. Tillich says:

> Hubris is not one form of sin beside others. It is sin in its total form...It is turning toward one's self as the centre of one's self and one's world. This turning toward one's self is not an act done by a special part of man, such as his spirit...And it is in the totality of his personal being that man makes himself the center of his world. This is his hubris; this is what has been called "spiritual sin"...All men have the hidden desire to be like God, and they act accordingly in their self-evaluation and self-affirmation.[2]

In other words, hubris is the self-elevation of finite man to the realm of the infinite. The possibility of this self-elevation is man's greatness. That is, man's greatness lies in his being infinite, and it is just this temptation of hubris into which he universally falls through destiny and freedom.[3] In other words, the danger is that man will refuse to acknowledge his finitude. Man, as Tillich stated, elevates himself beyond the limits of his finite being and provokes the divine wrath which destroys him. Man turns away from God in unbelief and toward himself, because he is then in a position to draw the whole world to himself.[1] That is, man is aware that as an individual he is separated from the whole, and he desires to draw the whole of reality into himself. This desire on the part of man to overcome the poverty of his separated state and to become united with the whole by drawing it into himself is what is meant by "concupiscence."[2] Also, hubris should not be translated as "pride." Because, for Tillich pride is a moral quality, whose opposite is humility. Hubris, according to Tillich, is not the special quality of man's moral character. It is universally human; it can appear in acts of humility as well as in acts of pride. In this respect, hubris has been called the "spiritual sin," and all other forms of sin have seen derived from it, even the sensual ones.[3] At this point, there is a main difference between Reinhold Niebuhr and Tillich.

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[1] Ibid., p. 48.

[2] Ibid., pp. 50-51.

[3] Ibid., p. 50.

It goes without saying that when Tillich introduces the term "concupiscence," he uses it ontologically instead of referring exclusively to sensuality and its psychological concomitants.[1] Every individual, according to Tillich, since he is separated from the whole, desires reunion with the whole. This is the root of love in all its forms. The classical name for this desire is concupiscentia,--the unlimited desire to draw the whole of reality into one's self.[2] For Tillich concupiscence should not be identified with the striving for sexual pleasure alone. For concupiscence refers to all aspects of man's relation to himself. Tillich says:

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[1] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 151-152.

[2] Martin, Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man, p. 123.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 50.

> It refers to all aspects of man's relation to himself and to his world. It refers to physical hunger as well as to sex, to knowledge as well as to power, to material wealth as well as to spiritual values.[3]

Concupiscence is the unlimited character of the strivings for these things that are symptoms of man's estrangement. Related to a definite and limited content, they are expressions of man's essential eros and are not demonic or self-destructive.[4] Actually, Freud's "libido" and Nietzsche's "will to power," according to Tillich, have contributed immensely to a rediscovery of the Christian view of man's predicament. However, this all-embracing meaning of concupiscence has been reduced to a rather special meaning, namely, the striving for sexual pleasure. The natural desire for union with the whole of reality is not bad in itself, but if it is unlimited it becomes "concupiscence," which is not simply unrestrained sexuality, but unlimited desire in all of man's relations. That is, in the existential situation, concupiscence is distorted. Concupiscence, or distorted libido, according to Tillich, wants one's own pleasure through the other being, but it does not want the other being.[1] This is the contrast between libido as love and libido as concupiscence. At this point, Tillich criticizes both Freud and Nietzsche.

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[1] David E. Roberts, "Tillich's Doctrine of Man," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 127.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 52.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Martin, Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man, p. 123.

> ...[B]oth ignore the contrast between man's essential and his existential nature and interpret man exclusively in terms of existential concupiscence, omitting any reference to man's essential eros which is related to a definite content.[2]

Freud, according to Tillich, did not make this distinction because of his puritanical attitude towards sex. Only through repression and submission of libido can man become creative. In Freud's thought there is no creative eros which includes sex.[3] Also, Nietzsche did not show the norms and principles by which the will to power can be judged. It remained unlimited and had demonic-destructive traits. For Tillich it is another concept and symbol of concupiscence. Thus, for Tillich neither libido nor the will to power in itself is a characteristic of concupiscence. Both become expressions of concupiscence and estrangement when they are not united with love and therefore have no definite object.[4]

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 54.

[2] Ibid., p. 53. [3] Ibid., p. 54. [4] Ibid., p. 55.

Thus, through Tillich's understanding of these three marks of estrangement(Unbelief, Hubris, and Concupiscence), it becomes clear that Tillich's idea of sin is a matter of our relation to God and not to ecclesiastical, moral, or social authorities. Sin is a religious concept, not in the sense that it is used in religious contexts, but in the sense that it points to man's relation to God in terms of estrangement and possible reunion.[1]

In addition, for Tillich original sin is neither more nor less than the universal destiny of estrangement which concerns every man. This is the universal fact of sin which precedes the individual sinful act, and it is also illuminated by the ontological structure "freedom and destiny." He says:

> Original or hereditary sin is neither original nor hereditary; it is the universal destiny of estrangement which concerns every man---Sin is a universal fact before it becomes an individual act, or more precisely sin as an individual act actualities the universal fact of estrangement. As an individual act, sin is a matter of freedom, responsibility, and personal guilt. But this freedom is imbedded in the universal destiny of estrangement in such a way that in every free act the destiny of estrangement is involved and vice versa, that the destiny of estrangement is actualized by all free acts.[2]

Tillich's concept of original sin must include the element of destiny in Adam's fall and the element of freedom in the fall of his heirs. For Adam, according to Tillich, is an essential man and symbolizes the transition from essence to existence. Also, the unity of destiny and freedom must be preserved in the description of every condition of man.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 49.

[2] Ibid., p. 56.

Further, Tillich translates "original" and "actual" sin as "fact" and "act." The fact is original and precedes the act; the fact conditions the act and forms its destiny. As stated before, as an act sin is a matter of freedom, responsibility, and personal guilt. But since freedom and destiny cannot ultimately be separated, it is impossible to separate sin as fact from sin as act. They are interwoven, and their unity is an immediate experience of everyone who feels himself to be guilty.[2]

Thus, for Tillich man, by his very existence, is estranged from God and from his own essential being and in spite of the power of his finite freedom, he is unable to achieve reunion with God. That is, man cannot save himself because the unity of freedom and destiny means that no act within the context of existential estrangement can overcome existential estrangement. Destiny keeps freedom in bondage without eliminating it. For this reason, man by himself is incapable of breaking out of his existential estrangement to achieve reunion with God. Tillich says:

> Man, in relation to God, cannot do anything without him. He must receive in order to act. New being precedes new acting. The tree produces the fruits, not the fruits the tree. Man cannot control his compulsions except by the power of that which happens

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*

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> to him in the root of these compulsions. This psychological truth is also a religious truth, the truth of the "bondage of the will." Attempts to overcome estrangement within the power of one's estranged existence lead to hard toil and tragic failure. [1]

This is why man seeks for the New Being, Jesus as the Christ. Thus, for Tillich, the idea of sin connects specifically with his Christology. Tillich's basic approach to the Christ, developed in his Systematic Theology, Vol. II, presents him as the divine answer to mankind's anguish when the estrangement of existence bursts into our consciousness.[2] Tillich distinguishes two major types of the quest: the non-historical and the historical expectation of the New Being. The non-historical attitude, exemplified in Far Eastern religions, does not expect salvation through history, but rather in the negation of all beings and the affirmation of the Ground of Being alone.[3] Here the New Being is sought above and beyond history. In the historical attitude, however, the New Being is the fact of a transformed reality, the transformation happening in history through a unique and irreversible process.[4] Although the Christian idea of the New Being is thoroughly historical, it is capable of incorporating the non-historical. The Son of Man, the Logos, Incarnation, the Spirit, and St. Paul's

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[1] Ibid., pp. 79-80.

[2] Tavard, "The Protestant Principle and the Theological System of Paul Tillich," Paul Tillich in Catholic Thought, eds. by Thomas F. O'Meara, o. p. and Donald M. Weisser, o. p.(New York: A Division of Doubleday & Co., 1969), p. 293.

[3] Carl J. Armbruster, S. J., The Vision of Paul Tillich (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1967), p. 178.

[4] L. Gordon Tait, The Promise of Tillich(Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1971), p. 61.

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element of mysticism--all these transhistorical elements build a bridge across which non-historical expectations can enter Christianity.

The New Being will first be considered under the aspect of "newness." The old eon is estrangement, the split between essential and existential being. The Christ as the New Being ushers in the new eon by manifesting undistorted essential being within the conditions of existence.[1] The New Being is new "in contrast to the merely potential character of essential being; and it is new over against the estranged of existential being.[2] Also, the appearance of the New Being is the beginning of fulfillment, and it is the end of the old situation. It is the end of the reign of law. It is the end of existence. The next step is to consider the "beingness" of the New Being. Tillich insists that "Jesus as the Christ is the bearer of the New Being in the totality of his being, not in any special expressions of it."[3] For this reason, for Tillich Jesus is the Christ not because of what he did or said, but because his being is the New Being. This must be emphasized against both liberal and fundamentalistic tendencies to discover the character or "prove" the divinity and authority of Jesus through the data of the scriptural accounts of his life.[1] Jesus' being has the quality of the New Being beyond the split of essential and existential being. This means that the particular aspects of Jesus' life must always be subordinated to and interpreted by his being. For this reason, Tillich warns, neither Christ's sinfulness nor his goodness may be interpreted as a special ethical quality. His goodness and sinlessness are ways of speaking of the being of Christ--which was the New Being overcoming the estrangement of existence.[2] Thus, Tillich describes man's need for an absolutely new being. The New Being is certainly found in the Christ who constitutes a return to the original unity between God and man. In analyzing the essential nature of Godmanhood in Jesus as the Christ, Kenan Osborne states:

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[1] Armbruster, The Vision of Paul Tillich, p. 183.

[2] Ibid., pp. 183-184.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 119.

> As regards Essential Godmanhood, Tillich's line of thought runs as follows: a. God and man are dialectical concepts. We have no other concept of God beyond a "related" or a "dialectical" concept; nor can we describe the essence of man, a finite being, without implying the Ground of all being. b. God's creativity cannot be understood as something accidental to his being. He is always and essentially a creator. c. This divine creativeness is the self-objectification of God or the Logos, and as creative, Logos has an eternal reference to essential man. The Logos, therefore, has this eternal ability to objectify himself in and through the essence of man. This is not a temporal situation for the Logos. d. This eternal interdependence between Logos and the essence of man is what Tillich terms Essential Godmanhood. And this has been manifested unambiguously only once in human history: namely in the unique event of Jesus as the Christ.[3]

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[1] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, pp. 175-176.

[2] Ibid., p. 162.

[3] New Being(The Hague: Marinus Nijhoff, 1969), p. 167.

The Ethical Concepts in Paul Tillich

Love: Its Ontological Meaning

In this section the ethical concepts of Tillich are to be examined. The ontological meanings and their significance for the ethical concepts are explicated in order to lay the ground work for his ethical thought. Here Tillich's concepts of ethics present him at his best, clear, stimulating, provocative. He makes a basic analysis of all concepts fundamental in the mutual relations of human beings, and of man and God. Tillich's concern is to penetrate to the essential, or ontological, foundation of the meaning of each of these concepts and thus to save them from the vague talk, idealism, cynicism, and sentimentality with which they are usually treated. And then the basic unity of all concepts of ethics is affirmed and described in terms that are fresh and compelling.

Love's relation to the concrete in the world, has been already discussed. For this reason, it is primarily the ontological character of love that is treated here. In introducing and summarizing Tillich's thought on love, J. A. T. Robinson maintains that for Tillich love, realizing itself from kairos to kairos, creates an ethics which is beyond the alternative of absolute and relative ethics or what Tillich elsewhere calls supernaturalism and naturalism.[1] In short,

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[1] Robinson, Honest To God, pp. 115-116.

Robinson expresses Tillich's thought on love. For Tillich love as the highest concept of ethics, is neither the supernatural nor the natural but the ontological. Love is an absolute, eternally related to the ground of being and manifesting this ground in action. That is, for Tillich love is being-itself in which every being participates. He says:

> If we speak of the ontology of love we indicate that Love belongs to the structure of Being itself, that every special being with its special nature participates in the nature of Love since it participates in Being itself. The participation of a being in the nature of Love can happen even as the negation of love, as indifference, or as hate.[1]

This is why Tillich emphasizes that love is not a matter of ought-to-be but a matter of being.[2] Being-Itself is Love. Needless to say, this statement is implicit in the statement that God is Love. That is, according to Tillich, the ontology of Love is expressed in John 4:8 and 16: "God is love." It is not said that God is first something else and then has Love, but that He is Love, that Love is his very nature.[3] For this reason, for Tillich, he who remains in Love remains in God. Also, knowledge of God is impossible except through participation in Love.[4] Further, Tillich briefly states the ontological character of love as follows: "Life is being in actuality and love is the moving power of life."[5] For him the ontological nature of love is expressed in these two sentences. They mean that being is not actual without the love which drives everything that is towards everything else that is. That is, love, as stated before, is the drive towards the unity of the separated.[1] Such a love as the drive towards this unity belongs to the essential structure of life.

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[1] Will Herberg, Four Existentialist Theologians(New York: Doubleday & Co., Ltd., 1958), pp. 300-301.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 272.

[3] "Being and Love," p. 662.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 25.

For Tillich, love, however, could not unite that which is essentially separated, for reunion presupposes separation of that which belongs essentially together. Separation presupposes an original unity. Unity embraces itself and separation, just as being comprises itself and non-being. For this reason, the absolutely strange cannot go into a communion. But the estranged is striving for reunion. Love cannot be stated as the union of the strange but as the reunion of the estranged. That is, estrangement presupposes original oneness. The greatness separation, for Tillich, is the separation of self from self. Every self is self-related and a complete self is completely self-related.[2] Love reunites that which is self-centred and individual. In other words, it is the reunion with the essential being of man. Consequently, it is ontologically and therefore universally true.[3] Life, according to Tillich, has love in itself as one of its constitutive elements. But there is no love without the emotional element. That is, for Tillich "the emotional element cannot be separated from love; love without its emotional quality is 'good will' toward somebody or something, but it is not love."[1] The question is only how to relate it to the ontological definition of love. Love as an emotion is the anticipation of the reunion which takes place in every love-relation. Love is an expression of the total participation of the being which is in an emotional state.[2] This means that the emotional element in love does not precede the others ontologically but that the ontologically founded movement to the other one expresses itself in emotional ways. Love, as Tillich puts, is the whole being's movement towards another being to overcome existential separation.[3] It is the superiority of the person-to-person relationship that actualizes their reunion in love, and therefore love is a state of the whole person.[4] Further, love is the ecstatic self-transcendence that enables a person reunite with other person. Accordingly, the ontology of love, according to Tillich, leads to the basic assertion "love is one."[5] For only the relation of love to being as such can reveal its fundamental character.

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 134.

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 136.
[2] *Love, Power, and Justice*, p. 26.
[3] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. III, 136.
[4] *Ibid*., p. 137.
[5] *Love, Power, and Justice*, p. 27.

Thus, Tillich defines love as the urge to reunite the separated.[1] If love is the drive towards the reunion of the separated, the different qualities of love become understandable. Here Tillich distinguishes four types of love: libido, philia, eros, and agape.[2] For Tillich they must be clearly distinguished, but all of them share a desire to be united with something that is not strange but separated. They are interrelational. Tillich states that the will to reunite is essential in every love relation, and the different qualities of love interpermeate and are interdependent.[3] First of all, libido is not the desire for pleasure, that is, it is not pleasure as such which is desired, but the union with that which fulfills the desire.[4] In other words, life strives for union with that which is separated from it, though it belongs to itself. For Tillich it means the normal drive towards vital self-fulfilment. In the light of this analysis, it is justified to say that *libido* or *epithymia* is a quality which is not lacking in any love relation.[1] Also, the attempts to establish an absolute contrast between *agape* and *eros* usually presuppose an identification of *eros* and *epithymia*. That is, for Tillich, there is *epithymia* in every *eros*. *Eros*, however, transcends *epithymia*. For *eros* as striving for a union with that which is bearer of values transcends *epithymia* in the mystical union with that which is the source of the beautiful and the true.[2] For this reason, for Tillich theology would not exist without the *eros* towards truth, and without the *eros* towards the beautiful no ritual expressions would exist. Also, for him, without the desire of man to be reunited with his origin, the love towards God becomes a meaningless word.[3]

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[1] D. Mackenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue(New Yoek, Evanston, and London: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 47.

[2] For Tillich, philia, in a word, means "friendship," eros means "aspiration toward value," libido or epithymia means "desire," and agape means "the creation of the Spirit." There is one point of identity in all these qualities of love which justifies the translation of them all by "love."

[3] Tillich, Dynamics of Faith(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), pp. 114-115. Tillich states that the qualities of love are actually lying within each other and driven into conflict only in their distorted forms. No love is real without a unity of eros and agape. Agape without eros is obedience to a moral law, without warmth, without reunion. Eros without agape is chaotic desire.

[4] Love, Power, and Justice, pp. 28-29.

Tillich also points out that the *eros* quality of love is in a polar way related to what could be called the *philia* quality of love. For him, this means that while *eros* represents the transpersonal pole, *philia* represents the personal pole, and they are interdependent.[4] That is, there is *eros* quality in *philia*, and vice versa. This implies that without the radical separation of the self-centered self neither the creative nor the religious *eros* is possible.[5] In other words, he who cannot relate himself as an "I" to a "thou" cannot relate himself to the true and the good and to the ground of being in which they are rooted.[1] For Tillich the philia quality of love is also dependent on eros. Concepts like participation and communion point to the eros quality in every philia relation. It is the desire to unite with a power of being which is both most separated and most understandable and which radiates possibilities and realities of the good and the true in the manifestation of its incomparable individuality.[2] For Tillich eros and philia, however, are not only united in the individual relation. They are also united in the communion of social groups. Tillich says:

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. 30. [2] *Ibid.* [3] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[4] *Ibid.* [5] *Ibid.*

> In families, and national groups, the desire for participation is directed towards the power of being which is embodied in the group. The very fact that such groups consist of individuals with whom an I-thou relation is potentially given, distinguishes the eros within a group from eros which is effective, e. g. in artistic creations.[3]

As indicated before, eros as well as philia contains an element of epithymia. "There is," Tillich says, "an element of libido even in the most spiritualized friendship and in the most ascetic mysticism. A saint without libido would cease to be a creature. But there is no such saint."[4]

According to Tillich, agape, however, enters from another dimension into the whole of life and into all qualities of love. That is, agape is the depth of love or love in relation to the ground of life.[1] In agape ultimate reality manifests itself and transforms life and love. That is, love as agape is a creation of the Spiritual Presence which conquers the ambiguities of all other kinds of love.[2] Also, as Tillich states, it drives to accepatnce of the beloved and his transformation into what he potentially is.[3] This, according to Bonhoeffer, means the undergoing of the transformation of one's entire existence by God.[4] Further, for Tillich, agape is love cutting into love. That is, in the holy community the agape quality of love cuts into the libido, eros, and philia qualities of love and elevates them beyond the ambiguities of their self-centeredness. But agape must not be confused with other qualities of love. Certainly agape is related to and can be combined with all of them, but it also judges all of them.[5] Libido is good in itself. Freud's depreciation of what he described as the infinite libidinous drive with its ensuing dissatisfaction and death instinct, Tillich has accepted as a description in estrangement, but not of libido in its creative meaning.[6] That is, Tillich, as Bernard Martin points out, sees in Freud's theory of the _libido_ two valuable and enlightening expressions of that state of estrangement which traditional theology has called concupiscence.[1] But the value of Freud's analyses for an understanding of the human situation is limited by the fact that they are adequate descriptions of man's existential state of estrangement only and not of his essential being. Tillich says:

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid., p. 32. [3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid., p. 33.

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 137.

[3] Tillich, Dynamics of Faith, p. 116.

[4] Bonhoeffer, Ethics, p. 175. For Bonhoeffer love is something which happens to man, something passive, something over which he does not himself dispose, simply because it lies beyond his existence in disunion.

[5] My Search for Absolutes, p. 108.

[6] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 116.

> Freud, in this respect, was unclear, namely, he was not able to distinguish man's essential and existential nature. This is a basic theological criticism, not of any special result of his thinking, but of his doctrine of man and the central intuition he has of man. His thought about _libido_ makes this deficiency very obvious.[2]

In other words, _Freud_ does not distinguish between _libido_ as concupiscence and _libido_ as love.

Although _libido_ belongs to man's created goodness, it is distorted and ambiguous in the state of man's estrangement. For this reason, _libido_ has become unlimited and has fallen under the tyranny of the pleasure principle. It uses the other being not as an object of reunion but as a tool for gaining pleasure out of him.[3] _Agape_, however, elevates _libido_ into the divine unity of love, power, and justice. The same is true of _eros_. Tillich defines _eros_ as the driving force in all cultural creativity and in all mysticism. As such _eros_ has the greatness of a divine-human power.[4] But in the state of man's estrangement it is also distorted and participates in the ambiguities of life. The _eros_ quality of love, therefore, can be confused with the _libido_ quality and be drawn into its ambiguities.[1] And then it cuts itself away from the substance in which self has to express itself and falls into the pleasure of the irresponsible culture-value. That is, the ambiguity of cultural _eros_ is its detachment from the realities which it expresses and consequently the disappearing of existential participation and ultimate responsibility. Against it _agape_, however, does not deny the longing toward the good and the true and its divine source, but it prevents it from becoming an aesthetic enjoyment without seriousness.[2] That is, _agape_, according to Tillich, makes the cultural _eros_ responsible and the mystical _eros_ personal.[3] Here the relation of ontology and biblical religion to man's social existence is being discussed implicitly under the heading: "_eros_ and _agape_." For Tillich where _agape_ is put into an absolute contrast to _eros_, no positive relation of biblical religion to ontology is seen.[4] But this presupposes a distortion of the meaning both of _agape_ and of _eros_. Tillich says:

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[1] Martin, _Paul Tillich's Doctrine of Man_, p. 123.
[2] _Theology of Culture_, p. 119.
[3] _Love. Power, and Justice_, p. 117.
[4] _Ibid_.

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[1] _Ibid_. [2] _Ibid_., p. 118. [3] _Ibid_.

[4] Tillich, _Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality_ (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 71.

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> ...(T)he New Testament teaches explicitly and implicitly that participation in the divine Spirit or Logos means both having love and having truth. The desire for God is both the desire for him as love and the desire for him as truth. If the desire for him as love is called agape, the desire for him as truth should called eros.[1]

From this standpoint Tillich would criticize Anders Nygren's thought on love, since for Nygren there is no original relation between agape and eros. He says:

> It is most important to insist on the original absence of any relation between Eros and Agape...It is, however, of the utmost importance that we should accustom ourselves from the beginning to the idea that we cannot count on any direct correspondence and commensurability between Eros and Agape.[2]

Also, the ambiguities of the philia quality of love establish preferential love.[3] This is obvious not only in intimate relations such as family and friendship, but also in the innumerable sympathetic person-to-person encounters. The implicit rejection of all those who are not admitted to such a preferential relation is negative complusion, but such a rejection of others is tragically unavoidable.[4] However, agape, according to Tillich, does not deny the preferential love of the philia quality, but it purifies it from a sub-personal bondage, and it elevates the preferential love into universal love. That is, agape loves in everybody and through everybody love itself.[1]

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[1] Ibid., p. 72.

[2] Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros(Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1953), p. 31.

[3] For Tillich, the philia type of love is bound to personality. The ecstatic element in philia is participation in the self-realization of the friend in his changes and negativities. The couple of friends are ontologically bound together.

[4] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 119.

Consequently, there is no conflict between agape and eros, between agape and philia, between agape and libido. There are tensions, as there are implicitly in every dynamic process. Also, agape is not only itself united with the other qualities of love, but also creates unity among them. For there is one point of identity in all these qualities of love which justifies the translation of them all by "love." This identity is the "urge towards the reunion of the separated," which is, as Tillich puts it, the inner dynamics of life.[2] Love in this sense is one and indivisible. Agape has this power because, similarly to faith, it has the basic structure of the "New Being."[3] Accordingly, it is the self-projectional emergence of being and is possible only as the foundation of the power of being itself in the different qualities of love. Love, according to Tillich, is the power of being which reunites the separated. In summarizing Tillich's ontological love, Will Herberg says that for Tillich love is real only as the power of being.[4] Ontologically speaking, this means being-itself, the power in every power, is, at the same time, love.[1] Further, in expressing the ontological character of love, Tillich says that it is not the negation but the affirmation of power. The powerful being is the bearer of the powerful love. Love is not weakness, not resignation of power but the perfect power of Being.[2]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Tillich states that the love toward God is the love of love, neither agape nor philia nor eros nor libido, but all of them united. The love toward God is life finding itself and its substantial love-character and the affirmation of this character(Moral Principles of Action, p. 668.).

[3] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, pp. 137-138.

[4] Herberg, Four Existentialist Theologians, p. 304.

Power: Its Ontological Nature and Its Operation in the Social Problems

Tillich also attempts to treat the problem of power ontologically. He sees the task of ontology as that of describing the texture of being-as-being or of being as that in which everything that is participates.[3] The question of being can only be answered through attempts which must be tested by the power they have to make man's encounter with reality understandable. The concept Tillich suggests for a fundamental description of being as being is one within our triad of concepts, namely, the concept of power.[4] That is, power is ontological, and it in itself is an element in the essential structure of life.[5] It is used for a fundamental description of being as being. As a matter of fact, we cannot express the nature of being in terms of a definition, but, as Tillich points out, we can say something in terms of metaphorical indication, namely, "Being is the power of being."[6] "To be"

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[1] Ibid. [2] Ibid.

[3] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 35.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, P. 356.

[6] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 37.

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means "to have the ~~power~~" which resists non-being. That is, where there is no power, there is no being. Thus, being is described as the power of the resistance against non-being. The question of being is produced by the "shock of non-being."[1] The answer to the question how non-being can resist the power of being, can only be that non-being is not foreign to being.[2] Everything which participates in the power of being is "mixed" with non-being.[3] It, according to Tillich, is being in process of coming from and going toward non-being.[4] It is always limited by non-being. As stated before, Tillich calls this finitude. But non-being is nothing except in relation to being. Being, for Tillich, precedes non-being in ontological validity. It is its own beginning and end, the initial power of everything that is.[5] Still more by the "courage to be," being affirms the ultimate prevalence of being over non-being. Such a deed of "courage to be" is the expression of the foundation of every being.[6] It affirms the presence of the infinite in everything finite. Accordingly, the power of being is its possibility to affirm itself against the non-being

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[1] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 186.

[2] *Love, Power, and Justice*, p. 38.

[3] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. I, p. 189.

[4] *Ibid.* [5] *Ibid.*

[6] *Courage To Be*, p. 218.

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within it and against it. The power of being is the greater the more non-being is taken into its self-affirmation. In spite of this non-being, the self-affirmation of a being is the expression of the power of a being. "Self-affirmation means the affirmation of the power of being in which the self participates."[1] Hence for Tillich it reaches to the root of the concept of power. That is, power is the possibility to affirm itself, in spite of negativity. In other words, power is the eternal possibility of resisting non-being.[2]

Thus, when being intends to keep itself from the threat of non-being it advances beyond itself. That is, for Tillich the power of being is the power to advance beyond itself without losing itself.[3] In this respect, man's being in his existential situation appears as a union of remaining within itself and advancing beyond itself. Thus, the power of being as not static possibility but as the paradoxical tension of being itself makes the foundation of the dynamic life-process and in every moment of life it processes in the relation of every being from the atom to the human person. Tillich states:

> If we look in the light of this basic religious assertion at the processes of life, we find that there is power of being, the power of resisting the threat of nonbeing, for all beings from the atom to

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 107.

[2] *Systematic Theology*, Vol. III, p. 385.

[3] Tillich, *The Interpretation of History* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 182.

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> the human person. Each of them, too, has a center and a manifoldness of elements united by it, like the nucleus of the atom and the electrons around it or the conscious, knowing, and deciding ego in the individual man and the manifoldness of memories, desires, and thoughts in him.[1]

Thus, for Tillich the power of being is manifest only in the processes in which it actualizes its power. And these processes are going on in every moment of life, in all relations of all beings.[2] They go on between those powers of being which we call culture, between man and nature, between man and man, between individuals and groups, between groups and groups.[3] This leads to an analysis of the relation of the power of being in an individual to the power of being in a group. According to the polarity of individualization and participation which characterizes being itself, everything real is an individual power of being within an embracing whole. Within the whole of power the individual can gain or lose power of being. Also, the individual person is an ultimate, independent reality with both personal and social functions. The individual man is a social being, but the society does not create the individual. They are interdependent.[4] For Tillich, social-relation is power-relation, and it can keep the balance of the power-relation only where power is exercised rightly. Tillich says:

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[1] Tillich, Political Expectation, ed. by James Luther Adams(New York, Evanston, San Francisco, and London: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 116.

[2] Love, Power, and Justice, pp. 41-42.

[3] Ibid., p. 42. [4] Ibid., p. 93.

> If all being is indeed a balance of tensions of might, then social being is a balance of tensions of power. For power is might on the level of social existence.[1]

Power, however, appears as the power of the ruling group in the modern social life. Thus, social power is the hierarchical power, power in degrees.[2] Social power, centered and therefore hierarchical, has many forms in which it can appear. For Tillich it can appear in the control of a society by a feudal group, a military caste, a high bureaucracy, an economic upper class, a priestly hierarchy, and an individual ruler with or without constitutional restrictions, the ruling committees of a parliament, or a revolutionary vanguard.[3]

It goes without saying that for Tillich the center of power is only the centre of the whole as long as it does not degrade its own centrality by using it for particular purposes. However, in the moment in which the representations of the centre use the power of the whole for their particular self-realization they cease to be the actual centre, and the whole being, without center, disintegrates. Finally, the loss of the power of the whole, through internal or external causes, is unavoidable. Hence the revolutionary situation occurs necessarily. Tillich states:

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[1] The Interpretation of History, p. 183.

[2] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 94.

[3] Ibid.

> This exposition is equally valid for revolutionary force. It presupposes that the group in power, in contradiction to the meaning of life of the total society, only continues in power through the possession of the apparatus of power; that the might of the total group has long been dwelling in a group other than the ruling one; and that therefore the meaningful force, that which is united with the real power, belongs to the bearers of the revolution.[1]

This leads to all-decisive question of the relation of power to force and compulsion. Here, power, according to Tillich, needs compulsion in order to keep the balance of the power-relation in society. Then the element of compulsion in every historical power structure is not its foundation but an unavoidable condition of its existence.[2]

For Tillich power actualizes itself through force and compulsion. But power is neither the one nor the other. Tillich says:

> If power is understood to be the assured possibility of exercising force, socialism would have to disavow it to the same degree that it disavows force. But it is wrong to interpret power thus. To be sure the possibility of breaking down resistance, that is, exercising force, does belong to power. But this possibility does not form a basis of the concept, but grows out of it. The foundation of the concept of power lies in the structure of existence itself, and indeed of human as well as pre-human existence.[3]

In other words, power is being, actualizing itself over against the threat of non-being.[4] It uses and abuses compulsion in order to overcome this threat. And it uses and abuses force in order to actualize itself. For this reason, power needs compulsion. But its use of compulsion, according to Tillich, is only effective if it is an expression of the actual power relation.[1] That is, as far as it represents the total interest, compulsion is right and effective. But if it trespasses this limit it becomes harmful, ineffective, and self-defying.[2] Expressing it in another way, compulsion, or force, is distorted if it loses its inner foundation in the ontological structure of power which resists non-being. Tillich says:

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[1] The Interpretation of History, p. 193

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 309.

[3] The Interpretation of History, pp. 181-182.

[4] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 47.

> Force becomes distorted when the presupposition of meaningful power, the implicit acceptance of the structure of power, has disappeared, and power tries to maintain itself by means of the apparatus of power standing at its disposal. The worst excesses of force are to be found in situations wherein the inner foundation has been taken away from power. When force becomes isolated from power, whose function it is, it soon dissolves, for force thrives on acquiescence to it, even on the part of those who are subjected by it.[3]

For this reason, for Tillich compulsion is bad if it does not express the power of being in the name of which it is applied.[4] This is why coercion is tragic. It transforms the object of coercion, at least partly, into a thing, into a mere object that is deprived of its spontaneity, of its living response. A person is deprived of his freedom to act out of the totality of his being.[5] A law that is not the expression of his identity is imposed upon him. Tillich continues to state:

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[1] Ibid., pp. 47-48. [2] Ibid., p. 48.

[3] The Interpretation of History, p. 193.

[4] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 48.

[5] Political Expectation, p. 121.

> With that part of his personal existence upon which force is exercised he has ceased to be personal and therefore able to have a full community with other persons. This is the terrible thing in every coercion--not the pain it produces, but the partial depersonalization that is connected with the application of force. And this is true not only of him who is forced, but also of him who forces. And it is even true if we have to force ourselves into the repression of elements that belong to us as living beings. [1]

Compulsion, however, is good in itself. Further, for Tillich, power uses force in the service of love. He says:

> It must reject the agitators who produce the image of an enemy who is nothing but enemy, and it must remember that force should never be the tool of hatred, but always the tragically unavoidable way of love to conquer what is against love, and to create the ultimate unity of what belongs together. [2]

Here Tillich tries to show that power does not contradict the universal ethics of Christian love. Tillich also attempts to overcome the schism between the world in which coercive force is necessary and the world in which the law of love is valid. That is to say, for Tillich, love and power are united. He states:

> These are not two worlds, but one--the one world in whose divine ground, power and love are united; in which power and love, in their coexistence, conflict in a thousand ways, yet whose hope is the reunion of power and love--fragmentarily, in history, but complete only beyond time and space.[3]

In this respect, compulsion needs the criterion

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[1] *Ibid.*

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 122.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

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which is implied in the actual power relation, and on it the social and political consequences depend. Politics and power politics, according to Tillich, are one and the same thing. Therefore, for him there are no politics without power.[1] Unfortunately, in the existential situation the term "power politics," however, is used for a special type of politics, namely, that in which power is separated from justice and love, and identified with compulsion.[2] That is, this confusion is possible because there is indeed a compulsory element in the actuality of power. But this is only one element, and if power is reduced to it and loses the form of justice and the substance of love, it destroys itself and the politics based on it.[3] The problem is resolved only by the insight of the ontological foundation of power. That is, for Tillich the ambiguities in the relation of power and compulsion in the existential situation are overcome by the ultimate power, namely, the Spiritual Power.[4] Then such ambiguities are overcome only by penetration into the ontological roots of power.

Justice: Its Being as Form, and Its Relation to Love

In Tillich's theonomous ethics, justice is defined as the form in which power of being actualizes itself in the encounter of power with power. "The power of being," Tillich says, "has a form in expressing itself."[1] For this reason, for him justice is not a merely social category far removed from ontological inquiries, but it is a category without which no ontology is possible. Justice in itself is the unavoidable essential nature of being.[2] Actualized being or life unites dynamics with form. Everything real has a form. Consequently, that which has no form has no being. At the same time, everything real drives beyond itself. That is, it is not satisfied with the form in which it finds itself. It urges towards a more embracing, ultimately to the all-embracing form, and it destroys its given form and creates a new form.[3] We recall in this connection what has already been expounded in regard to the ontological structure of "Dynamics and Form."

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[1] *Love, Power, and Justice*, p. 8.

[2] *Ibid*. [3] *Ibid*.

[4] *The Interpretation of History*, pp. 190-191.

Thus, justice is the form in which the power of being expresses itself, and the principle of justice is the principle which in expressing itself the power of being has to follow. If life as the actuality of being is essentially the drive towards the reunion of the separated, it follows that the justice of being is the form which is adequate to this movement. Hence love is the fundamental principle of justice.[1] Further principles to be derived from the basic principle mediate between it and the concrete situation in which the risk of justice is demanded.

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[1] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 67.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 83.

[3] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 54.

According to Tillich, there are four such principles. The first principle is that of adequacy, namely the adequacy of the form to the content. That is, it is the principle of adequacy which demands that the form of being coincide with its contents.[2] For Tillich, the second principle of justice is that of equality. For him, of course, the character of equality is to be explicated ontologically. Every man has equality as participating in the power of being. Tillich further states that justice implies equality; but equality of what is essentially unequal is as unjust as inequality of what is essentially equal. Under the impact of the Spiritual Presence, the ultimate equality of everyone who is called to the Spiritual Community is united with the preliminary inequality that is rooted in the self-actualization of the individual as individual.[3]

In this sense justice means equality. But in the process of actualization innumerable differences appear, differences in the given nature of the individual, differences in his given social opportunity, differences in his given creativity, differences in all sides of his power of being.[1] In spite of these differences in the existential situation, the ultimate equality, however, cannot be separated from the existential inequality.[2] For Tillich the relation of equality and justice depends on the power of being in a man and his corresponding intrinsic claim for justice, and when the power of a being finds the expression which is adequate to it, there is justice. The third principle of justice, for Tillich, is that of personality. This principle is the intrinsic demand of the justice of being that every person be treated as a person.[3] Therefore, justice is always violated if men are dealt with as if they were things. Tillich calls it Verdinglichung, "reification," or Vergegenständlichung, "objectivation." It contradicts the justice of being, the intrinsic claims of every person to be considered a person. For this reason, where man is considered as a deliberating, deciding, responsible person, there is justice. Tillich says:

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 57. [2] _Ibid_., pp. 57-58.

[3] _Systematic Theology_, Vol. III, pp. 262-263.

> What is decisive is only what man is considered as a deliberating, deciding, responsible person. Therefore one had probably better speak of the principle of personality as a principle of justice.[4]

For Tillich, the fourth and last principle of justice is that of union. If the reunion of the separated is disturbed, justice is violated. But in justice itself every system includes an element which is essential for the encounter of man with man and a valid principle for a concrete situation.[1] Here the ontological foundation of the principle of community appears.

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[1] Love. Power, and Justice, p. 59.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 263.

[3] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 60.

[4] Ibid.

Also, justice is classified by Tillich as intrinsic, tributive, and creative. According to intrinsic justice, the basis of justice is the intrinsic claim for justice of everything that has being. And the claims for justice based on the different forms in which the power of being actualizes itself are different. But they are just claims if they are adequate to the power of being on which they are based. Justice is first of all a claim raised silently or vocally by a being on the basis of its power of being. It, according to Tillich, is an intrinsic claim, expressing the form in which a thing or a person is actualized.[2] The second form of justice is tributive or proportional justice. For Tillich it appears as distributive, attributive, retributive justice. Distributive justice gives to any being the proportion of goods which is due to him. Attributive justice attributes to beings what they are and can claim to be. Retributive justice does the same, but in negative terms, in terms of deprivation of goods or active punishment.[1] Tillich has called these the tributive, because there is no essential difference between distributive and retributive justice. Both of them are proportional and can be measured in quantitative terms.[2] Such a proportional justice is the basis for a system of moral laws. For Tillich however, this is not the Christian view of justice. He says:

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[1] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 336.

[2] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 63.

> Every system of moral commandments is, at the same time, the basis for a system of laws. In all moralisms the moral imperative has the tendency to become a legal principle. Justice, in Aristotle, is determined by proportionality. Everybody gets what he deserves according to quantitative measurements. This is not the Christian point of view.[3]

For Tillich a crucial form of justice is the creative, the third form of justice. Tillich calls it "transforming justice." As such it cannot be defined in definite terms, and therefore tributive justice is never adequate to it because it calculates in fixed proportions as stated before. As a matter of daily experience, we sometimes should speak of the resignation of proportional justice for the sake of creative justice.[4] But here the question arises; what is the criterion of creative justice? The answer, according to Tillich, is "Fulfillment within the unity of universal fulfillment."[5] It means that we should forego a certain assertion of justice for the sake of the ultimate fulfilment of the whole being. Such an expression of the third form of justice is given in the Biblical literature of both Testaments. In expressing the nature of justice in both Testaments, Tillich states:

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[1] Ibid., p. 64. [2] Ibid.

[3] Theology of Culture, pp. 143-144.

[4] Love, Power, and Justice, p. 65.

[5] Ibid.

> Justice, in the Old Testament, is the activity of God toward the fulfillment of His promise. And justice, in the New Testament, is the unity of judgment and forgiveness.[1]
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> It is not quite right to say that justice in the Bible is the negation of proportional justice. There are innumerable places in both Testaments where the symbol of the judge is applied to God or the Christ; and there are other places where the injustice of human judges is exposed and more seriously condemned than almost any other sin.[2]

That is, in both Testaments justice is applied to God who is not bound to the given proportion between merit and tribute. He can creatively change the proportion, and does it in order to fulfill those who according to proportional justice would be excluded from fulfillment. In the paradox of "justification by grace through faith," the divine justice is manifest in the divine act which justifies him who is unjust.[3] In other words, the sinner is accepted as the righteous in spite of his sin. This is why Tillich says that "one must accept oneself just as one is accepted in spite of being unacceptable."[4]

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[1] _Theology of Culture_, p. 144.

[2] _Love. Power, and Justice_, p. 65.

[3] _Ibid_.

[4] _Morality and Beyond_, p. 78.

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By the experience of the "justification through faith" a new concept of justice emerges. This "justification by grace," according to Tillich, is the highest form of divine justice. This also means that proportional justice is not the answer to the moral problem.[1] In other words, as Tillich puts it, not proportional, but transforming justice gives the answer. Such a transforming justice, however, does not negate but fulfills the ambiguous human justice.[2] In short, for Tillich, creative justice has the form of uniting love,[3] and it is thus fulfilled in love.[4]

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[1] Theology of Culture, p. 144.

[2] Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 226.

[3] Herberg, Four Existentialist Theologians, p. 305.

[4] Theology of Culture, p. 144.

CHAPTER IV

SUZUKI AND TILLICH: A COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION

We have discussed both Daisetz Suzuki's Busshō ethics and Paul Tillich's theonomous ethics. Indeed, both Suzuki and Tillich intend to analyze ethics in relation to being. That is, both are radically committed to the attainment of the basic ontological foundation and structure of ethics. For them, ethics has its foundation in the basic structure of being. In each case, this is to be achieved by the subordination of ethics to its ground of being, even though they analyze ethics from their different ontological principles.

We are now in a position to make a comparison between them. What are the ontologically different points, as well as similarities between Busshō ethics and theonomous ethics? Such a comparison, however, is difficult because their thoughts on ethics in relation to ontology are "in some cases so radically different that the same terms often carry different meanings."[1] For this reason, significant comparison will be of the realities behind the words rather than of the words themselves.

Both Busshō ethics and theonomous ethics have often

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[1] Chuck, "Paul Tillich and Zen Buddhism," p. 282.

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been seen as standing over against each other, holding contrasting positions. The contrast is located fundamentally in their respective ontologies, that is, in their interpretations of being. This is the foundation of the essential difference between Tillich and Suzuki. In other words, they represent two diverse ways of viewing the ethical predicament of human being and the means of its resolution, and the choice of one or the other of these alternatives must be with full recognition of all its implications.[1] In order to make clear each comparative point, most of the materials which have already been stated in the previous chapters will be used.

1. Both Tillich's theonomous ethics and Suzuki's Busshō ethics are based on an ontological foundation. As previously discussed, Tillich's theonomous ethics is ontological. For Tillich, "ethics is the science of man's moral existence asking for the roots of the moral imperative, the criteria of its validity, the sources of its contents, and the forces of its realization."[2] Needless to say, for him the answer to these questions is given by his ontological analysis of being. "The question about ethics," says Tillich, "is the question about activity toward the Unconditional. It is not simply one of behavior. Ethics can come to fulfillment only as a religious ethics."[3]

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[1] Supra, p. vi.

[2] Supra, pp. 179-180.

[3] Supra, p. 180.

Against the philosophy of values, pragmatism, heteronomy, and autonomy, Tillich asserts that the only way to a theological foundation of the moral imperative is the theonomous one. This calls for ethics under the Spiritual Presence which is the religious substance, that is, the experience of an ultimate concern.[1] Further, the Spiritual Presence creates a theonomous morality. Theonomous ethics avoids the destructiveness of the heteronomous way, and it gives religious foundation to the autonomous way. Here Tillich's major concern is to push "beyond supernaturalism and naturalism" to a third position, in which the transcendent is nothing external or "out there" but is encountered in, with and under the Thou of all finite relationships as their ultimate depth, ground, and meaning.[2] That is, it is the claim of the personal ground of our very being, it does not come as anything foreign. In this respect, theonomous ethics becomes ontological. Theonomous ethics asserts that the law given by God is not an outwardly imposed rule, obligation, or law, but man's essential nature.[3] Consequently, if man were not estranged from himself, in other words, if his essential nature were not distorted in his actual existence, no law would stand against him. God's law is not strange to man. It represents man's true nature from which he is estranged.

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[1] _Supra_, p. 184.

[2] _Supra_, p. 186.

[3] _Ibid_.

But man is estranged from himself, and therefore the values he experiences appear as laws, natural and positive laws, demanding, threatening, promising. In this respect, every valid ethical commandment is an expression of man's essential relation to himself, to others and to the universe.[1] For Tillich this alone makes it obligatory and accounts for the unconditional form of the moral imperative. The moral imperative, therefore, is the law of our own being. No outside command can be unconditional, whether it comes from a state, or a person, or human authorities like traditions, conventions, political or religious authorities, or even God.[2] From this point of view, no gulf between the "ought to" and the "is," therefore, can be ultimate for Tillich.

For Tillich, the moral command is unconditional because it is we ourselves commanding ourselves. In other words, morality is the self-affirmation of our essential being. This makes it unconditional. Theonomous ethics is neither a law, nor lawlessness, but it is ecstatic.[3] The essence of being is more than a mere logical concept. The ideal element of being, therefore, cannot be grasped merely through factual observation, nor through logical conceptualization, but only through the intuition of essence. Also, theonomous ethics perceives, in the power of a revelatory experience, that

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[1] Supra, p. 187. [2] Ibid.

[3] Supra, pp. 187-188.

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both good and evil are self-condemned for they are both self-centred. Indeed, Tillich's ontologically-oriented-theonomous ethics is above morality and immorality. It demands nothing but your being open and willing to accept what is given to you.[1]

Thus, all Tillich's ethical concerns depend upon the ontological foundation. For Tillich ethics is rooted in being itself; that is, it has an unconditional foundation; it "is," prior to all natural conditioning factors. For this reason, it can be grasped by ontological reason which grasps being itself. Tillich asserts that ethics has its foundation in the basic structure of being. It means that ethics is derived from the essential structure of being which appears within existence, though in a state of distortion. That is, ethics is determined by what man essentially is. Further, the ontological and the ethical are in one point identical: both deal with being as being.[2]

Like Tillich, Suzuki's approach to ethics is also ontological. Busshō ethics is spontaneously, directly obedient to being. It acts in accordance with the desires of the heart without breaking the law. As previously stated, Suzuki's ethics grows out of the concept of Busshō, "Buddha-nature," which is equivalent in Western terms to Ultimate Reality. He asserts that when one's mind functions with

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[1] Supra, p. 188.

[2] Tillich, Love. Power, and Justice, p. 107.

Busshō it is no more harassed by dualistic thoughts of good and evil, just and unjust, merit and demerit.[1] But spirituality, which is the core of *Busshō* ethics, goes beyond them; it is neither moral nor immoral. This means that Suzuki makes no judgment, he *takes things as they are*.[2] *Busshō* ethics is not between good and evil, but it is of a something which is neither good nor evil, becoming conscious of itself.[3] Expressing it in another way, Buddha's "COMMIT NO EVIL," the major subject of *Busshō* ethics, is not merely a rule. It must become my subjectivity; it must not remain an externally imposed rule. When it is truly my subjectivity and my true self, then my self is no longer that separate, finite ego of which I once boasted, but is none other than the Buddha-nature, the Absolute, the Eternal Truth.[4] That is, the subjectivizing of the "COMMIT NO EVIL" can be likened to the self-expression of the Buddha-nature. Also, the practice of it is the Buddha-nature itself in action. That is, "COMMIT NO EVIL" is not something contrived by a mere man. It is the *Bodhi* turned into words. It is the very speaking of Enlightenment. Here is the ground of the injunction to do good, and here is the power of fulfilling the injunction, and both are one.[5]

In this respect, Suzuki's *Busshō* ethics should never be a mere system of theoretical discussions or speculations on ethical problems; it must be associated with enlightenment in metaphysical truths and their realization in one's own life. The fundamental principle of Suzuki's Busshō ethics, therefore, consists in the Middle Path which is not the way between right and left, but the way to the realization of the ultimate end--the extinction of the pains arising from egoism. It is the solid way, in contrast with the crooked; the holy or noble, in contrast with the false, or base, and it leads to enlightenment.[1] When we are awakened we may see in ourselves the eternal Buddha-nature in its full illumination, and in this way, the communion with all the Buddhas may be realized. For Suzuki, morality is the way to this realization, and makes us tread the one and same way of the Buddhas. For this reason, the crux for understanding ethics is enlightenment-experience. For the man who is enlightened his actions will permit no external standard of judgment, and so long as they are the inevitable overflow of his inner life, they are good, even holy.[2] Hence, Suzuki points out that Zen wants to live from within, not to be bound by rules. It is above moral judgments, for there is no deliberation, no discrimination. The evaluation of good and evil presupposes discrimination, and where this is absent no such valuation is applicable, it cannot be measured by the standards used for things finite.[3]

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[1] *Supra*, p. 93. [2] *Supra*, p. 95. [3] *Ibid*.

[4] *Supra*, p. 99. [5] *Supra*, p. 100.

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[1] Supra, p. 104.

[2] Supra, p. 94.

[3] Ibid.

Accordingly, Suzuki does not try to give us any "ethical principles" so called. "If we find in Zen something like ethics," says Suzuki, "that is our finding, our deduction."[1] Here his emphasis is upon the inner life of a man. This is why he says that "His daily activities are not changed; what is changed is his subjectivity..,there is not much to say about the Zen man's life here, because his outward behavior does not mean much; he is all involved in his inner life."[2] At this point, ethics and ontology are interrelated. Indeed, they are one. The really good, according to Suzuki, is just so, and no more, no less. Just for this reason, even the very moment we say, "it is good," the good loses its goodness. Thus, the good is just-so-ness. In other words, the good is the isness of things.[3] What a thing is genuinely in its isness, therefore, is ethical. Also, Suzuki talks about the Genesis story of creation in which, when God saw the world created in response to his fiat, "Let there be light," he said "it is good." Here Suzuki states that this "good" has nothing to do with any human way of evaluating things. It is the being itself of things. It is not something added to them from an external source. It is something inherent.[4] Thus, all Suzuki's ethical concerns mean that ethics, in short, is rooted in being itself, in the isness

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[1] *Supra*, p. 95.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Supra*, p. 96.

[4] *Supra*, p. 102.

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of things.

From this point of view, both Tillich and Suzuki are very similar in their basic understanding of ethics. That is, their bases of ethics and their approaches to ethics are purely ontological. For them, both ethics and being are mutually related. Further, for Tillich and Suzuki they are one, even though according to their different ontological principles. This is the main reason why a Western ontologist like Walter Weisskopf can say that "Suzuki's approach is definitely ontological, and not very different from the one of a Western ontologist such as Tillich."[1]

Both Suzuki's and Tillich's ontological ethics are significant especially in this particular age. In modern society, mechanized civilization, which is superior to moral, spiritual civilization, has driven the human being to the age of speed and mechanized the human being himself. On the other hand, though the removal of priviledges has heightened to consciousness of the equal rights of human beings, the sense of alienation is keenly felt at various places when relentless struggles for common benefits through cooperative efforts destroy humanity as individuals. Monotonous work had driven the people to mental diversions and pleasures. This, coupled with wrong equality consciousness and unbridged desires, resulted in immoral conduct, which produced mutual distrust, and thus

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[1] Walter A. Weisskopf, "Comment," New Knowledge in Human Value, ed. by Abraham H. Maslow(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), p. 222.

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the people are now suffering from anxiety, loneliness, and fear. This vicious cycle is being repeated.[1] Consequently, we have to fight hand in hand to save men's minds from such dehumanization threatened by the new technological world.

From this point of view both Busshō ethics and theonomous ethics should be highly evaluated. Because both of them are the awakening to the essential self of human being, that is, the real restoration of humanity. Their life is the returning to the original human being which is lost in modern society. Their intent is to bring man into union with being and with himself. Ethics begins to be realized in the voice of one's deepest self. Also, intuitive obedience to one's being is more accurate than reasoning. This is why these ontological ethics should be applied to the present situation of Eastern Christian churches, because their understanding of Christian life is mostly ascetic, and legalistic. They are not related to their own being but to the Churchly disciplines and training. We should say that none of their good deeds has ultimate value before God and that none of their bad deeds is ultimately damning. Although for Christian there is not "good deed," for him there is the great paradox, that there is a reunion with the eternal "ground of our being" without "right action" on our part.[2] Christian revelation does not give a new law and new set of commands; it gives a new spirit out of which true thought and right action can follow. In other words, being precedes action. There are many people who do many good works but in whom the ultimate center is lacking. This ultimate center is faith. Faith can exist as an absolute affirmation of being as being. "Being precedes action" stands in opposition to both moral legalism and amoral lawlessness.[1] It affirms morality and points beyond it to its religious foundation. There is no answer in ethics without an explcit or implicit assertion about the nature of being, Indeed, ethics has its ground in the basic structure of being. Both Suzuki's and Tillich's contributions lie in their most thoughtful analyses of problem of ethics which we have had in Christian churches. Their concern is to penetrate to the essential, or ontological foundation of the meaning of ethics, and thus to save ethics from vague talk, idealism, cynicism, legalism, asceticism, and sentimentality, with which it is usually treated.

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[1] Shuyu Sakurai, "The Significance of Zen in Modern Society," Japanese Religions, Vol. 6. No. 1(1969), p. 20.

[2] Supra, pp. 23-24.

2. *Tillich's system of theonomous ethics, however, develops out of his ontological principle "participation," while Suzuki's system of the Busshō ethics comes from his different ontological principle of "identity."*

Though both Tillich and Suzuki are similar in their ontological approach to ethics, there are two different ontological principles "participation" and "identity" from

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[1] *Supra*, p. 26.

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which Tillich's and Suzuki's different ethical consequences are derived. On the one hand, "one participates, as an individual being, in the Kingdom of God." On the other hand, "one is identical with everything that is in Nirvana."[1] Participation and identity present the mutually different ontological approaches to ethics implied in them which creates the theoretical as well as practical contrast between Tillich and Suzuki. For Tillich the concept of "participation" is the basic ontological principle on which his whole system of theology and philosophy is built. Whenever Tillich exposes the idea of "participation," he does it in relation to the concept of "individualization." These constitute the first pair of ontological elements, stand in polar relation, and are interdependent on all levels of being.[2] Man, according to Tillich, is an individual who participates in his world. In other words, the individual self is a part of the world. This means that a self includes within itself that in which it participates. Participation is essential in individualization.[3] This is why individualization and participation are interdependent in a polar tension. Man as a "person" is individualization in its most perfect form; communion is participation in its most perfect form.[4] In the Kingdom of God both participation and individualization reach their ultimate form in the polarity. For Tillich, "no individual exists without participation, and no person without communion,"[5] because persons can grow only in the communion of personal encounter. From this viewpoint, Tillich criticizes the Buddhist idea of "identity." "Only if each person," says Tillich, "has a substance of his own is community possible, for community presupposes separation. You, Buddhist friends, have identity, but not community."[1] In other words, for him "only on this basis 'the individual self' is community--in contrast to realizing identity--possible."[2]

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[1] Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 68.

[2] Supra, p. 169. [3] Ibid. [4] Supra, pp. 169-170.

[5] Supra, p. 170.

In polarity with individualization, participation underlies the category of relation as a basic ontological element. Hence, we have Tillich's idea of relationship between God and man, man and man, man and nature. For him "without individualization nothing would exist to be related. Without participation, the category of relation would have no basis in reality."[3] Further, every relation includes a kind of participation. This is true even of indifference or hostility. Nothing can make one hostile in which one does not somehow participate, perhaps in the form of being excluded from it. Nothing can produce the attitude of indifference whose existence has not made some difference to one. The element of participation guarantees the unity of a disrupted world and makes a universal system of relations possible.[4]

In contrast with Tillich's "participation," Suzuki analyzes reality with "identity." Suzuki's main criticism against Tillich is that "participation" presupposes a dualistic interpretation of reality whereas "identity" goes more fundamentally into the root of existence where no dichotomy in any sense has yet taken place.[1] For Suzuki, no "participation" is possible where there is no underlying "identity." When difference is spoken of, this presupposes oneness. The idea of two is based on one. Two will never be understood without one.[2] First of all, by "identity" Suzuki means advaitism which is different from monism or oneness, Advaitism simply asserts that reality is non-dualistic, that is, reality is not two, and it is also not the same as one. It is both yes and no, yet it is neither the one nor the other. Suzuki says that reality is not dualistic, but identical, that a world of subject and object is not final, and that there is a something which is neither subjective nor objective, and further that this something is not to be subsumed under any category-form of the dualistic concept of subject and object. That is, we have a subject that is aware of something and an object of which the subject is aware, for the world of sense-and-intellect is a dichotomous world of subject and object.[3] For this reason, we should transcend the subject/object aspect of existence. For Suzuki, this transcendence is reached when the personality and the teaching, or the questioner and the question, are identified, for the question is answered only when it is identified with the questioner.[4]

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[1] Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions, p. 75.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Supra, p. 170.

[4] Ibid.

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[1] Suzuki, Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957), p. 79.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Supra, p. 42.

[4] Ibid.

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For Suzuki, "reality is a non-duality" is something mystical. It should be grasped in its suchness or isness, or in its totality. Man has the feeling of a something which persistently claims his attention. It is always bafflingly before us or behind the duality of subject and object, or good and evil, value and disvalue.[1] Suzuki calls this something the First Person "I," or "Eastern Subjectivism." Eastern Subjectivism is stated from the point of view of the thing-in-itself-ness of a thing, or simply its isness. To see a thing subjectively, therefore, means to see it as it is, in its suchness, in its just-so-ness. Consequently, what we ordinarily call "subjective" is not subjective, for it is still objective inasmuch as it is conceived in opposition to an object. No subject is possible without its object, and to this extent there is in the subject something of objectivity.[2]

Consequently, the dichotomy of subject and object cannot obtain unless there is something that lies behind them, something that is neither subject nor object; this is a kind of field where they can operate, where subject can be separated from object, object from subject. If the two are not related in any way, we cannot even speak of their separation or antithesis.[3] Suzuki says that there must be something of subject in object, and something of object in subject, which makes their separation as well as their relationship possible. That is, there is a living synthesizing activity whereby the subject "A" is linked to the object "A" when we say that "A" is "A." This is the work of *prajnā*. It is *vijnanā* that analyzes the one "A" into the subject "A" and the object "A"; and without *prajnā* the bifurcation cannot be replaced by the original unity or identity. Thus, *prajnā* makes the law of identity, and the foundation of our thinking thus owes its functioning to *prajnā*.[1] From this viewpoint, Suzuki argues that Tillich's participation cannot take place unless there is identity behind it. Whenever Suzuki meets Tillich he attempts to make the point that "unless you and that object are identical or share something there is nothing to respond to your participation. You cannot put anything of you into it."[2] Further, for Suzuki, the idea of participation is an intellectual interpretation of the primary experience, and as such applicable only to the dualistic world, while as far as the experience itself is concerned, there is no room for any kind of dichotomy. Thus, the Eastern Subjectivism is an absolute one. It is a position transcending the dualism of subject and object, and all forms of opposition and separation. The only way to catch it is by means of a paradox or contrary diction--"the clear light of the void, or rays of darkness, or eternal present, or pure darkness is pure light," etc.[3] This is the logic of self-identity, in which the two words are at once one and not-one. It is a pure experience. It is not to be confused with other experiences of our daily life, which may be classified as intellectual, emotional, or sensuous. It is the "primary" experience on which every other experience is based.[1]

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[1] _Supra_, p. 43. [2] _Supra_, p. 44. [3] _Supra_, pp. 56-7.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 57.

[2] Daisetz Suzuki and Tucker Callaway, "Dialogue: Christian and Buddhist," *The Eastern Buddhist*, New Series Vol. III, No. 1(June, 1970), p. 113.

[3] *Supra*, p. 44.

In this pure experience subject and object are not differentiated--subject is object, and object is subject. For Suzuki, this means the merging of the two contradictory terms: distinction and non-distinction, thinking and non-thinking, rationality and irrationality. To experience this truth of merging spiritually means to realise the irrational rationality of non-discrimination, to perceive that two contradictory terms are self-identical, that is, A is Not-A and Not-A is A.[2] It might be interpreted as the identity of the opposites: A is Not-A, therefore, it is A. Through this definition of the opposites, something original is made. Thus, for Suzuki the ultimate reality means "non-discrimination" which is the unconditional self-affirmation-negation, or self-negation-affirmation. That is, it asserts unconditional affirmation. It is to become prajnā. Such a distinction of non-distinction is imperative for a penetrating insight into the fundamental truth of absolute self-identity of opposites. This insight, or realization, or intuition, means the awakening of prajnā, the attaining of enlightenment, becoming the

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[1] Suzuki calls a pure experience the primary feeling experience. He likes to note the difference between sense-perception and "primary" feeling experience. In the former there is a sense-subject and its object, but in the latter, subject and object are not differentiated.

[2] Supra, p. 58.

Buddha.[1] From this viewpoint, the Buddha-nature is originally and always the basic nature of all beings. Also, the Buddha-nature is unquestionably realized simultaneously with enlightenment. In this respect, the distinction of Buddha and Buddhists is also overcome. The simultaneity of Buddha and Buddhists is realized only here and now at each and every moment. Suzuki's "identity," however, should not to be explained merely to mean that there are no distinctions between God and natures.

For Suzuki, what human being truly and really has is the one spiritual world, that is, the One, Undiscriminated, Indeterminate, Undistinguished, Undifferentiated.[2] Identification presupposes original opposition of the two terms, subject and object, but the truth is that from the very first there are no two opposing terms whose identification is to be achieved by Zen. There has never been any separation between subject and object; all the discrimination and separation we have or, rather, make, is a later human creation.[3] Consequently, the aim of Zen philosophy is to restore the experience of original inseparableness, which means to return to the original state of purity and transparency.[4] In other words, Suzuki wants to start with what God had in his mind before creation. However, Western people, according to Suzuki, start with things after light separated from darkness in the first day of creation.[5] This is the great difference between the Eastern and Western

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[1] Supra, p. 59. [2] Supra, pp. 52-3. [3] Supra, p. 53.

[4] Supra, p. 53.

[5] Suzuki and Callaway, "Dialogue," p. 108.

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minds. From this viewpoint, to Suzuki Tillich's participation is not acceptable. Tillich's idea of "participation" presuppses a dualistic conception of reality.[1] In other words, there is a clear separation between God and man, though dialectical, God is God, man is man, but not God is man, man is God. Also, in Tillich's participation, the separateness of the individual from the whole of reality is affirmed, while in Suzuki's identity, the oneness of the individual with all of reality is emphasized over against the separateness. Here we must take into account Suzuki's idea of the identity of nature-and-man. For him, the problem of nature is an eternal one. When it is solved, therefore, we know not only nature itself but also ourselves; that is, the problem of nature is the problem of human life, for humanity is rooted in nature. "Man," says Suzuki, "is, after all, a part of nature itself. First of all, man himself is not man-made but nature-made,.."[2] This means that there is nothing in man that does not belong in nature. Even when separating himself from nature, man is still a part of nature, for the fact of separation itself shows that man is dependent on nature. Nature produces man out of itself; man cannot be outside of nature, he still has his being rooted in nature. There is no hostility between nature and man. Rather, there must be a friendly relationship between them. In other words, it is not man facing nature as an unfriendly stranger but man thoroughly merged in nature, coming out of nature and going into nature. Further, for Suzuki man came from nature in order to see nature in himself; that is, nature came to itself in order to see itself in nature.[1] Thus, for Suzuki both nature and man are completely identified.

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[1] Suzuki, Mysticism: Christian and Buddhist, p. 97.

[2] Supra, p. 76.

For Zennists then the question immediately arises: Is not the real polar element of "individualization" not "participation" but "identity"? That is, "participation" cannot be essentially relieved of its "partial" or "relative" nature. Consequently, individualization through participation cannot be complete individualization because of the "partial" or "relative" nature of participation.[2] Also, for Zennists Tillich's "participation" is necessary in the Christian religion, because God is substantial "being-itself," and not non-substantial "absolute-Mu." For this reason, for Zennists including Suzuki, the "individualization" cannot be completely fulfilled through "participation" as being-itself but only through "identity" as "absolute-Mu." Identity as an ontological principle of absolute-Mu is neither identity as the sheer negation of individuality nor identity with oneness which is substantial, but identity with absolute Nothingness.[3] This is why Zennists ask Tillich: "Do you believe that every person has a substance of his own which gives him true individuality?" They continue to ask: "Do you believe that community between individuals is possible?" In other words, "Are not both community and separation in

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[1] Supra, p. 77.

[2] Masao Abe, "Christianity and the Encounter of World Religions," The Eastern Buddhist, Vol. I, No. 1(September, 1965), p. 117.

[3] Ibid., p. 118.

Christian understanding incomplete in so far as the self as well as God is understood as substantial?" "Is not the dialectical nature of the Christian understanding of community and separation really not dialectical, thus not reaching the core of ultimate reality?"[1] For Zennists if every person has a substance, no community is possible. Buddhist communion takes place as the communion of the "Realizer of *Nirvana*" with everything and everyone in *topos*(τόπος) of the absolute Nothingness in which everything and everyone are respectively absolute, being just as they are, and thus absolutely relative. Hence, identity involves in itself total differentiation, and this through individualization. *Nirvana* is not an objectively observable state but one's realization in which everything and everyone, including oneself, are respectively and equally realized as they are. In *Nirvana* identity itself is individualization.[2]

The present writer, however, has to criticize Suzuki's idea of "identity." First of all, Suzuki's idea of non-separation between God and man is not acceptable to me. From my Christian point of view, it is the root of sin; having turned away for the divine center to which he essentially belongs, man makes himself the center of his world.[3] The identity between God and man is the self-elevation of finite man to the realm of the infinite. Man elevates himself beyond the limits of his finite being and provokes the divine wrath which destroys him. The only way to a God-man relationship is that man participates in Jesus as the Christ, to use Tillich's terms, the New Being. For this reason, man is not God at all. Also, Suzuki's nature-loving religiosity lacks personal note. No exuberant passion explodes in Suzuki's life. Men and their works in history remain outside the scope of his vision. He completely immersed in the contemplation of nature, and he does not do justice to the personal character of man. Suzuki also reduces man to nature. Because for Suzuki human origins are rooted in nature, and man is, after all, a part of nature itself. Man is not man-made but nature-made.[1] There are no human determinations or activities, which are independent of nature. However, for Suzuki human being is not independent but belongs to nature. Also, is there any room for freedom in Suzuki's idea of nature? Because if we follow him, we think nature is brute fact, entirely governed by the laws of absolute necessity; and there seems to be no room for freedom here. However, we would say that nature's necessity and man's freedom are divergent ideas. Finally, I like to ask Suzuki: If identity is the foundation of your Zen ethics, why do you need the idea of mahākarunā? Because love is "the power of being" which reunites the separated. If everything is mutually united, what is the role of love?

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[1] *Ibid*.

[2] *Ibid*.

[3] *Supra*, p. 222.

3. In accordance with the two different ontological

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[1] Supra, p. 76.

principles "participation" and "identity," Tillich's substantial individuality and Suzuki's anātman, "non-ego," are diametrically opposed to each other. This is basically important for understanding the difference between Tillich's theonomous ethics and Suzuki's Busshō ethics. To Suzuki Tillich's ontological principle "participation" gives a stronger sense of the individual. For Tillich the ego is a structural center and everything that is has such a center. It is a quality which is implied in every being.[1] To Suzuki this is, however, nonsense. Tillich believes in the existence of the self, but Suzuki rejects it altogether, because there are no individuals in the world of identity; individuals do not exist, they are merely an aspect of existence. That is, "I" or individual is an illusion. Consequently, when "I" is an illusion, all that goes on in the name of this agent must be an illusion too, including moral sins, various kinds of feelings and desires, and hell and the land of bliss.[2] With the removal of this illusion the world with all its multiplicities will disappear, and if there is anything left which can act, this one will act with utmost freedom, with fearlessness, like the Dharma-king himself, indeed as the One.[3]

In other words, the individual is, for Suzuki, nonexistent when he is isolated from other individuals and cut off from the group to which he belongs, whether the group be biological or political or cosmological. This means that the existence of each individual owes something to an infinitely expanding and all-enwrapping net of relationship, which takes up not only every one of us but everything that exists. Our individual self rising the absolute point of "here-and-now" gains its significance only when it is merged in all other selves.[1] In this respect, for Suzuki there is actually no individual self as such. It means that an individual self begins to be realized when it interfuses with others in the world of identity. Here is no individual concern, that is, selfish concern. It is all Amida and no ego. Life has interfused into the manyness of things, has transformed the static spatial conception of the jijimuge into a most lively temporal functioning, technically known as the "simultaneous awakening of multitudes."[2] At this point, Suzuki appeals to the super-individualistic power of the Busshō. By this he means the feeling of compassion going beyond individualism. This is an annoying feeling; it goes directly against the instinct of self-preservation. But there is no doubt that its roots are deeply laid, and in fact it makes up the very foundation of human nature. He is no more a self-reliant individualist, he now wants to identify himself with a power that holds in itself the whole universe with all its multitudinousness.[3]

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[1] Supra, p. 167. [2] Supra, p. 111. [3] Ibid.

Suzuki's idea of non-ego is basically derived from sūnyatā; that is, that all phenomena arise from innumerable causes and conditions functioning mutually; and are changeable, appearing and disappearing, unstable and unsubstantial.[1] Such a view of life and the world produced the doctrine of non-ego, and this doctrine made the independence of an individual personality impossible. The denial of ego, however, does not stop just with the denial. Experience goes much more deeply and is more informative of reality than linguistics. Actually, for Suzuki, the non-ego is a state of mind known as mu-nen or mu-so, "no-thought" or "no-reflection." This does not mean just to be without thought, ideas, feelings. For Suzuki it means letting your natural faculties act in a consciousness free from thoughts, reflection, or affections of any kind. This state of mind is also known as egolessness, "non-ātman," in which you cherish no egoistic thoughts, no consciousness of your own attainments.[2] In Haiku, for example, there was no artificial or intellectually calculated scheme for any kind of effect; that is, there was no "ego" on the part of the author aiming at its own glorification.[3] Strictly speaking, there is from the beginning no ego and therefore no need of crucifying it as in Christianity. At this point, we have dissimilarity between Christian and Buddhist ideas of "unselfishness." For Buddhism, unselfishness, according to T. Callaway, refers to a complete denial of the reality of

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[1] Supra, p. 126. [2] Supra, p. 132. [3] Supra, p. 112.

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[1] Supra, p. 152. [2] Supra, p. 154. [3] Ibid.

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individual selfhood, while Christianity believes in the existence of the self.[1] From this viewpoint, it may be said that Buddhism is more unselfish than Christianity.

In this respect, for Suzuki, the greatest of human tragedies is ignorance and ego-centricity. Also, ego is the root of sins of all kinds. Consequently, the doctrine of non-ego is the foundation of Suzuki's Busshō ethics, because it is the very basis of human rights and justice.[2] When we realize that the ego is non-existent, Suzuki's idea of mahākarunā asserts itself. For this reason, it goes without saying that the sense of the individual is much weaker in Suzuki than it is in Tillich. Suzuki is much more apt to consider the individual as one aspect of the whole, whereas Tillich is more apt to consider the individual as an agent in his own right. This is also the basic difference between Tillich's and Suzuki's ethics.

This fundamental difference of Tillich's affirmation of the individual self and Suzuki's negation of it is due to their basically different understandings of the substance of existence. In Tillich reality has substance with accidents, while in Suzuki it is non-substantial. For Tillich everything that is has substance and accidents; there is no substance without accidents.[3] Substance, according to Tillich, is something underlying the flux of appearances, something which is relatively static and self-contained. The problem of substance is seen in the problem of change. The process of change threatens the substantiality of a thing. This is the root of man's fear of change; it is not that he fears the change itself but the threat of non-being which accompanies change. In other words, for Tillich, everything that is finite is innately "anxious," its substance will be lost. This threat, however, is accepted with ontological courage in which man affirms the attributes of his identity, which are really accidental, by attributing to them substantiality.[1]

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[1] Tucker Callaway, Japanese Buddhism and Christianity (Tokyo: Protestant Publishing Co., 1957), p. 220.

[2] Supra, p. 152.

[3] Supra, p. 178.

In contrast with this idea of substance, Suzuki says that everything that is has no substantiality in itself, because the Buddha-nature is non-substantial. In Suzuki, all beings have the Buddha-nature, and further, all beings are the Buddha-nature. This "all beings are the Buddha-nature" is, for Zennists, a verbal preaching of "WHAT IS IT THAT THUS COMES?" which is not a mere question, but is a realization of the Busshō. It is that which one can never obtain, no matter what he does. That is, "WHAT" or "WHENCE" is unthinkable, unnamable, unobjectifiable, unobtainable, and therefore limitless and infinite.[2] This does not mean that the Buddha-nature is something unnamable, and unobtainable. But it means the unnamable. Yet, at the same time the unnamable is the Buddha-nature. In other words, it means that the Buddha-nature is not something whatsoever; it is not substantial at all. Since the Busshō is not substance, "WHAT" is immediately the Buddha-nature and the Buddha-nature is immediately "WHAT."[1]

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[1] Supra, p. 179.

[2] Supra, p. 79.

Zen master Dōgen also often emphasizes the idea of the no-Buddha-nature to clarify the non-substantiality of the Buddha-nature. No-Buddha-nature, however, is not a counterpart to the idea of the Buddha-nature, it is no-Buddha-nature in its absolute sense. In other words, Dōgen is not concerned with having or not having the Buddha-nature but with Buddha-nature in itself which is non-substantial.[2] By rejecting both the "eternalist" view which substantializes and is attached to the idea of the Busshō and the "nihilistic" view which also substantializes and is attached to the idea of Mubusshō,[3] "no-Buddha-nature" clearly indicates the non-substantiality of the Buddha-nature. Thus, just as the Buddha-nature is non-substantial, "all beings" are unobjectionable, limitless and groundless. The dimension of "all beings" cannot be called a measurable dimension. Suzuki grounded his own experience in this dimensionless dimension of all beings. In this dimensionless dimension, there is a mutual penetration between the Buddha-nature and all beings. For this reason, the Buddha-nature is neither immanent nor transcendental in relation to all beings. Through the realization of the Busshō which is non-substantial, all things are dynamically non-dualistic, because the realization of "all

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[1] Supra, p. 80.

[2] Supra, p. 51.

[3] Ibid.

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beings are the Buddha-nature" is based on a dehomocentric, cosmological dimension.[1]

We have discussed the different points between Tillich's substantial individuality and Suzuki's anātman. This is one of the basic distinctions between Tillich and Suzuki. This basic point of difference has far reaching implications, for it determines their attitudes toward the ethical problems. Here the present writer, however, has a couple of criticisms against Suzuki. For Suzuki the denial of the individual self, however, is an assertion of a belief in the Buddha-nature. But, when Suzuki's idea of anātman is examined from the Christian viewpoint, it becomes, not a denial of the self, but an exaltation of the self. Because, for Suzuki, man's being is the Buddha-nature, and the Buddha-nature is the whole universe. This means that Suzuki teaches each individual man to think of himself as the center and source of all existence. This is why it is said that Buddhism instructs men to commit the epitome of all sin, namely, to turn from devotion to God to the worship of oneself. This is exactly Tillich's idea of hubris. This has been discussed before. Also, if there is no substantial individuality, how can satori be realized through man in existence? However, Suzuki says that satori demands to be actualized in existence and through man. But, how? Further, how can self-realization coming from beyond existence have any influence on existence? Self-realization should be related to individual self in existence.

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[1] Supra, p. 52.

4. *In accordance with the two different ontological principles "participation" and "identity," Tillich's and Suzuki's ontological approaches to reality are different. For Tillich, reality has its dualistic aspect, that is, the essential created goodness and the actual distortion of existence, while for Suzuki reality has the logic of self-identity. Tillich divides reality as essence and existence, and Suzuki identifies existence with essence. Consequently, existence including nature, for Tillich, is an estrangement and a "fall" from essence. Suzuki, however, asserts that existence works perfectly and is not estranged from essence. Men who are not enlightened, however, are ignorant of this fact*. These two different understandings of existence create the theoretical as well as practical contrast between both Tillich's theonomous ethics and Suzuki's *Busshō* ethics.

For Tillich, the distinction between essence and existence is absolutely central in his ontology. Essence means that which makes a thing what it is and that against which a thing is judged. It is the power of being and the criterion of being. However, existence is actuality; it is that which is fallen from essence.[1] Man and nature in their actual existence are estranged, distorted, and separated from their true and essential being. This is, for Tillich, of

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[1] *Supra*, p. 211.

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universal anthropological significance and accurately symbolizes the basic reality of the human situation.[1] In other words, the Fall, as the "transition from essence to existence," is the profoundest and richest expression of man's awareness of his existential estrangement. It also points out the split between essential created goodness and its existential distortion. For Tillich, this distinction between essence and existence, which religiously speaking is the distinction between the created and the actual world, is the backbone of the whole of Tillich's theological thought. The meaning of "to exist," according to Tillich, is "to stand out," that is "stand out of non-being." How can something stand out of its own non-being? To this Tillich's answer is that _everything_ participates in being, whether or not it exists. It participates in potential being before it can come into actual being. As potential being, it is in the state of relative non-being, it is not-yet-being, _me on_. For Tillich potentiality is the state of real possibility, that is, it is more than a logical possibility.[2] It is the power of being which, metaphysically speaking, has not yet realized its power. The power of being is still latent; it has not yet become manifest. Therefore, if we say that something exists, we say that it has left the state of mere potentiality and has become actual.[3]

Thus, "man as he exists," says Tillich, "is not what he essentially is and ought to be. He is estranged from true being."[1] However, "how is this fallen existence possible?" For Tillich the answer is man's finite freedom. Man is free, in so far as he has the power of contradicting himself and his essential nature. Man's freedom, however, is not absolute; it operates within the context of universal destiny. This means that finite freedom produces the human transition from essence to existence, not individually and accidentally, but within the frame-work of a universal destiny.[2] The world is seen as creation and therefore as essentially good; *esse qua esse bonum est*, is the conceptualization of the Genesis story in which God sees everything he has created "and behold, it was very good." However, in Tillich the negative judgment is directed against the world in its existence, not in its essence, against the fallen, not the created, world.[3] Further, the transition to existence is not an historical event that happened "once upon a time." It is the original fact in that it is an ontological condition that precedes but touches all of creation.[4] That is, the very constitution of existence implies the transition from essence to existence. Here the coincidence between creation and the Fall begins to be realized despite their logical difference. In other words, creation has as its end, in the case of man, the actualization of his finite freedom, but this very actualization is also the beginning of the Fall, since it separates man from the creative ground of the divine life. For Tillich, "actualized creation and estranged existence are identical." In this respect, "if God creates here and now," says Tillich, "everything he has created participates in the transition from essence to existence. He creates the newborn child; but if created, it falls into the state of existential estrangement. This is the point of creation and the Fall. But it is not a logical coincidence."[1] At this point, man and nature are equally involved in the transition from essence to existence; neither is "innocent."

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[1] _Supra_, pp. 210-211.
[2] Tillich, _Systematic Theology_, Vol. II, p. 20.
[3] _Ibid_., pp. 20-21.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 211. [2] *Supra*, pp. 212-213.

[3] Tillich, *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions*, p. 65.

[4] *Supra*, p. 216.

The result of this "fallen" situation of existence is estrangement. This state of estrangement results in personal guilt and universal tragedy. Tillich prefers "estrangement" to the traditional word "sin" because it expresses the truth "that one belongs essentially to that from which one is estranged."[2] Sin is the personal act of turning away from that to which one belongs. Sin is "separation," "estrangement from one's essential being." In this respect, for Tillich sin must not be understood as "sins," that is, particular acts which are considered morally evil. Estrangement points to the universal character of sin. The term "sin," therefore, must be used after it has been reinterpreted religiously.[3] Man's sinful or estranged state is expressed by three major attitudes or qualities. These are for Tillich, unbelief, hubris, and concupiscence.

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[1] Supra, p. 217. [2] Supra, p. 218. [3] Supra, p. 220.

Thus, man, by his very existence, is estranged from God and from his own essential being and in spite of the power of his finite freedom, he is unable to achieve reunion with God. In other words, man cannot save himself, because the unity of freedom and destiny means "that no act within the context of existential estrangement can overcome existential estrangement. Destiny keeps freedom in bondage without eliminating it."[1] For this reason, man by himself is incapable of breaking out of his existential estrangement to achieve reunion with God. This is why man seeks for the New Being, Jesus as the Christ. First of all, the New Being will be considered under the aspect of "newness." The old _eon_ is estrangement, the split between essential and existential being. The Christ as the New Being, for Tillich, ushers in the new _eon_ by manifesting undistorted essential being within the conditions of existence. The New Being is new "in contrast to the merely potential character of essential being; and it is new over against the estranged character of existential being."[2] The New Being is the end of existence. The next step is to consider the "beingness" of the New Being. Jesus as the Christ, for Tillich, "is the bearer of the New Being in the totality of his being not in any special expressions of it."[3] Consequently, Jesus as the Christ is not because of what he did or said, but because his being is the New Being. Jesus' being has the quality of the New Being beyond the split of essential from existential being. In Jesus as the Christ a new reality beyond the cleavage appeared. Thus, for Tillich salvation is participation in the New Being which overcomes the split between the essential and existential being, and it is also inseparable from the concept of grace, the creation of the Spiritual Power on which his theonomous ethics is based. This is Tillich's understanding of salvation. However, his idea of salvation by participating in the New Being is the "accepting acceptance though being unacceptable," that is, justifying man who is unjust. Man as the sinner is accepted as the righteous in spite of his sin.

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[1] _Supra_, p. 227. [2] _Supra_, p. 229. [3] _Ibid_.

In contrast with Tillich's approach to existence, Suzuki asserts that existence is not distorted, estranged, and separated from essence; what man really has is spiritual reality; he is the One, undiscriminated, unseparated, undistinguished, undifferentiated; because, from the very beginning there has never been any separation, estrangement, distortion, and discrimination which are later human creations.[1] In this respect, everything, according to Suzuki, works perfectly. In discussing Zen's attitude toward reality, Hubert Benoit says: "It knows that in reality nothing is wrong with us and that we suffer because we do not understand that everything works perfectly, because in consequence we believe falsely that all is not well and that it is necessary to put something right." "To say that all the trouble derives from the fact that man has an illusory belief."[1] This is why C. Humphreys also asks: "Why formulate rules unless the original sense of 'right' has been somehow paralysed?"[2] Man who is not enlightened, however, is ignorant of this fact that everything works perfectly. Everything appears to be wrong in man because the fundamental idea that everything is perfectly, eternally and totally positive, is asleep in the centre of his being, because it is not awakened, living and active therein. This is why Suzuki strongly asserts enlightenment. His philosophy and ethics should never be a mere system of theoretical discussions or speculation on philosophical and ethical problems; they must be associated with enlightenment in metaphysical truths and their realization in one's own life. As previously stated, the fundamental principle of Suzuki's philosophy and ethics, therefore, consists in the Middle Path which is not the way between right and left, but the way to the realization of the ultimate reality.[3]

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[1] *Supra*, p. 53.

Unlike Tillich, there is no transition from essence to existence in Suzuki's idea of reality, but essence is existence and vice versa. Suzuki talks about the creation story of Genesis in which God saw the world created in response to his fiat, "Let there be light," and said "it is good." Suzuki interprets this "good" as the just-so-ness and the isness of things.[4] It is simply ontological, religious, but not moral. It is simply "good." At this point, God, according to Suzuki, has not committed any moral or immoral act. And this "goodness" of things as they are is sono-mama in Japanese Zen terminology. It is in being itself, in becoming itself, in living itself.[1] This is called a life of kono-mama or sono-mama. Kono- is "this," sono- "that," and mama means "as-it-is-ness." Kono-mama or sono-mama thus corresponds to the Sanskrit tathatā, "suchness," and to the Chinese chih-mo or shih-mo. Kono- or sono-mama, therefore, means the isness of a thing, reality in its isness. Some may say, "There cannot be any meaning in mere isness." But this is not the view held by Zen in which isness is the meaning. "When I see into it," says Suzuki, "I see it as clearly as I see myself reflected in a mirror...Satori is emancipation, moral, spiritual, as well as intellectual. When I am in my isness, thoroughly purged of all intellectual sediments, I have my freedom in its primary sense."[2] Sono-mama, then, is the ultimate reality itself; we humans, however fiercely or desperately we may strive or struggle, can never go beyond this. All that we can do is to write a Haiku appreciating the fact, without asking why or how. Also, suchness is the two contradictory concepts, emptiness and non-emptiness, in a state of self-identity. Suchness is not their synthesis but their self-identity as concretely realized in our everyday experience. Suchness is not the result of rationalistic thinking about experience, but just a plain direct description of it, and not

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[1] Hubert Benoit, The Supreme Doctrine (New York: The Viking Press, 1959), p. 3.

[2] Supra, p. 106. [3] Supra, p. 104. [4] Supra, p. 96.

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[1] Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture, p. 16.

[2] Ibid., pp. 16-17.

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dependent on any category, authority, knowledge, or any kind of information.[1] For this reason, for Suzuki, the good is something that we are, not something we have or do; one is all right as he is. "Whatever we may say," says Suzuki, "about moral ideas of perfection, religion is after all the acceptance of things as they are, things evil together with things good ...You are all right as you are."[2] This is why Suzuki gives or makes no judgment, he takes things as they are. Busshō ethics is not between good and evil but it is, of a something which is neither good nor evil, becoming conscious of itself. This is, for Suzuki, passivity. Passivity means "accepting life as it is." It is not self-reflection or self-examination, but an unqualified acceptance of reality. So long as there is a trace of conscious contrivance man is not wholly possessed of reality. The unity of man and reality is to be attained by accepting and not by striving. In this case passivity, for Suzuki, is identifiable with accepting existence as it is.[3] "To believe," then, is "to be." Religion wants first of all "to be." To believe, therefore, is "to exist"--this is the fundamental of all religions.[4] When this is translated into terms of psychology, the religious mind turns on the axle of passivity. This is why Suzuki says that "you are all right as you are," or "to be well with God and the world," or "don't think of the morrow"--this is the final word of all religions.[5]

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[1] Ibid., pp. 230-231.

[2] Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series, p. 280.

[3] Ibid. [4] Ibid. [5] Supra, p. 98.

The truly religious man has nothing to do but go on with his life as he finds it in the various circumstances of this worldly existence. He rises quietly in the morning, puts on his dress and goes out to his work. When he wants to walk, he walks;when he wants to sit, he sits.[1] We just accept existence as it is, our trust is wholly placed in the infinite wisdom of *Amida*, and what we have to do is to rest in this trust, this acceptance.

Hence, there are some differences between Suzuki's and Tillich's understanding of salvation. Unlike Tillich, for Suzuki man is saved *as he is*. For him "to escape," or "to be emancipated," or "to be disengaged," is altogether inadequate to express the Zen way of achieving "salvation." For Suzuki even "salvation" is a bad term, because Zen recognizes nothing from which we are to be saved. We are from the first already "saved" in all reality, and it is due to our ignorance of the fact that we talk about being saved or delivered or freed.[2] So with "escape," etc., Zen knows no traps or complexities from which we are to escape. The traps of complexities are our own creation. We find ourselves, and when we realize this, we are what we have been from the very beginning of things.[3] For Tillich, however, man can never be saved by his own efforts, because the unity of freedom and destiny means "that no act within the context of existential estrangement can overcome existential estrangement. Destiny keeps freedom in bondage without eliminating it." The only way of achieving salvation is participation in Jesus as the Christ who is essential being under the conditions of existence, conquering the gap between essence and existence. In Suzuki man, however, is not in relation to any person or any being or any **thing**, but to himsef; he is saved by himself through his own enlightenment, but not through participation in anything. On this account Suzuki emphasizes that everyone can attain Buddha-nature without a mediator. Dependent origination, a basic idea in Buddhism, indicates that there is no irreversible relationship even between man and God, nature and the supernatural, the secular and the holy.[1] This is especially clear in Suzuki's Zen ethics which stresses *soku* as seen in its familiar phrasing "*samsara* as it is *is* *nirvana*."

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[1] *Ibid*., p. 281.

[2] Suzuki, *Selected Writings*, p. 254.

[3] *Ibid*., pp. 254-255.

From another viewpoint, it will be said that Tillich's idea of salvation is homocentric, while Suzuki's salvation is de-homocentric. In Tillich, salvation is almost exclusively focused on man as "man." In Christianity it is taught that man alone, unlike other creatures, was created in the *imago dei* and thereby he alone can respond to the Word of God. The fall and redemption of nature, therefore, takes place through and with that of man. This homocentric nature of Christian

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[1] Abe, "Man and Nature in Christianity and Buddhism," *Japanese Religions*, Vol. 7(July, 1971), p. 9.

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salvation is inseparably connected with Christian personalism in which God is believed to reveal himself as personal and in which man's encounter with God in terms of the I-Thou relationship is essential. In the Zen Buddhist idea of salvation, there is, however, no homocentrism. Zen seeks a basic dimension common to all being including human beings. This common dimension may be said to be the generation-extinction nature.[1] For this reason, man's birth-and-death is a human form of generation-and-extinction which is common to all living things.[2] The problem of man's birth-and-death is, therefore, not necessarily restricted to the "human dimension." It is rather dealt with as a generation-extinction problem within the total "living" dimension. This, according to Abe, means the Buddhist conviction that, without transcending the generation-extinction nature common to all living beings, man's birth-death problem cannot be basically solved. Thus, it is a non-homocentric dimension, the dimension common to all living beings. Here we can see the dehomocentrism in Zen's understanding of man's most fundamental problem for his existence and his salvation from it. Also, the dimension of generation-extinction is endless and boundless. In the dimension man and other living beings are not discriminated from each other. Hence, Zen does not give a special or superior position to man against other living things with regard to his nature and salvation.[3] Further, by going beyond the "living" dimension to the "being" dimension, Zen Buddhism develops its non-homocentric nature to its utmost limits, and emphasizes that "all beings are the Buddha-nature." The dimension of all beings, living and non-living, is no longer that of generation-extinction, but that of appearance-disappearance or being-nonbeing. The "living" dimension has a life-centered nature that excludes non-living beings. The "being" dimension, however, embraces everything in the universe, by transcending even the wider-than-human "life-centered" horizon. For this reason, the "being" dimension is truly boundless, free from any sort of centrism, and deepest precisely in its dehomocentric nature. In this respect, man's birth-and-death is definitely liberated not from the "living" dimension, but from the "being" dimension.[1] It is this most radical non-homocentric and cosmological dimension that provides the genuine basis for man's salvation in Buddhism.

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[1] Supra, p. 74. [2] Ibid. [3] Supra, p. 75.

However, Suzuki's approach to existence seems to me to be dangerously ambiguous. Suzuki says that existence works perfectly and is not estranged from essence. Men who are not enlightened, however, are ignorant of this fact. Here the question immediately arises: the non-enlightened world, then, is not the distorted existence which is separated from essence? If existence works perfectly, why do we have so many tragedies like murder, war, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and My Lai, etc., in this world? Are these examples not the results of the estranged existence? Suzuki says that the greatest of human tragedies is ignorance and ego-centricity. Also, ego is the root of sins of all kinds. However, what does he mean by ignorance, or ego-centricity, or human tragedy? Are they not the distorted existence? Also, Suzuki repeatedly states that the main purpose of Zen is the restoration of original human being. However, I like to ask: restoration from what? I think this "what" is exactly the estranged existence. Consequently, Suzuki cannot assert that salvation does not apply to men; for he does seek to save them from "ego-centricity," "human tragedy," "illusion." This is also the main reason why Suzuki wrote books on Zen throughout his life. Finally, if "everything works perfectly," why the human mind, as J. Chuck points out, does not also work perfectly. The tendency for the human consciousness to go astray contradicts the assertion that everything works perfectly, because the human consciousness is also a part of reality.[1] Also, Tillich's idea of the Fall seems questionable. Tillich's idea of the Fall ontologically describes man's transition from essence to existence as a universal event. It is the expression of man's awareness of his existential estrangement. Through man's transition the coincidence between creation and the Fall begins to be realized. Creation has as its end the actualization of man's finite freedom, but this very actualization is also the beginning of the Fall. For destiny keeps freedom in bondage without

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[1] _Supra_, p. 79.

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[1] Chuck, "Paul Tillich and Zen Buddhism," pp. 288-289.

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eliminating it. At this point, man is unavoidably involved in the transition; he is not innocent. The sinfulness of man is thus an ontological destiny. However, it seems Tillich's "transcendental Fall" engages in more ontological speculation than does the Bible. In Biblical thought the "ultimate power" is revealed through and in specific historical events rather than in the structure of being. Also, Tillich's idea of the Fall, as Reinhold Niebuhr states, may not correspond to the facts which we experience ourselves as creatures with indeterminate possibilities of good and evil, possibilities of seeking our life at the expense of other life, and of finding our life by losing it; and these possibilities and perils always confront us as persons and wills within a particular historical context.[1] Needless to say, there is destiny, as well as freedom, in human life. But this destiny is constructed of acts, events which can be grasped poetically rather than ontologically. The Bible is not greatly concerned with the problem of natural evil.[2]

5. *Also, the Ultimate in Tillich is symbolized in personal categories, i. e., "Personal God" who is the ground of everything personal and reigns over men with love and justice. This is why God forgives, demands, and leads men to convert. The Ultimate in Suzuki, however, is stated in impersonal category: the all-inclusive Buddha-nature which is the blessed oneness of everything in the ultimate ground of*

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[1] Reinhold Niebuhr, "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Theology," *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, eds. by C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall, p. 225.

[2] *Ibid*.

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being. The Buddha-nature neither forgives nor demands nor makes men convert. Needless to say, there are also some impersonal elements in Tillich's idea of the Ultimate. For him, *esse ipsum*, "being itself," is a transpersonal category and enables us to understand the meaning of Suzuki's all-inclusive impersonal *sūnyatā* which is Buddha-nature. In other words, *esse ipsum* points to the unconditional and infinite character of the Ultimate and the impossibility of identifying it with anything particular that exists.[1] Further, if in St. Paul the Kingdom of God is identified with the expectation of God being all *in* all, if it is replaced by the symbol of Eternal Life, or described as the eternal intuition and fruition of God, this has also a strong affinity to the praise of Suzuki's *Busshō* as the state of transtemporal blessedness, for blessedness presupposes--at least in symbolic language--a subject which experiences blessedness.[2] Also, it is obvious that Suzuki's *Busshō* appears in manifestations of the personal characters of *Amida* and *Kwannon*.

However, this does not mean that a fusion of Tillich's and Suzuki's ideas of the Ultimate is possible, nor does it mean that one can produce a common denominator by depriving the conflicting symbols of their concreteness. Basically, there are some differences between their ideas of the Ultimate. For Tillich the Ultimate, God, can be spoken of as personal, because

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[1] Tillich, *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions*, p. 67.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 68.

He is the basis of, and includes, all personality. But God is personal not in finite separation but in an absolute and unconditional participation in everything. According to Tillich the symbol "Personal God" is absolutely fundamental because an existential relation is a person-to-person relation.[1] Man cannot be ultimately concerned about anything that is less than personal, but since personality includes individuality, the question arises in what sense God can be called an individual. This is why Tillich states that God can be called the "absolute participant" and at the same time the "absolute individual." The one term cannot be applied without the other. This means that both individualization and participation are rooted in the ground of the divine life and that God is equally "near" to each of them while transcending them both.[2] As we could not call God a being, so we cannot call Him a person. God, according to Tillich, is a heavenly, perfect person; He is not a person, but He is not less than person, He is the ground of everything personal. For Tillich "Personal God" does not mean that God is a person, but that God is the ground of everything personal and that He carries within Himself the ontological power of personality.[3] This is why God forgives, demands, and leads men to convert.

Thus, for Tillich the God who is person is translated

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[1] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, p. 244.

[2] Ibid., pp. 244-245. [3] Ibid., p. 245.

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by the God who is the Person-Itself, the Ground and abyss of every person. At this point, both person and being also meet. Both of them are not contradictory concepts. Being includes personal being; it does not deny it. That is, the ground of being is the ground of personal being, not its negation. For this reason, the ontological question of being creates not a conflict but a necessary basis for any theoretical dealing with the biblical concept of the personal God.[1] Religiously speaking, this means that our encounter with the God who is a person includes the encounter with the God who is the Ground of everything personal and as such not a person. This is why Tillich states that "The God of Abraham, Issac, and Jacob and the God of the philosophers is the same God." He is a person and the negation of himself as a person. That is, the Christ is Jesus and the negation of Jesus.[2] However, for Tillich, "Personal God" is a symbol, not an object. It is one symbol beside others indicating that our personal center is grasped by the manifestation of the inaccessible ground and abyss of being.[3]

In contrast with Tillich, Suzuki's Ultimate is the all-inclusive impersonal and great indefinable Buddha-nature. Busshō is an impersonal reality which functions without deliberation or self-conscious purpose in accordance with the irrevocable laws of its nature. Nothing is excluded from Busshō. As Busshō it thinks all things into existence. This means that nothing is objectively real. In other words, nothing has independent existence as a thing in itself.[1] All particular entities are to be described by such terms as sūnyatā. For Suzuki, there is no real individual self as such. We can realize it only from Busshō which is a cosmic glue. There is the Budhha-nature in everyone of us which breaks through our limited related ego-centered self and asserts itself as the transformation of ego-centered love in something universal.[2] Thus, individuals are recognizable only when they are thought of in relation to something not individual; though paradoxical, they are individuals so long as they are not individuals. For when an individual being is singled out as such, it at once ceases to be an individual. This individual self, according to Suzuki, is an illusion.[3] Thus the self has no absolute, independent existence. Men exist only in the realm where they are identical with Buddha-nature. Since Busshō itself is impersonal, it follows that men are likewise essentially impersonal. There is no place in the framework of Buddhist thought for the concept of individual personalities who can voluntarily enter into loving fellowship with one another. Since everything is identical with Buddha-nature, each thing is identical with every other thing. To know any particular thing is to know every other particular thing, for each is in all, and all is in each.[1] For this reason, Busshō is perfectly expressed in any of its particular ideas, for it is each of its particular ideas. Nothing can be other than it is because Busshō is what it is, and thinks its thoughts as it must. Consequently, it should be emphasized that Busshō is impersonal. It cannot act deliberately. It cannot plan, or alter the process of its own unfolding to accomplish its plan. Also, it cannot produce things objective to itself. It is incapable of choosing one thing and rejecting another, because when all beings are recognized as manifestations of Busshō, nothing is repulsive, disagreeable. Thus, in the Zen consciousness we can almost say that what corresponds to the Christian ardour for a personal God is lacking.[2] In this respect, Zennists are not apparently concerned with "trespasses," "repentance," "forgiveness." Their mentality is more of metaphysical type which searches for something that will give mental peace and harmony by overruling contradictions and joining tangled threads into one continuous line.[3] This is why Zennists including Suzuki never prayed, they never asked for the forgiveness of their sins, they never practised anything that popularly goes under the name of religious deeds; for the bowing to the Buddha, the offering of incense, the reading of the sutras, and saying the Nembutsu--these were practised just because they had been practised by all the Buddhas, and manifestly for no other reason. This attitude of Zennists is evidenced by the remarks of many Zen masters.[1] For Suzuki, the fundamental reason why he refuses the idea of a "Personal God" is due to the Zen Buddhist concept of sūnyatā. This is why for Suzuki the Christian idea of God should be identified with "Emptiness." "If God," says Suzuki, "is the ultimate ground of all beings, he must be Emptiness itself" which means "to be established nowhere," "to be empty." Because for Suzuki "when God is at all determined...he ceases to be God."[2] When a thing is established, there is something fixed, definitely settled, and this determination is, for Suzuki, the beginning at once of order and confusion.

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[1] Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality, pp. 82-83.

[2] Ibid., p. 85. [3] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p.132.

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[1] Callaway, Japanese Buddhist and Christianity, p. 184.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Supra, p. 125.

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[1] Callaway, Japanese Buddhism and Christianity, p. 184.

[2] Suzuki, Essays in Zen Buddhism, Second Series, p. 50.

[3] Ibid., p. 52.

However, the present writer argues for Suzuki's view of Buddha-nature as "all-inclusive impersonal." From Christian viewpoint, God as the Ultimate is a "He," but not an "It," or more exactly, God is a "He" as much as he is in an "It," and he is above both of them. In Suzuki's Buddha-nature, however, the "He"element is left out, and it becomes a sub-personal. That is, if the "He" element is left out, the "It" element transforms the alleged supra-personal into a sub-personal, as usually happens in mysticism, monism, and pantheism. And such a neutral sub-personal cannot grasp the center of our personality; it can satifsy our aesthetic feeling or our intellectual needs, but it cannot convert our will, it cannot overcome our loneliness, anxiety, and despair. Only a person, as Schelling points out, can heal a person.[1] If Busshō is not personal, how can man be united to it?

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[1] Ibid., p. 53. [2] Ibid., p. 321.

6. In accordance with their different ontological attitudes toward existence, there are some differences between Tillich's and Suzuki's ideas of love. Tillich's agape implies transformation, the movement from the highest to lowest, and "in-spite-of" acceptance of the unacceptable, while Suzuki's mahākarunā is non-transformative, totalistic, and implies acceptance "just-because-of." Tillich's ontological principle "participation" leads to agape. Agape is the virtue of "participation." For Tillich love is neither the supernatural nor the natural but the ontological. Love is an absolute, eternally related to the ground of being and manifesting this ground in action. Love is being-itself in which every being participates. Love belongs to the structure of Being itself, that every special being with its special nature participates in the nature of love since it participates in Being itself.[2] Further, love is being in actuality and love is the moving power of life. In other words, being is not actual without love which drives everything that is towards everything else that is. Love is the drive towards the unity of the separated; it is the desire for union of the polarity of individualization and participation.

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[1] Tillich, Theology of Culture, p. 131.

[2] Supra, p. 232.

For this reason, all communions are embodiments of love, the urge for participation in the other one. For Tillich, however, love could not unite that which is essentially separated, for reunion presupposes the separation of that which belongs essentially together. Separation presupposes an original unity. Unity embraces itself and separation, just as being comprises itself and non-being. Accordingly, the absolutely strange cannot enter into communion. But the estranged strives for reunion. For this reason, love cannot be stated as the union of the strange but as the reunion of the estranged.[1]

Like Tillich, Suzuki's mahākarunā is also ontological. Mahākarunā flows out of rightly seeing reality as it is. Though there are no real ethical distinctions, the acceptance of the Busshō concept produces an attitude toward the phenomenal world which results in a distinctive type of moral conduct. This attitude is often designated by the mahākarunā. For Suzuki, compassion corresponds to the Christian idea of agape. Zen is not just an assertion of life as we live it.[2] Here Suzuki sees into the will which moves in life and identifies itself with this will--which might be called the cosmic will, Buddha-mind. The Buddha-mind is not a mere state, but it sees here the working of mahākarunā. As stated before, there is something in every one of us which breaks out through our limited relative ego-centered self and asserts itself boldly as the transformation of ego-centered love into something universal. There are no other ethical principles or moral injunctions given by an outside agent. For Suzuki, love is not a command given us by an outside agent. Love needs no external, all-powerful agent to exercise itself. Love is life and life is love. Love creates life. Therefore, life cannot sustain itself without love.[1]

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[1] Supra, p. 233.

[2] Supra, p. 125.

When the things of the phenomenal world are recognized as manifestations of Busshō, nothing is disagreeable, nothing is repulsive. Everything is welcomed with warmhearted delight. This is the attitude of compassion. Although compassion welcomes all things, it desires nothing. Compassion has no temptation to fight, to kill, to steal, to covet. It is patient, and it is free from fear and pride.[2] Compassion brings serenity in the midst of ceaseless changes of the phenomenal world. Compassion finds joy in everything. Also, the man who lives in the life of compassion works "silently for the welfare of his fellow beings" without any selfish motive. His whole existence is devoted to the good of others.[3] Mahākaruṇā, for Suzuki, is the ultimate principle on which man's moral life depends. However, unlike Tillich, mahākaruṇā is not the reunion of the estranged, because reunion presupposes the separation. For Suzuki, there is no separation from the very beginning. Everything belongs essentially together.

Also, Tillich's agape involves relationship, while Suzuki's idea of compassion exists without relationship. There is, according to Suzuki, in the world of mahākarunā what is called mu-en no jihi. Mu-en means no special relationship. No reward is expected, no return. It is compassion simply going out.[1] However, Tillich speaks about agape and eros. And God's love is agape which means mu-en-jihi. Tillich also has u-en no jihi and that is eros.[2] Also, for Tillich both agape and eros are mutually related. However, for Suzuki there is no relationship, but identity between agape and eros; love is a total thing, and cannot be divided into parts. "Christ would say if one," says Suzuki, "strikes the right cheek, turn the other. Here is something not quite innocent. Here is something discriminating that I don't like." "If a Buddhist," Suzuki goes on to say, "were struck on the right or left cheek he would just accept it and wouldn't turn the other cheek. This is real love."[3] Also, this is where Suzuki objects to the Christian idea of love; Christians talk about left and right. It seems Suzuki's mahākarunā says sonomama ga yoroshi, "all is well just as things are," but Tillich's agape says sonomama ga yokunai, "all is not well just as things are."[4] Further, there is another thing Christ says, "love your enemy." But Zen does not talk about an enemy, it does not say "love your enemy" because there is no enemy. "When you," says Suzuki,

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[1] Supra, p. 160. [2] Supra, p. 127. [3] Ibid.

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[1] Suzuki and Callaway, "Dialogue," p. 119.

[2] Ibid., pp. 119-120.

[3] L. Newton Thurber, "Hendrik Kraemer and the Christian Encounter with Japanese Buddhism," Japanese Religions, Vol. 2, Nos. 2, 3(May, 1961), p. 84.

[4] Suzuki and Callaway, "Dialogue," p. 119.

"say love of an enemy in distinction from friends there is a certain thing which I cannot conceive of as absolute love."[1] Also, Suzuki states that Christ could not eliminate this legalistic residual of Judaistic thought. For Suzuki, love ought not to be relative, love ought to be absolute. Further, if it is real love, love cannot make any distinction between so called sinners or non-sinners.[2] Rain falls on the just as well as the unjust, on the unjust as well as the just. Thus, love is the One, undiscriminating whole thing. Love is a total thing. If God loves, that love must be whole, totalistic, In this respect, if man loves God that also cannot be particularistic.

According to Tillich, love as _agape_ enters from another dimension into the whole of life and into all qualities of love. In other words, _agape_ is the depth of love or love in relation to the ground of life. In _agape_ ultimate reality manifests itself and transforms life and love. That is, love as _agape_ is a creation of the Spiritual Presence which conquers the ambiguities of life and of all kinds of love. In the holy community _agape_ cuts into the _libido_, _eros_, and _philia_ and elevates them beyond the ambiguities of their self-centeredness.[3] Although _libido_ belongs to man's created goodness, it is distorted and ambiguous in the state of man's estrangement. Consequently, _libido_ has become unlimited and has fallen under the tyranny of the pleasure principle. It uses the other being not as an object of reunion but as a tool for gaining pleasure out of him.[1] Agape, however, elevates libido into the divine unity of love, power, and justice. The same is true of eros. In the state of man's estrangement it is also distorted and participates in the ambiguities of life. The eros quality of love, therefore, can be confused with the libido quality and be drawn into its ambiguities. And then it cuts itself away from the substance in which self has to express itself, and falls in the pleasure of the irresponsible culture-value. The ambiguity of cultural eros is its detachment from the realities which it expresses and consequently the disappearing of existential participation and ultimate responsibility.[2] Against it agape, however, does not deny the longing toward the good and the true and its divine source, but it prevents it from becoming an aesthetic enjoyment without seriousness. Agape makes the cultural eros responsible and the mystical eros personal. The ambiguities of the philia quality of love establish preferential love. This is obvious not only in intimate relations as family and friendship, but also in the innumerable sympathetic person-to-person encounters. The implicit or explicit rejection of all those who are not admitted to such a preferential relation is negative compulsion, but such a rejection of others is tragically unavoidable.[3] Agape, however, does not deny the preferential love of the philia quality, but it purifies it from a sub-personal bondage, and elevates the preferential love into universal love. That is, agape loves in everybody and through everybody love itself.[1] Thus, agape has this transformative power, because it has the basic structure of the "New Being" which is the foundation of the power of being.

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[1] Thurber, "Hendrik Kraemer and the Christian Encounter with Japanese Buddhism," p. 84.

[2] _Ibid_.

[3] _Supra_, p. 238.

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[1] Supra, p. 239. [2] Supra, p. 240. [3] Supra, p. 241.

Agape, in this connection, is transformative. It is a creative justice which accepts of the unacceptable and also tries to transform it. The very important form of justice, for Tillich, is creative justice. Tillich calls it "transforming justice." What is the criterion of creative justice? Tillich's answer is "fulfilment within the unity of universal fulfilment."[2] It means that we resign a certain assertion of justice for the sake of the ultimate fulfilment of the whole being. It is given in both Testaments. In both Testaments justice is applied to God who is not bound to the given proportion between merit and tribute. He can creatively change the proportion, and does it in order to fulfil those who according to proportional justice would be excluded from fulfilment. In the paradox of the "justification by grace through faith," the divine justice is manifest in the divine act which justifies him who is unjust.[3] In other words, the sinner is accepted as righteous in spite of his sin. Such a transcendent, transforming justice, however, does not negate but fulfils ambiguous human justice. For Tillich creative justice is the form of uniting love, and it is also fulfiled in *agape*.[1] Also, the term *agape*, according to Tillich, is used in a new sense for that kind of love that God has for man, the higher for the lower, and that all men should have for one another, whether they are friends, or enemies, accepted or rejected, liked or disliked.[2]

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[1] Supra, pp. 241-242. [2] Supra, p. 256. [3] Supra, p. 257.

Hence, there are basic differences between *agape* and *mahākarunā*. Unlike Tillich's agape, Suzuki's *mahākarunā* is a state in which one does not suffer under his own conditions may suffer by identification with another who suffers. It may be likened to a cool refreshing wind blowing over the scorching world of *karma*. *Mahākarunā* perceives a voice of cosmological significance in all being. All existence and living are bound to the same life. "All being is my mother and father, my brothers and sisters in this life and the next; everything... when I become a Buddha, must be saved." It conveys the tone of such a cosmic love which is echoed in the openness of the world.[3] In this respect, a Zennist neither accepts the other one in terms of "in-spite-of," nor does he try to transform him, but he suffers his suffering through identification. In contrast with Tillich's understanding of compassion, one suffers with another who suffers through the fundamental identification not simply with the other but with the absolute *Mu* or *Nirvana* which the other must also, in his original nature, return to and realize.[1] On the basis of the realization of the absolute Mu as the principle of "differentiation as it is is equality," he totally accepts the other just because he is the other. For this reason, Suzuki's mahākarunā accepts the other not "in spite of" but "just because of" his selfishness, completely deepening and transcending the in-spite-of position through one's realization of the absolute Mu in which everyone including oneself, as well as everything, are equally and respectively made to work from the very ground of their existence.[2] In this respect, the Buddhist loves his neighbors as himself because he believes his neighbor is himself. To him, other men are not other men, they are the products of his own essential selfhood. He accepts other people, animals, and inanimate objects impartially, just as they are, because in his opinion they have appeared in his consciousness as they must. Since they are all of the tissue of ideas there is no qualitative difference between them. The truly enlightened one feels the same compassion for a stone that he would for a sick child.[3] Further, we should know more about what is the exact difference between the characters of "in-spite-of" and "just-because-of." Prof. Abe makes Suzuki's idea of compassion more understandable to Western people. According to Abe, the in-spite-of character of the Christian faith by means of prophetic criticism and the "will to transform" based upon divine justice, functions as a militant element in the realm of human society and history, whereas the just-because-of nature of Buddhist realization, by dissolving and regenerating personal and collective *karma*, functions as a stabilizing element running beneath all social and historical revels.[1]

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[1] *Supra*, p. 258.

[2] Tillich, *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions*, pp. 70-71.

[3] Walter Leibrecht(ed.), *Religion and Culture*(New York: Harper, 1959), p. 312.

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[1] Abe, "Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions," pp. 120-121.

[2] Ibid., p. 121.

[3] Callaway, Japanese Buddhism and Christianity, p. 222.

Thus, Suzuki's compassion is not a transformation of reality; salvation from reality is the basic attitude. This is why Zennists always ask: "Is the will to transform the individual as well as the social structure absolutely necessary in a religion's attitude to man, to society and to history? In the prophetic quest for justice an indispensable element in religious activity as regards the human situation? Is the only justifiable way for a religion to react to the human, social and historic reality, necessarily to be based on the will to transform with a revolutionary force? Finally, they ask: Does not the Christian will to transform, however much it may spring from *agape*, in the last analysis approach and try to transform the other one or the social and historic structure, not from within but somewhat from without, in so far as *agape* is, in its nature, the movement from the higher to the lower?[2]

Here the present writer should point out that something is lacking in Suzuki, though his idea of *mahākarunā* is ontological. First of all, *mahākarunā* lacks the will to transform persons who suffer or the social structure in which they suffer.

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[1] Abe, "Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions," p. 121.

[2] *Ibid*., p. 120.

The Christian symbol of the Kingdom of God is directed toward a radical transformation of individual and society in order to overcome the existential distortion. Also, *Mahākarunā* lacks *agape*'s characters of "the acceptance of the unacceptable," or "the movement from the highest to the lowest."[1] That is, there is no the elements of a creative justice, and of the God-to-man love. It goes without saying that there are great expressions of compassion in Suzuki's Zen philosophy and art, as well as in personal relations with friends, but, from my Christian viewpoint, this is *eros*, not *agape*. In other words, compassion is an autonomous idea of love which is the longing toward the good and the true and its divine source. But compassion cannot prevent itself from becoming an aesthetic enjoyment, or intellectual satisfaction, without seriousness. Of course, Christian love, *agape*, does not deny its divine source of compassion, but should fulfill it.

7. *Tillich wrestles seriously with the ethical problems within the total context of estranged existence, based on ontological foundations, while Suzuki has comparatively little to discuss the ethical problems in this existential situation. Because, for Suzuki, the solving of them is not the chief business of life*. Though in this thesis Tillich's social ethics has not been fully discussed, his concern about the ethical problems in this existential situation have been treated in the

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[1] Tillich, *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions*, pp. 70-71.

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third chapter. Needless to say, Tillich discusses the concrete problems of ethics seriously through his various philosophical, theological works; The Interpretation of History, The Protestant Era, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, Theology of Culture, Morality and Beyond, and Political Expectation. Especially, since the publication of the last, Tillich's systematic aspect of social ethics became clear. In his serious handling of the ethical problems in the concrete situation, Tillich uses especially agape as a "listening love" in relation to justice and power. For Tillich, the absoluteness of love is its power to go into the concrete situation, to discover what is demanded by the predicament of the concrete to which it turns. In other words, love is both absolute and relative by its very nature. The agape quality of love, an unchanging principle, nevertheless always changes in its concrete application. It "listens" to the particular situation. Consequently, Tillich calls agape "listening love."[1] "Listening love" is a listening to and looking at the concrete situation in all its concreteness, which includes the deepest motives of the other person. Agape acts in relation to the concrete demands of the situation--its conditions, its possible consequences, the inner status of the people involved, their hidden motives, their limiting complexes, and their unconscious desires and anxieties.[2] For Tillich, love perceives all these--the more deeply the stronger the agape element is. This is why Tillich states that "love alone can transform itself according to the concrete demands of every individual and social situation without losing its eternity and unconditional validity."[1] Love can adapt itself to every phase of a changing world. Love alone is able to determine standards of conduct that will respect the changing human situations while safeguarding the divine content of every human action in which man is ultimately concerned. Hence the conflict between absolutism and relativism is overcome by love.[2]

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[1] Supra, p. 201. [2] Supra, p. 202.

Also, love as agape has the basic principle of justice within itself. For Tillich justice means that the power of being is the form in which the power of being expresses itself, and the principle of justice is also the principle which, in expressing itself, the power of being has to follow. If life as the actuality of being is essentially the drive towards the reunion of the separated, it follows that the justice of being is the form which is adequate to this movement.[3] Hence agape is the fundamental principle of justice. Also, Tillich's idea of power shows his serious concerns about the concrete problems of social ethics. For Tillich the power of being manifests only in the process in which it actualizes its power. These processes are going on in every moment of life, in all relations of all beings: between man and nature, between man and man, between individuals and groups, between groups and groups.[4] This leads to an analysis of the relation of the power of being in an individual to the power of being in a group. Everything real is an individual power of being within an embracing whole. Further, social-relation is power-relation, and it can keep the balance of the power-relation only where power is done rightly. The centre of power is only the centre of the whole as long as it does not degrade its own centrality by using it for particular purpose. However, in the moment in which the representations of the centre use the power of the whole for their particular self-realization they cease to be the actual centre, and the whole being, without centre disintegrates. Finally, the loss of the power of the whole, through internal or external causes, is unavoidable. Hence the revolutionary situation occurs necessarily.[1] This leads to the all-decisive question of the relation of power to force and compulsion. Here power needs compulsion in order to keep the balance of power-relation in society. But its use of compulsion is only effective if it is an expression of the actual power relation. That is, as far as it represents the total interest compulsion is right and effective. But if it trespasses this limit it becomes harmful, ineffective, and self-defying.[2] In other words, compulsion, or force, is distorted if its inner foundation has been taken away from the ontological structure of power which resists non-being. Compulsion, however, is good in itself. Further, power uses force in the service of love. Power does not contradict the universal ethics of Christian love. Love and power are united.[1]

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[1] Ibid.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Supra, pp. 252-253.

[4] Supra, p. 246.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 247.

[2] *Supra*, p. 249.

Compulsion, according to Tillich, needs a criterion which is implied in the actual power-relation, and on it the social and political consequences depend. Politics and power politics, for Tillich, are one and the same thing. Therefore, there are no politics without power. Unfortunately, in the existential situation the term "power politics" is used for a special type of politics, namely, that in which power is separated from justice and love, and identified with compulsion. If power is reduced to it and loses the form of justice and the substance of love, it destroys itself and the politics based on it. The problem, according to Tillich, is resolved only by the ultimate power, namely, Spiritual Power.[2]

Thus, Tillich wrestles seriously with the concrete problems of ethics in the existential situation. In contrast with Tillich, Suzuki, although he is concerned about social ethics, has relatively little to say about the concrete problems of ethical decisions within the total context of estranged existence throughout his whole writings and life. Needless to say, Suzuki's idea of world-peace is very meaningful. Especially, his thoughts on "radical pacifism," "the World Empire" to which any kind of nationalism cannot be attached, and "absolute disarmament" are very significant in this parti-

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[1] _Supra_, p. 250.

[2] _Supra_, p. 251.

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cular war-troubled age. Suzuki, however, does not offer any concrete methods: how he applies to his so-called "the World Empire," and he also offers very little in the way of how man exercises his freedom to it. It seems it looks like a sort of an utopian idea. What did he do actually for world-peace and other social problems during his life in this world? This is the present writer's major criticism against Suzuki. This is also why we have a number of questions which were submitted to Suzuki. How is it that in the writings of Zen there is so little explicit concern expressed about cultural conditions, the organization of society, and the welfare of man? Do Zen masters and students participate in the social problems of the day? Actually how? Concretely how do they approach them? What is Zen's attitude toward ethics? Toward political and economic deprivation? Toward the individual's actual position and responsibility toward his society? What interests has Zen in the history of the individual, the influences of family, education, and social institutions in the development of the individual's alienation from himself. Is Zen concerned with the problem of emotional maturity and self-fulfillment in man's social existence, i. e., "inter-personal relationships"? etc.[1] As a matter of fact, Suzuki did not suggest any concrete methods and responsibilities vis-à-vis social problems. Because Suzuki strongly emphasizes the individual enlightenment-experience, satori, that he pushed it to a realm beyond estranged existence in the dualistic world in which a number of the concrete social problems exist. By doing this, Suzuki, as J. Chuck points out, ends up having nothing to offer to man in the way of guidance for his terrestrial existence. Suzuki realizes that man is involved in terrestrial existence, but he offers no consistent, systematic formulation of how he might live on this level of life. He offers very little in the way of how man might exercise his freedom toward it, nor does Suzuki put much emphasis on man's responsibility for what might happen to it.[1] Needless to say, Zen is socially-minded as much as any other religion, but this has been manifested or demonstrated more individualistically, laying its emphasis upon individual experience. This is why Zen is often charged with aloofness, solitariness, and being detached from the masses. The Zen-man is sometimes found to be living in the rarefied atmosphere of "intellectual" superiority; he is apt to be standing aloof from society and from being useful to the community where he belongs. Also, Zennists including Suzuki are not good at organization; they are just as charitably disposed as any religious people and ready to put their teachings into practice. But they are not accustomed to carry on their philanthropic undertakings in a systematic way; rather, they have been encouraged to go on with their work quietly, privately, individually, and without letting others know what they are doing.[1] Further, Zen monks have no wish to advance themselves or play a role in public life. The life of Zen Monk is to work for himself. With others they are indulgent, with themselves not. Their everyday life is just not to complain about others and circumstances, not to change them but to change themselves, and to develop countervailing forces.[2] Consequently, there are no responsibilities to others, and no reformations, betterments, in public life. They just keep themselves, not to hurt others or not to help others. They are content to let things be and try to make the best of it; they do not try to change other people or society, but only themselves. This is the main reason why Zennists including Suzuki are notoriously bad organizers in public life, and never expressed to any significant degree their compassion in a social way.

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[1] Erich Fromm, Daisetz Suzuki, and Richards DeMartino, Zen Buddhism and Psychoanalysis, p. 59.

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[1] Chuck, "Paul Tillich and Zen Buddhism," p. 323.

This means that Zen Buddhism lacks the dynamic to influence society and the historical situation, because the main emphasis of Zen philosophy is not on the improvement of society and the world. This is the another reason why Suzuki's social ethics is weak. For Suzuki, the solving of the social problems is not the chief business of life. Man must not be so preoccupied with improving life that he forgets to live it.[3]

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[1] Suzuki, Selected Writings, p. 274.

[2] Eugen Herrigel, The Methods of Zen(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960), p. 65.

[3] Alan Watts, This Is It(New York: Collier Books, 1967), p. 32.

Because for Suzuki the Zen life is more playful than purposeful, man must not be busy in improving life. For this reason, it can never speak prophetically, like Christianity, to the situation in which it finds itself. There are no special goals for the future.In the universe, there is no purpose because there is no victory to be won, no end to be attained. For every end, as the word itself shows, is an extreme, an opposite, and exists only in relation to its other end. Because the world is not going anywhere there is no hurry, the purposeless life misses nothing, for it is only when there is no goal and no rush that the human senses are fully open to receive the world.[1] In short, the life of Zen is that of anabhogakaryā. For Suzuki a life of anabhogakaryā is that of non-teleology, non-responsibility, effortlessness, meritlessness, letting the Unconscious live its life. In other words, one awakens the mind abiding nowhere. Teleology is a term belonging to a world of time, relativity, causality, morality, and so on, while Zen lives beyond all these limitations.[2] A man of anabhogakaryā is one who lives the myō in its ethico-aesthetic sense, as well as in its ontological sense. "All the moral values and social practices come out of this life of non-striving, of the efforless, of just-so-ness, of suchness which is emptiness."[3] When all defilements and accretions are wiped away, purged, purified, the original light of creativity will illumine one's whole being and whatever one does will be "good." In this respect, anabhogakaryā is one of the most important ideas of Zen ethics. Further, the aimless life goes beyond consequential action. This is the very life of the universe, which is complete at every moment and does not need to justify itself by aiming at something beyond. Also, non-teleological life does not suggest anything depressing. On the contrary, it suggests the freedom of clouds, and mountain stream, wandering nowhere, of flowers in impenetrable canyons, beautiful for no one to see, and of the ocean surf forever washing the sand to an end.[1] Consequently, the aimless life is effortless. When one's mind functions with Nature, he is also not responsible for whatever deeds he commits, and accordingly no course of karma is attached to them. "You are," says Suzuki, "not living as you ought to be living, you are suffering under the tyranny of circumstances; you are feeling a constraint of some sort, and you lose your independence." He continues to say: "Zen aims at preserving your vitality, your native freedom, and above all the completeness of your being."[2] Suzuki, however, so emphasizes the individual experience of anabhogakaryā that he pushed it to a realm beyond this existential situation. This is why he ignores the concrete social problems. Thus, Suzuki's social ethics is weak. He frankly recognizes this and says that "So Buddhism has a great deal to learn from Christianity... Act is needed, work is needed."

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[1] Watts, The Way of Zen (New York: The New American Library, 1957), pp. 170-171.

[2] Supra, p. 114. [3] Supra, p. 119.

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[1] Supra, p. 115. [2] Supra, p. 117.

[3] Suzuki and Callaway, "Dialogue," p. 121.

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In addition, there are also two different interpretations of the concept of power in Tillich and Suzuki. For Tillich, the concept of power is the ontological, while for Suzuki the idea of power is the relative. For this reason, love and power in Tillich are correlated, and for Suzuki, on the other hand, both love and power seemed to be diametrically opposed. For Tillich, power is the ontological, and in itself is an element in the essential structure of life. Power is used for a fundamental description of being as being. "To be" means therefore "to have the power"which resists non-being. Where there is no power, there is no being.[1] Also, everything which participates in the power of being is mixed with non-being; it is being in process of coming from and going toward non-being. It is always limited by non-being. Further, for Tillich, when being intends to keep itself from the threat of non-being it advances beyond itself.[2] Thus, the power of being is not a static possibility but as the paradoxical tension of being itself makes the foundation of the dynamic life-process and in every moment of life it processes in the relation of every being from the atom to the human person. These processes are going on in every moment of life, in all relations of all beings.[3] From this ontological point of view, the concept of power does not contradict love. That is, for Tillich love and power are ontologically united. "These are," says Tillich,

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[1] *Supra*, pp. 243-244. [2] *Supra*, p. 245. [3] *Supra*, p. 246.

"not two worlds, but one--the one world in whose divine ground, power and love are united."[1] In other words, the ethical concepts of love and power coincide essentially with the structure of being. Both power and love are interpenetrating, and interdependent in being-itself.

In contrast with Tillich, Suzuki asserts that power is the relative. Unlike his idea of love, Suzuki's power excludes first of all the idea of mutual relationship in the jijimuge world on which his thought about love is built. "The notion of power," says Suzuki, "excludes the feelings of personality, mutuality, gratitude, and all kinds of interrelationship. Whatever benefits we may derive from the advancement of the sciences, ever-improving technology, and industrialization in general, we are not allowed to participate in them universally because power is liable to monopolize them instead of distributing them equally among our fellow beings."[2] Unlike Tillich, Suzuki's idea of power is something brought from outside into a structure of inner relationship. Also, power is usually used arbitrarily and relatively and exaggerately. This is why power, for Suzuki, makes the social problems more difficult. "What troubles us these days," says Suzuki, "is no other than a crookedly exaggerated assertion of the power-concept by those who fail to see into its true nature and therefore are not capable of using it for the benefit of all."[3]

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[1] Supra, p. 250. [2] Supra, pp. 159-160. [3] Supra, p. 160.

Thus, for Suzuki power is superficially strong and irresistible. Also, it is in reality self-exhausting. Contrary to love, power is always dualistic, rigid, self-assertive, and exclusive. Power represents destruction, even self-destruction, quite contrary to love's creativeness. Love dies and live again, while power kills and is killed.[1] Consequently, for Suzuki power turns against itself and destroys itself when it has nothing to conquer. Being blind and self-limiting, power itself is unreal, and thus all that comes in contact with it turns into unreality, thus it becomes the symbol of insincerity and falsehood. This is why Suzuki states that power should be enlightened.[2] Thus, for Suzuki love and power seem to be diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive. Where there is power there cannot be any shadow of love, and where love is no power can ever intrude upon it. For Suzuki love belongs to an order higher than power, and it transcends power.[3]

8. "*Jesus as the Christ," on which Tillich's theonomous ethics is based, is power in the fulfillment of time, kairos*," *in which the power of the Kingdom of God in history may be seen. In order to overcome the existential distortion and ambiguities the Kingdom of God is fighting in history everywhere. In Suzuki, Zen is radically non-historical*. There is a clear distinction between Tillich's and Suzuki's attitude toward history. Tillich is different from Suzuki insofar as

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[1] *Supra*, p. 161. [2] *Supra*, p. 162. [3] *Supra*, p. 163.

the claims Tillich makes for "Jesus as the Christ" are related predominantly to the level of the historical, while Suzuki's claim to ultimacy is related to the dimension of the non-historical, in which all dualisms are transcended. This obviously means that for Suzuki the relationship to history is insignificant. But, for Tillich, history is the place where a relationship occurs, and Jesus as the Christ, the New Being, is the center of all history.[1] In Zen Buddhism, while of course everyone lives in history--that is, in time and space--history itself does not reveal anything, although to some people who live in time and space some things are revealed. That is the fundamental difference from Tillich's concept of the revelatory character of the historical process itself, especially in the great kairos appeared in Jesus of Nazareth as the Christ. History, according to Tillich, is running toward the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom of God is the symbol of fulfillment, unification, and the purification of history. Fulfillment transcends history, but it is fulfilled through history. For Tillich the Christian interpretation of history is that the moment in which the meaning of history becomes fully manifest is to be called the center of history, and that this center is the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. The center of history is God's action in Jesus as the Christ. But this action took place at a moment when, through the process of maturity, history was able to receive this event. Tillich calls such a moment kairos, "the fulfillment of time."[1]

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[1] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 364.

Needless to say, the center of history does not mean a midpoint between an indefinite past and indefinite future, nor does it indicate a midpoint in the cultural process. Rather, for Tillich, it expresses a moment for which everything before and after is both preparation and reception. The "central event" of Jesus as the Christ, while occurring only once, is actually repeated over again in his reception as the center of history and life. "Jesus as the Christ" becomes the center of history again and again whenever he is received as such, so kairos occurs again and again. Tillich states that "the 'great kairos,' the appearance of the center of history, is again and again re-experienced through relative 'kairoi,' in which the kingdom of God manifests itself in a particular breakthrough."[2] These later or earlier fulfilled times find their criterion and power in the one great fulfillment of time. For this reason, all kairoi must be tested and judged against the kairos, the appearance of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ. However, for Tillich not every time is a time of fulfillment in which the power of the Kingdom of God in history may be seen. Kairoi are rare and the great kairos is unique, but together they determine the dynamics of history in its self-transcendence.[1] Thus, "Jesus as the Christ" is central not only in terms of all of history, but also in each moment of history, before and after the event of his reception. As such it is both criterion and source of the saving power in history. Thus, Tillich denies any relative evaluation of various revelations in history; every such manifestation is dependent upon and judged against the event of Jesus as the Christ. In this "center" the contradictions of historical existence are overcome, in "beginning and power." In this connection, for Tillich the goal of Christian missions is the mediation of a reality which is the criterion for all human history. This criterion not only stands critically against paganism, Judaism, and humanism wherever it may be, but it also stands critically against Christianity, outside and inside the Christian nations. All mankind stands under the judgment of the New Being in Christ, who is the judgment of existence by essential being, because in him existence and essential being are united.[2] He is the end of existence, insofar as it is expressed in estrangement, conflict, and self-destruction. He is the end of history, that is, the aim or telos of history. For this reason, as the center of history the Christ, according to Tillich, is the uniting point in which all religions can be united after they have been subjected to the criticism of the power of the New Being.

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[1] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 238.

[2] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. III, p. 370.

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[1] Ibid., p. 372. [2] Supra, pp. 11-12.

Further, that all beings are to be judged by Jesus as the Christ means that all beings to be transformed by the New Being. According to Tillich, under the predominance of the symbol of the Kingdom of God, history is not only **the** scene in which the destiny of individuals is decided, but it is a movement in which the new is created and which runs ahead to the absolutely new, symbolized as "the new heaven and the new earth."[1] With respect to the mode of the future, it means that the symbol of the Kingdom of God has a revolutionary character. Christianity, insofar as it works in line with this symbol shows a revolutionary force directed towards a radical transformation of society.[2] This is why Tillich strongly insists that Christian missions are neither the attempt to save individual souls, nor an attempt at cultural cross-fertilization, nor an attempt to unite the world religions. Rather, it is the attempt to transform the latent Church--which is present in the world-religions, in paganism, Judaism, and humanism--into something new: the New Reality in Jesus as the Christ. Transformation is the meaning of missions.[3] The claim of the Church is therefore that Jesus as the Christ is the bringer of the New Reality for mankind all over the world. The New

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[1] Tillich, Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions, p. 72.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Supra, p. 12.

Being is one, as being-itself is one. Thus, all religions, faiths, philosophies, are reformed and fulfilled by the New Being, the New Reality in the Christ. In this respect, in Tillich the Kingdom of God is fighting in history everywhere. It is fighting in the tremendous inner spiritual experiences of the Buddhist as well. However, in Buddhism a criterion is lacking. Tillich would call "Jesus as the Christ" the criterion for the Kingdom of God, and this criterion is the ultimate victory over the demonic powers.[1] This is the main reason why "Jesus as the Christ" is the criterion of all beings. No matter how much research the Buddhists do into the life of Gautama, they will never come up with the same attitude toward history. But it seems to Tillich that there remains one significant thing as yet unanswered. Tillich has indicated that Jesus as the Christ is unique in the sense that he bears this unique revelatory relationship to history.[2]

Unlike Tillich, for Suzuki there is no time, no history whatever. It's the present moment. As to karma, his own existence so-called, objectively or dualistically speaking, did not come about of his own strength. He is not here on his own account. His parents gave birth to this biological presence, and we can go one after another up our ancestral tree all the way to God.[1] Suzuki deliberately ignores the historical approach to Zen. Suzuki interprets Zen as pure mysticism, as a paradox beyond all categories, as a phenomenon outside history and metaphysics, without affiliation to a religious community.[2] For Suzuki Zen is above space-time relations, and naturally even above historical facts. It looks like a colorless white cloud floating in the sky. This is why Suzuki states that "Zen is neither monotheistic nor pantheistic, Zen defies all such designations. Hence there is no object in Zen upon which to fix the thought. Zen is a wafting cloud in the sky. No screw fastens it, no string holds it."[3] Further, for Suzuki Amida, as the personification of Zen, is not a concept personified as usually understood. He is the ground from which all spiritual revelations grow and to which all personalities are related. According to Suzuki, Amida is not conceived as an individual in time and space. Amida as a mere historical figure is not meaningful for human being. Amida has more metaphysical foundation than objective historical fact. "Is Amida," says Suzuki, "a real being?" "My understanding of this part of Shin doctrine is that this sutra, the larger sutra especially, of eternal life, is related in a mythical way. It has almost nothing to do with so-called history."[4]

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[1] Robert Wood, "Tillich Encounters Japan," Japanese Religions, Vol. 2. Nos. 2, 3(May, 1961), p. 66.

[2] D. Mackenzie Brown, Ultimate Concern: Tillich in Dialogue, p. 142.

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[1] Suzuki and Callaway, "Dialogue," p. 142.
[2] Dumoulin, A History of Zen Buddhism, p. 269.
[3] Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, p. 41.
[4] Supra, p. 131.

Suzuki continues to say that "What we call facts are not really facts, are not really so dependable and objective. Real objectivity is in metaphysical subjectivity, you might say, metaphysical truth or poetic legend or religious myth."[1] *Amida* is really ourselves.[2] Here Suzuki, as stated before, pushes Zen to a realm beyond existential situation. By doing this Suzuki ends up having nothing to offer to man in the way of guidance for his terrestrial existence. This is why the Zen Buddhists ask; why should a Buddhist be disturbed to learn that the story of *Amida* and his vows have no historical reality when he believes the same can be said of himself and every other object in his very consciousness?

Also, unlike Tillich, for Suzuki not transformation of reality but salvation from reality is the basic attitude. It can lead to an affirmation of the activities of daily life but under the principle of ultimate detachment. In any case, no belief in the new in history, no impulse for transforming society, can be derived from the principle of *Nirvana*.[3] If Suzuki shows an increased social interest, this remains under the principle of *mahākaruṇā*. No transformation of society as a whole, no aspiration for the radically new in history, can be observed in these movements. Also, contrary to Tillich, in Zennists including Suzuki the realization of the Buddha-nature is not that the fullness of time occurs at a particular time in history but that any moment of history is the fullness of time because for Zennists at every moment time fully manifests itself.[1]

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[1] *Ibid*. [2] *Ibid*.

[3] Tillich, *Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions*, p. 73.

However, here the present writer has a question: If Zen is non-historical, how can it be possible at all for any human being to understand Zen? When Suzuki studies, writes, and lectures on Zen, he also has jumped to the point where space and time have not yet differentiated themselves? Or has even he been studying Zen from a conceptual distance, too? Here I think Suzuki's complete denial of history is obviously unsound from the viewpoint of Zen philosophy. The main trouble with the non-historical interpretations of Zen has been that Suzuki deliberately ignores the historical approach to Zen. As mentioned before, for Suzuki Zen is above space-time relation, and naturally even above historical facts. It looks like a colorless white cloud flowting in the sky, without any relationships to an existing religion. Actually, however, any man who takes such unhistorical and antihistorical position as Suzuki's can never understand the Zen movement or the teaching of the great Zen masters. In reality, Zen is subject to the general laws of mankind, and its history manifests its form. Therefore, H. Dumoulin asks: "Is there a form which is featureless and wordless, where 'gatelessness becomes the gate?'"[1] Zen Buddhism, as Dumoulin points out, is developed in their historical setting, to present the character and activity of its adherents, to describe its history, and to clarify its evolution. Where man exists, there is history, there is becoming and change, form and figure.[2] The Zen movement is an integral part of the history of Buddhism, and the history of Buddhism is an integral part of the general history of the Eastern thought. Zen can be properly understood only in its historical setting just as any other philosophical school.[3] **That is,** an essential trait of Zen in its historical form is its total embeddedness in Buddhist religion. Zen sprouts **from** the Buddhist mother soil, and remains piously rooted in it. Here the roots of Zen are to be found in the soil of the great Mahayana sutras. All Zennists are indebted for their best qualities to the Buddhist religion.

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[1] Abe, "Dōgen on Buddha Nature," The Eastern Buddhist, New Series, Vol. IV, No. 1(May, 1971), p. 68.

9. Finally, for Tillich, "Jesus as the Christ" is the final revelation, and the focus of all philosophies and religions. Here Tillich's claim of "Jesus as the Christ" turns upon its uniqueness. The Buddha-nature on which Suzuki's ethics is built, however, is not unique. All beings are the Buddha-nature. This means that Zen is the ultimate fact of all philosophies and religions. Here Suzuki's claim of the Buddha-nature is universality. Tillich claims to be based on

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[1] Dumoulin, A History of Zen Buddhism, p. 270.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Hu Shih, "Ch'an Buddhism in China: Its History and Method," Philosophy East and West, Vol. 3 (1954), p. 3.

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the revelation in Jesus as the Christ as the final revelation. This claim established a Christian church. The word "final" in the phrase "final revelation," however, means more than "last." Tillich affirms that there is a continuous revelation in the history of the church. For this reason, the final revelation is not the last. It means the decisive, fulfilling, unsurpassable revelation, that which is the criterion of all the others.[1] This is the Christian claim, and is the foundation of a Christian theology. Hence, the question arises: "How such a claim can be justified, whether there are criteria within the revelation in Jesus as the Christ which make it final? This is the question of the finality of the revelation in Jesus as the Christ. Tillich's answer is that a revelation is final if it has the power of negating without losing itself.[2] This criterion is necessary, because it is based on the fact that every revelation is conditioned by the medium in and through which it appears. That is, the question of the final revelation is the question of a medium of revelation which overcomes its own finite conditions by sacrificing them, and itself with them. In other words, he who is the bearer of the final revelation must surrender his finitude.[3] In this respect, what Christian missions have to offer is not Christianity, but the message of Jesus as the Christ, of the New Being. Because Christianity, like every historical religion, is a synthesis of many elements from Judaism, the mystery religions, and Hellenistic ideas. However, Christianity, without being final itself, witnesses to the final revelation. Christianity as Christianity is neither final nor universal. But that to which it witnesses is final and universal. For Tillich, a Christianity which does not assert that Jesus of Nazareth is sacrificed to Jesus as the Christ is just one more religion among many others. It has no justifiable claim to finality.[1]

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[1] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 132-133.

[2] Ibid., p. 133.

[3] Ibid.

By sacrificing his finitude, Jesus affirms that he is the bearer of final revelation, that is, "the Son of God," and he becomes completely transparent to the mystery he reveals. Thus, for Tillich, if a particular revelation is said to be final, decisive, completely transparent to the mystery it reveals, it must overcome and sacrifice its finite medium. However, for Tillich, in order to be able to surrender himself completely, he must possess himself completely. And only he can possess--and therefore surrender--himself completely who is united with the ground of his being and meaning without separation and disruption.[2] "Jesus as the Christ" fulfills this requirement, possesses these qualities, and therefore he can be called the medium of final revelation. He sacrifices his finitude that which was Jesus in him--not only his life but also his finite power and knowledge and perfection. Also, the final revelation is universally valid, because it includes the criterion of every revelation and is the _finis_ or _telos_(intrinsic aim of all of them).[1] For Tillich the final revelation is the criterion of every revelation which precedes or follows. For this reason, the final revelation is the criterion of every religion and of every culture, not only of the culture and religion in and through which it has appeared. It is valid for the social existence of every human group and for the personal existence of every human individual. It is valid for mankind as such. This is why in Christianity all things are brought to a focus in Jesus as the Christ. He is the focal point of the universe, of all history, and of all being; all beings, as they are brought into their true relation to him, are also brought into their true relation to one another and so into an all-embracing whole.

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[1] Ibid., p. 135. [2] Ibid., p. 133.

In contrast with Tillich's idea of the uniqueness of "Jesus as the Christ," Suzuki's Buddha-nature is universal. That is, in Zen philosophy "all beings are the Buddha-nature." This means that Zen is the spirit of all philosophies and religions. Undoubtedly the main ideas of Zen are derived from Buddhism. However, Zen itself is the fundamental fact not only of Buddhism, but also of all religions. Zen is the ultimate ground of all things and the foundations of all philosophies and religions. Because for Suzuki all the scriptures are merely tentative and provisory, and the central fact of life as it is lived is what Zen aims to grasp, and this in the most direct and most vital manner. Zen professes itself to be the spirit of Buddhism, but in fact it is the spirit of all religions and philosophies.[1] Suzuki continues to say that when Zen is thoroughly understood, absolute peace of mind is attained, and a man lives as he ought to live. What more may we hope?[2] Also, every religious faith must spring from Zen if it has to prove at all efficiently and livingly workable in our active life. This is why Zen is not necessarily the foundation of Buddhist thought and life alone; it is also very much alive in Christianity, in Mohammedanism, in Taoism, and even in positivistic Confucianism.[3] What makes all these religions vital and inspiring, keeping their usefulness and efficiency, according to Suzuki, is due to the presence in them of what may be designated as the Zen element. Zen is what makes the religious feeling run through its legitimate channel and what gives life to the intellect. In this sense, Zen is the essence of Christianity, of Buddhism, of culture, of all that is good in the daily life of ordinary people. Zen is not a doctrine, nor a set of ideas nor a position. It is not subsumable under any sort of "ism." Zen transcends all particular "isms" and is never committed to any definite system of philosophy.[4] It cannot be classified as either theism, atheism, or agnosticism. It is affiliated with no particular school of philosophy; it is no closer to idealism

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[1] _Ibid_., p. 137.

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[1] Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, p. 44.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Chuck, "Paul Tillich and Zen Buddhism," p. 332.

[4] Ibid.

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than to materialism. Also, for Suzuki Zen has no view about the nature of reality; it formulates no system of ethics, propounds no political ideology.[1] For this reason, in relation to the living truth of his own being, man's problem is not how to understand Zen, how to fix it as an intellectual possession, but rather how to be one with it, how to live out of it. In this respect, for Suzuki Zen has only one thing to say finally, and that is "be true to one's own self." In short, "be true," that is, "be the living truth itself." "Be real, be reality itself." Or in the shortest possible terms, Zen would only say, "Be."[2]

In this respect, Zen has nothing to do with any sectarian spirit. Christians as well as Buddhists can practise Zen just as big fish and small fish are both living in the same ocean. For Suzuki, Zen is the ocean, Zen is the air, Zen is the mountain, Zen is thunder and lightning, the spring flower, summer heat, and winter snow; nay, more than that, Zen is the man.[3] With the formalities, conventionalisms, superadditions that Zen has accumulated in its long history, its central fact is very much alive. The special merit of Zen lies in this: that we are still able to see into this ultimate fact without being biased by anything. Thus, for Suzuki the basic idea of Zen is to come in touch with the inner workings

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[1] Suzuki, Selected Writings, p. xxiii.

[2] Supra, p. 67.

[3] Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, p. 45.

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of our being, and to do this in the most direct way possible, without resorting to anything external or superadded. In this respect, anything that has the semblance of an external authority is rejected by Zen. Absolute faith, according to Suzuki, is placed in man's own inner being. For whatever authority there is in Zen, all comes from within, that is, everything that is comes from Zen. This is true in the strict sense of the word. Zen is the spirit of a man. Thus, the great truth of Zen is possessed by everybody. Zen does not consist of a certain angle of vision, but comprises all possible angles.[1] Look into your own being and seek it not through others. Your own mind is above all forms; it is free and quiet and sufficient; it eternally stamps itself in all beings including man. In its light all is absorbed.[2]

Thus, there is a serious difference between the content and the focus of the claims of Tillich for Jesus as the Christ and the claims of Suzuki's Zen to universality, even though there are similarities between them from the viewpoint of their pointing to something beyond particular religions and "isms." Needless to say, the present writer agrees with Tillich's idea of uniqueness of Jesus Christ. From my Christian viewpoint, Suzuki's concept of Busshō should be fulfilled by the New Reality in the Christ. Because Jesus Christ, as indicated, has the power of negating without losing himself

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[1] Benoit, The Supreme Doctrine, p. xv.

[2] Suzuki, An Introduction to Zen Buddhism, p. 46.

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and is the ultimate power of victory over the demonic powers. This is why he is the criterion of all cultures, philosophies, and religions, and also the answer to the question: How uniqueness of Jesus as the Christ can be justified? Jesus Christ who was revealed "once for all" is also extremely existential and is at the same time the ultimate meaning of all existence.[1] In Suzuki's *Busshō* what is extremely important, however, is *Dharma*, but not the historical person called Gautama. At this point, in Suzuki's *Busshō* a criterion is lacking. *Busshō* is neither final, nor unique, nor existential revelation, though it is universal. No matter how much research Suzuki does into *Busshō*, he will never come up with the same attitude toward the New Being in the Christ.

Further, Suzuki's *Busshō* is autonomous, humanistic, and philosophical. Even though *Busshō* gives an intellectual satisfaction, or aesthetic enjoyment to man, it is not *agape*, but *eros*. *Eros* should be fulfilled by *agape*. Philosophy should be fulfilled by theology. Autonomy should be transformed by theonomy. However, *agape*, as stated, does not deny longing toward the good and the true and its divine source of *eros*, but *agape* prevents *eros* from becoming an aesthetic enjoyment without seriousness. *Agape* makes the cultural *eros* responsible and the mystical *eros* personal.[2] In this respect, the uniqueness of Jesus Christ does not negate but fulfill *Busshō*. That is, the New Reality in the Christ transforms and fulfills the truth which is fragmentarily expressed in Busshō. History is running toward the Kingdom of God which is the symbol of fulfilment of history. Consequently, all philosophies, cultures, and all religions including Christianity stand under the judgment of the Ultimate Power of the New Being in the Christ. What Christian missions have to offer, therefore, is not Christianity but the message about Jesus Christ as the center of history, the final revelation. As previously discussed, every historical religion including Christianity is a synthesis of different elements from different cultures. In this respect, there is same elements of continuity between Christianity and Zen Buddhism, though it is also true that there can be no conversion from religion to the other unless there is some element of discontinuity between them.[1] For this reason, there is also mission to the Christians by Zen Buddhists to whom Christian missions are addressed.

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[1] *Supra*, p. 15.

[2] *Supra*, p. 240.

In this connection, the nucleus of a religious existence is the existential commitment to the ultimately meaningful reality. Out of this ultimately meaningful reality religious energy flows. Consequently, it must be respected in all religions. But at the present existential situation our understanding of the ultimately meaningful reality, as Doi points out, is subjectively conditional. True religion, however, has in itself no room for self-absolutization.[2]

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[1] Supra, p. 13.

[2] Supra, pp. 15-16.

The relationship between Christianity and Buddhism, between East and West, is profoundly dialectical. All religions should converse with each other more openly without excluding the possibility of conversions. Faith as an existential commitment to what is ultimately meaningful involves in itself the sense of mission to communicate the ultimate truth to the other. However, no substantial cooperation, as discussed before, can take place in some neutral zone where the participants are obliged to set aside their own convictions.[1]

Before concluding, the present writer must discuss Tillich's ethics more critically, in addition to his previous criticism of Tillich's idea of the Fall. Tillich's ethics, as stated, is entirely treated by his ontological analysis of the structure of being. It is not an ethics of good and evil, but an ethics of ontological participation in the New Being. However, the term "being" Tillich uses a concept, but it is a symbol. Hence, the serious question arises: how can the symbolical term "being" connect with the personal God in the Old and the New Testaments? Is the Biblical God, who is appeared throughout the history of Israel especially in the Old Testament, merely symbolic? Though Tillich describes his so-called "personal God" in his Systematic Theology, Vol. I, it is entirely based on the structure of being.[2]

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[1] Supra, p. 16.

[2] pp. 244-245. Tillich's "personal God," as previously discussed, does not mean that God is a person, but that God is the ground and abyss of everything personal. That is, God carries within Himself the ontological power of personality. At this point, Tillich's "personal God" is ontological. "Personal God" is a symbol which indicates that our personal center is grasped by the manifestation of the ground and abyss of being.

Also, Tillich's ethics lies more in the structure of being than in the historical event in the both Testaments. Particularly, his idea of the Fall stands for it, and it has been also critically discussed. His idea of the Fall therefore should be discussed and criticized here from another viewpoints. For Tillich, the Fall, the transition from essence to existence as a universal event, always concludes that evil is involved in finitude. The beginning of the Fall and the fulfilment of creation are ontologically the same. That is to say, creation has as its end, in the case of man, the actualization of his finite freedom, but this very actualization is also the beginning of the Fall, since it separates man from the creative ground of the divine life through a break between existence and essence.[1] The critical problem, however, comes to exist. If the creature, as R. H. Daubney points out, is separated from the creative ground, it must mean that its existence is annihilated and it is difficult to see how Tillich reconciles this with the sustaining and directing creativity of God.[2] That is, Tillich ignores the question of analogy. Further, the equation of finitude and sinfulness renders finitude inherently evil, and sin ontologically necessary. For in the structure of being evil is inevitable. Evil thus appears necessarily, not by accident or regrettable mistake but by the very structure of being. It is structurally an inevitable. Also, evil is inherent in human freedom, and destiny keeps the freedom in bondage. It is thus an "ontological fate," to use Reinhold Niebuhr's terms. For this reason, man is unavoidably involved in the Fall. However, can we agree with this "ontological fate" or ontological necessity of sin? Is this the Biblical understanding of sin? Is this the only way to explain the Christian doctrine of sin? Tillich's own rationalization of evil may be unsatisfactory. There remains to determine whether Tillich has done complete justice to good and evil considered as constant components of human activity. In fact, this is the major problem of history. Tillich also describes an ontological destiny without God's purpose and grace in Jesus Christ. That is, if man's true situation is seen in Jesus Christ, how can we agree with Tillich that man's turning away from this true situation is an act of freedom? Alexander J. McKelway is therefore right when he states that

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[1] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 255-256.

[2] R. H. Daubney, "Structural Concepts and Pattern of Liturgy," The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 227.

> Man is not free to turn away from God, nor is the universe free to fall from the unity of essence to the estrangement of existence. The so-called reality of sin can only be considered the most unreal and impossible of situations, which cannot stand and which itself is destined to fall. Thus there is no coincidental equality between created goodness and actual evil, for this evil is only a burden of falsehood and untruth, of self-deception and prideful imagining that man has laid upon himself, but which God has determined from the beginning to take away and has taken away in Jesus Christ. [1]

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[1] Alexander J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 186.

Hence, Tillich's idea of the Fall has no foundation in God's revelation in Jesus Christ. Perhaps the most serious theological objection against Tillich's ethics is directed to his treatment of the Fall.

From another viewpoint, man as imago dei is not simply involved in the ontological necessity of sin but has capacity to transcend it and to ask questions about the character of reality in its totality. For human being, one of the greatest things is that he has the possibility, not the necessity. Further, man is held responsible for his sin instead of this fateful necessity. By shifting his idea of sin from a "historical" to an "ontological" one, Tillich falls in the fatefulness of sin rather than in man's responsibility. Needless to say, Tillich states its historical aspect of evil when he suggests that sin is fundamentally "unbelief" which includes theoretical denial and practical disobedience.[1] For Tillich, the ontological, however, outweighs the historical. Because Tillich insists that Adam's innocence is a state of non-actualized potentiality, that is, before creation and actualization in place or time. Adam's innocence, however, is significant only in the historical realm. What could "infancy" mean without historical connotations? Indeed, the both Testaments, as mentioned, are not concerned with the necessity and the problem of natural evil, but with the drama of human history.

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[1] Tillich, Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 54.

It goes without saying that Tillich's ethics is based on the Spiritual Presence which creates theonomous ethics and thereby fulfills the quest of man for unambiguous life. Tillich has rightly seen that ethics has to do with Spirit and not law. Because the Spiritual Presence raises man in ecstatic moments to transcend life above the ambiguities which come from human life, a mixture of essence and existence. However, the problem arises: who is this Spirit? Whose "Spiritual Presence"? Whose spirit does Tillich mean when he uses the terms like "the Divine Spirit," or "the Spirit of the New Being"? Is this Spirit Jesus Christ's or man's? Because Tillich does not think that this Spirit is related to the Christ who appeared historically in the factual life of Jesus of Nazareth. For this reason, if the Spirit points man to a moral imperative which is only an expression of man's own essential nature, then is there not the greatest danger that this Spirit will become confused with the spirit of man? [1]

Thus, in dealing with his theonomous ethics Tillich lets exigencies of his philosophical system determines in advance that God's revelation can and cannot be. That is, the Biblical ethics and faith are reduced to Tillich's own philosophical dimension. The Biblical God and ethics are, however, not merely the product of philosophical speculation. Consequently, Tillich's philosophical ethics does not justice to Christian ethics, though it makes clear what is the basic structure of Christian ethics, including its function. For Tillich, ethics, as stated, because of the changing nature of its contents, must be the task of philosophy and not theology. Further, revelatory authority should not be claimed for ethical analysis. Thus, philosophical ethics alone is free to decide the changing forms and bases of the moral imperative. But the problem arises: what is the basis of Christian ethics? What else can the good be except the will of God? Is the grace of God in Jesus Christ not the basis for Christian ethics? The main reason why Tillich avoids theological ethics is that it derives its norm from "out there" and God is thought of as an outside power, establishing a law for our behavior. That is, a command of God is forced upon man simply because he is the stronger. Man must obey his command, regardless of whether it relates to the concrete situation of human being, or not. However, his command does not come because he is the stronger but because he made himself the weaker.[1] God's command is one of love and grace. It establishes man's personality and freedom rather than harms the essence of the moral imperative.

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[1] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 260.

For Tillich, the New Being is the basis of ethics. But it is not related to the historical Jesus of Nazareth. Tillich also refuses the doctrine of incarnation "God has become man." For Tillich, God does not change into something that is not

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[1] McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 218.

God. Incarnation carries polytheistic connotations of divine beings besides God.[1] Hence, Tillich understands, however, incarnation reversely. That is, to him Christ, as R. Allen Killen argues, is a man who becomes divine, while the Biblical Christ is a divine person who becomes man by taking upon himself a complete human nature.[2] In other words, Tillich minimizes the historical elements of Jesus of Nazareth. Tillich's trans-historical symbolism of Jesus as the Christ, however, cannot do justice to the Biblical message as a historical event. This is why Tillich's Christology is for some theologians, Roman Catholic or Protestant, a great stumbling-block. Gustave Weigel, for example, describes that "for us the Christ is a concrete historical person, one and undivided, and the one Jesus was that one Christ. They cannot be separated. What for Tillich is a patent impossibility is the basic Christian fact according to Catholic belief."[3] Kenneth Hamilton also discusses and criticizes that Tillich never bridges the gap between the universal significance of the New Being and the factual life of Jesus of Nazareth.[4] Indeed, Tillich neglects the historicity of the factual life of Jesus as God's revelation.

It goes without saying that Tillich intends to reconstruct

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[1] Armbruster, The Vision of Paul Tillich, p. 180.

[2] R. Allen Killen, The Ontological Theology of Paul Tillich(J. H. Kok N. V. Kampen, 1956), p. 240.

[3] Gustave Weigel, "Recent Protestant Theology," Theological Studies(Baltimore, 1953), p. 576.

[4] K. Hamilton's critical discussion on Tillich's gap between Jesus of Nazareth and the New Being is mainly treated in his The System and The Gospel(New York: Macmillan Co., 1963), pp. 158-173.

Christian ethics ontologically and subjectively against ascetic, legalistic, graceless ethics. Objectivity, however, has not lost its appeal for the human mind, that is, the historical Jesus of Nazareth is also the foundation for our Christian ethics and faith. Tillich of course states that his theonomous ethics is beyond both subjectivity and objectivity and points to a third position. However, he goes astray, after winding detours, into subjectivity, instead of rising above both subjectivity and objectivity. We must avoid heteronomy without falling into autonomy, and fulfill both subjectivity and objectivity by uniting them in Jesus Christ on whom our Christian ethics is based.

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